

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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NO. 1.—JANUARY, 1902.

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## I. THE FRAUDS OF SPIRITUALISM.

BY REV. S. L. KREBS, A.M.

I want to make a report, through the REVIEW, of things seen and heard during the past three years at seances with spiritualistic mediums of national and international fame. I wish especially to set forth as clearly and plainly as I can the methods I found so fertile for the detection and demonstration of gross and deliberate though exceedingly shrewd and successful fraud, practiced upon "all classes and conditions of men" and women during the past decade and more.

### I. THE BANGS SISTERS.

#### A. OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE.

The motive that animated me to enter this field of investigation can very readily be described in a few sentences. That the dead survive death's shock in possession of memory and consciousness, and that direct intelligent communication with them is possible and frequently takes place under certain required conditions, is the core of the claim of modern spiritualism. If this tremendous assertion is experimentally true, it would settle, and from the *scientific* standpoint, beyond question, cavil and peradventure, the greatest, deepest and most absorbing problem of all times and climes. So radical and

important is this claim that, as Prof. William James says in his classical "Principles of Psychology" (Vol. I, p. 306): "I am persuaded that a serious study of these phenomena is one of the greatest needs of psychology." He was alluding to psychic phenomena.

Having had some experience of psychic phenomena in circles of intimate friends and fully sympathizing with the thought that inspired Prof. James to write as he did, it was with great expectations and in high enthusiasm that I embraced an opportunity, during a recent visit to Chicago, to have a sitting with the Bangs Sisters, the most famous mediums there, and indeed reputed by avowed and experienced spiritualists everywhere to stand at the top of the ladder both for the value of their phenomena and for their honesty and sincerity of motive. I had read much of their wonderful mediumistic performances and had heard intelligent people declare their sincere conviction that the results produced at the Bangs' seances were genuine supernaturalia. Hundreds, for example, showed me "spirit letters," "spirit messages" on slates, color messages, etc., received through their mediumship. Though there are frauds in the ranks of spiritualistic mediums, nevertheless the Bangs Sisters are genuine, honest, reliable—such is their reputation among spiritualists themselves.

The popularity of the Bangs Sisters is great, indeed. Their patrons and friends are innumerable, such as Hon. A. B. Richmond, Meadville, Pa.; G. F. Dougherty, M.D.; A. J. Buck, St. Louis; Rev. Q. O. M. Hewitt, Mrs. Mary Lease, the eloquent lawyer and lecturer; Frank L. Stobbs, Esq., Chicago; Dr. J. M. Peebles, the famous traveller and author; Henry Q. Graham, Chicago; Lyman C. Howe, the eloquent lecturer and writer; S. W. Gould, S. J. Gibson, "Quæstor Vitæ," all of whom have appeared in print, in *Progressive Thinker*, *The Sunflower*, *Banner of Light*, *Light*, and elsewhere, as the eloquent eulogists and defenders of the sisters. Moreover scores and hundreds have spent large sums of money at their seances, like Mrs. Ellen Vorhees, of Chicago, whose

total spent there mounted up to \$500. (See *Light*, May 20, 1899.)

This high reputation holds patrons and attracts investigators, and so busy are the sisters kept, that it was only through the courtesy of Mr. J. F. Francis, the aggressive editor of *The Progressive Thinker*, one of the leading spiritualistic organs, that I secured a half forenoon for my visit. Mr. Francis reiterated to me personally the high esteem in which he, with the general body of spiritualists, held the Bangs Sisters, and gave me a long list of all the "reliable" mediums of Chicago, at the top of which, in the very front rank, stood the name and address of the Bangs Sisters. Furnished with a complimentary letter of introduction from Mr. Francis, I appeared a few days subsequently at their handsome residence at the appointed hour, and for one hour and a half enjoyed the long-coveted opportunity of witnessing for myself some of the phenomena I had heard and read so much about.

The Bangs Sisters represent and produce nearly all phases of mediumship, "slate writing," "spirit letter writing," "portrait painting," "materializations," "trumpet seances," etc., etc. I selected spirit-letter writing, and here is

#### WHAT APPARENTLY HAPPENS,

according to the many accounts I had read and likewise heard from the lips of awe-struck witnesses.

In the privacy of your own home, on a blank sheet of ordinary letter paper, you write down three or four questions to as many deceased friends, or to one or two, just as you desire, addressing them by name and signing your own name to the questions. Enclosing this in an envelope with three or four blank sheets for the "spirit" messages or replies, you seal your envelope, and, if you wish, place some secret mark on it, to render identification easier and surer, and at the same time to guard against fraud by the simple trick of substitution. Seated at an ordinary square table, which you are free to

examine thoroughly, in the presence and indeed at the request of the medium, you place your letter between two slates, which the medium then binds about longitudinally and transversely with heavy, broad and powerful rubber bands, or strong twine.

These slates never leave your sight; indeed, you may keep your fingers resting upon them during the entire time of the seance, so that touch re-enforces sight in proving that *the slates never leave the top of the table* where you place them. You and she, seated on opposite sides of the table, hold the slates between you, above the table, of course, in full sight, until the "current," as she calls it, sets in, which you feel as a slight vibration or tremor in the slates and in your arms. The slates are again placed on the table. You are then requested by the medium to write another short message, such as "Please communicate," to any dead friend, on a small piece of paper, sign your name to it and fold it up when written. She turns her back while you write this note, to prove, as she informs you, that there is no such thing on her part as reading what you write. This note, when folded up, the medium requests you to hand her. She immediately places it on top of the two bound slates, and lays another slate over it. You both sit quietly for awhile in silence, or else in easy conversation on any subject that happens to suggest itself. After a few minutes the medium picks up one of several letter tablets lying about on the table, and announces that she sees, "clairvoyantly," in letters of fire, in the air, over your head, the name of some one. She "gets" the initials first, and finally the full name, and sure enough, *it is the very name you had just written a moment or two before on the small note.* You feel astonished, and will you or nill you, awe-struck. These emotions are accentuated when, in 15 or 20 minutes, she gives the name of another "spirit," which turns out to be one of those to whom you had addressed questions *in the sealed envelope, now a prisoner between the two bound slates.* She goes on (and so does your astonishment too!) to give the substance and even the very language of the question you had



put to the spirit, and these surprising proceedings continue until all the "spirits" are named, and all the questions in the sealed letter stated correctly by the medium sitting before you and the slates still on the table where you had placed them.

After sitting a few minutes more, in silence, holding slates between you, three raps on them or about the table somewhere constitute the signal that the "spirits" or "guide" have finished their mystic labor; whereupon the medium hands you the pile of slates, which, please remember has never, all this time, left your hand or eye. You remove the upper slate, expecting to see your note under it, but, lo! it has vanished completely! With concealed excitement you unbind the remaining two slates, pick up your envelope which you find all right within them, carefully examine it—size, color, shade, spots, specks, secret mark and all, thus thoroughly identifying it as the very one you had brought with you, and no mistake about that—open it, AND FIND THE NOTE, JUST AS YOU HAD FOLDED IT, HIDDEN AWAY BETWEEN THE SHEETS OF LETTER PAPER, and to crown all, THESE SHEETS FILLED WITH WRITING IN INK! This of itself is a sufficient miracle, and you at first do not care much for the sense or thought of the writing. You are simply overwhelmed with the fact, patent, plain and puissant, that CHIROGRAPHY, ENOUGH TO FILL SIX OR EIGHT PAGES OF LETTER PAPER, HAS BEEN EXECUTED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE BETWEEN FAST-BOUND SLATES UNDER YOUR VERY EYES AND HANDS, and that a piece of paper placed above has, somehow, in some way, by some means, passed through a solid slate (as the medium indeed assures you it has) and has appeared intact IN A TIGHTLY SEALED ENVELOPE BOUND BETWEEN TWO SLATES. Finally you examine the sense of the communications and find it intelligent and apropos to the matters inquired about, and many people assert that frequently information is given, such as names of friends and incidents of the past, which is entirely unknown to the medium, as far as they know at least, and which could not, therefore, have been furnished in the "spirit-writing" by *her*.

I am here describing my first experiences, for I had two seances with the Bangs Sisters at an interval of one year. That reader who has never experienced a seance such as this can scarcely form an adequate conception of the feelings of awe and wonder that steal across the core of consciousness. The remarkable results, the silent surroundings, the comments of the medium, the entire ensemble impresses one at once and almost to the point of conviction, and I could easily mention the names of many highly educated and cultured people that have felt dazed and nonplussed despite themselves and notwithstanding the fortifications of their own doubts and previous sneers at the whole subject. During the decade or more that the Bangs Sisters have been holding seances, hundreds have gone there convinced that the whole thing was a trick and a humbug, and determined to discover the secret, but have come away sadder if not wiser people, either fully convinced the other way, or as Dr. Flower, confessing his utter inability to explain it, understand it or remotely guess as to the nature of the powers at play therein, whether celestial, human or diabolical. But in Dr. Flower's case, while he is not prepared to deny, he is also not ready by any means to admit the sweeping claims made by the sisters and by spiritualists generally, namely that "spirits" of the dead, by "spirit" power, invisibly, silently, imperceptibility to all incarnate senses, enter the slates or affect them telepathically or otherwise from a distance, and cause the note under the top slate to "dematerialize," pass through the lower slate and envelope and then "rematerialize" inside that sealed envelope, and cause writing in ink to appear and remain permanently on the letter sheets, and secure detailed information from three or four spirits addressed and singled out of the millions and billions that have entered spirit life during all past ages. Dr. Flower's intuitive skepticism on such sweeping claims as these, all of which the medium makes, is sound and fortunate indeed, for now let us turn from what apparently happens and see

WHAT REALLY HAPPENS.

Whilst I went, on the occasion alluded to in Chicago, with great expectations, and indeed (to be strictly honest both with myself and my reader), in hopes, in fond hopes, that the claim of spiritualism would be found to be true (for I would rejoice unspeakably with the rest of humanity if immortality could in these materialistic days of ours be scientifically, clearly and sensibly demonstrated, inasmuch as there is no proposition of so stupendous import to the human race as the survival of consciousness and the possibility of its bridging the gulf) nevertheless, I also provided as far as possible against fraud, for all of us have an innate horror of being duped, even if harmlessly so, but especially and particularly when we pay hard cash for the duping into the bargain, though most of us seem able to work up a very respectable laugh when our neighbors are the victims of the selfsame duping!

Thinking, therefore, that the table might be used (as in a former case which I shall narrate later on), simply as a screen for operations of a fraudulent nature, I armed myself with a small, rectangular looking-glass, three by four inches in size, and secreted it under the front part of my vest, so as to have it convenient for unobserved production if needed when seated at the table. I came within an inch, literally, of precipitating a catastrophe and spoiling the whole experiment and losing my opportunity, for the glass almost slipped out for me several times while walking about the room prior to the seance! When seated, the doubling of the body kept it snugly in place.

At request of Miss Bangs I examined the table thoroughly and the cloth upon it. Both are sound. There are no mechanical tricks or devices about them. I suggested sitting *without* the cloth, for it fell down five or more inches all around the table and I feared it would obstruct my view in the glass of the space beneath. To this proposition Miss B. positively demurred, and it was this demurrer that aroused my suspicions on this occasion and determined me to be as all-

eyed as possible, and yet I tried to be as easy and unsuspecting as I could, so as not to arouse her suspicions of me, or of my intentions.

When we were both seated at the table I got my sealed and marked envelope out of my coat pocket and handed it to her, at her request. She felt it and said it was a fat letter, and asked how many sheets I had in it. I told her six or eight. She said four was the usual number, but she would try for results with the letter as it was. In my sight she then placed it between the two slates and bound them, as before described.

While she was doing this, with my eyes riveted upon her every movement, I slipped the mirror out from under my vest, and adjusted it in my lap, holding it between my legs at such an angle (moving it from time to time as needed with my right hand), that *I could clearly see everything under the table, and beyond it to the door between the two rooms, and the medium's lap*; for, fortunately, the table cover instead of completely hiding her lap, came down to within an inch or two of it *along the line of vision from the glass*, while my side of the cover I held up with my left thumb, allowing the fingers of my left hand to lie at ease, in a natural position of rest, on the top at the edge of the table, in sight of the medium. I did this to remove any suspicions she might form that anything crooked was going on at *my* side of the table. And in order to deepen this impression and her sense of security I at times placed the right hand also on the table, held the slates with it, touched them, etc.

And thus we sat, she watching me, and I watching her, and yet both hoping and believing that the other was innocent and unsuspecting!

When the two bound slates were on the table (with my sealed envelope between them), she picked them up and asked me to hold them with her. So we held them between us about a foot above the table. I soon felt a slight but distinct vibration or tremor. This is easily explained. It is the result of muscular tension exerted by the medium, and is a very com-

mon phenomenon that any one can produce. It is the simple law that muscular tension applied to an object free to move will communicate its own tremor to that object. No one can tightly tense the muscles of his arm without producing this tremulousness. Knowing full well, therefore, the cause of this vibration which I felt in the slates, I thought I would ask the medium and see what she might have to say. She said it was "magnetism," "spirit power," "the current," for which she was waiting, and constituted a sign, said she, that the "spirits" were present and that we would have good results (!). This remark prepared me for more fraud. And I got it, by the wholesale. But I never expected, even then, to make the full and complete discovery of the entire *modus operandi* of the complicated trick, as I actually did. Let us proceed to get the rest of it.

After this she picked up one of the several large letter tablets lying over on her side of the table, and *moving it over so as to cover about one-half of the bound slates* (note this), and gazing mysteriously into the air, said she saw a letter, S; soon another letter, L, appeared to her, and then a third, K; whereupon she asked me whether they were the initials of any person I knew (!). "Yes," I replied, "they are. They are my own initials." "Ah! is that so?" she exclaimed. "But you knew my name," I ventured to assert, "from the letter of introduction of Mr. Francis." "No. I did not read it, as it was addressed to my sister," was her answer. Now mark: this whole manœuvre of the clairvoyant initials was simply a ruse to *divert my attention* from the movement of the letter tablet over the end of the slates, which to all appearances seemed a perfectly natural movement on her part as she leaned forward over the table and looked up into the air for the initials. What *the purpose* was of the tablet in this position over her end of the slates we will discover to our immense surprise in a moment.

To resume. After the initial incident, she removed the tablet, picked up the slates, and we held them between us "to develop power."

After this, she requested me to prepare a note on a small piece of paper, which she handed me (size of half an envelope), and address it to some one in spirit-life. She said she would turn her back while I was writing it, so as to preclude any possibility of her seeing what I should write, or the name. When she had turned her back, and while I was engaged in writing the note (which I addressed to "Mary Smith," asking her to "please communicate," suddenly a happy thought struck me. I quickly reached over, carefully picked up the two bound slates and rapidly and silently turning the ends *lying towards her* up before my eyes, almost caused those organs to leap out of their sockets with astonishment when they saw a SMALL WEDGE STICKING BETWEEN THE SLATES, THUS PRIZING THEM OPEN WIDE ENOUGH TO ALLOW NOT TOO FAT a letter TO SLIDE OUT THROUGH THE SPACE THUS MADE BETWEEN THEM!\*

Upon this discovery my excitement was great. It was a critical moment. She might turn at any second. And knowing *this* much, I longed to discover the *entire* secret. So quickly and noiselessly I replaced the slates, finished my note, told her I was through, folded the note three or four times at her request, and handed it to her.

Let us look back now a moment, and see how this discovery explains the purpose of the ruse of the clairvoyant initials, S. L. K. It was to get the tablet over the slates while the attention of the sitter is diverted to thought on the initials and their meaning and UNDER COVER OF THE TABLET PUSH THE WEDGE INTO PLACE. It is an easy matter to slip the wedge between the slates, for it is made of such dimensions, about thickness of a lead-pencil and about 2½ or three inches long, that when

\* In examining the slates with her permission before the seance began, I had noticed the curious fact that the wooden frames were whittled or *planed down* on the sides which she was careful to turn INWARDS, the frame being thus made flush with the slate proper. We now see the purpose of this, namely to avoid catching the letter on the corner of the wooden frame, and thus to *smooth the way for it to slide out the more readily and surely.*

lying on the table its point is just high enough to strike the crack or line of junction between the bound slates, and the latter, being bound with rubber bands, easily give place to it, and even if tied with twine can readily be prized apart, inasmuch as the knots would give a little and the fibers and twists in the twine would too, for the force of the wedge is very great, according to well-known mechanical principles. Moreover, the edges of the two slates at the line of junction *were not flush*, because the frames of the slates were *rounded* on the outside. Hence, when placed together, a *reëtrant* angle was formed, so that the wedge as it was pushed along UNDER THE LETTER TABLET on the table could readily find hold or point of application, *i. e.*, strike the crack before-mentioned, and thus readily prize apart the slates.

To proceed. Remember I had just finished my "Mary Smith" note and folded and handed it to her. She took it and after putting a small blot of ink on it, which she said the "spirits" would use in producing the writing, with her right hand dropped or threw it, with assumed carelessness but really with considerable dexterity, upon the center of the upper of the two bound slates APPARENTLY (that is, a careless or excited observer would have thought it had dropped into the CENTER of the slate, but it actually fell ON THE WOODEN FRAME of the slate with about one half inch of the note PROJECTING BEYOND THE FRAME), and INSTANTLY, yea, almost in one and the same moment or act, she covered slates and note with a third slate, that she had picked up with her left hand, and which was LARGER THAN THE LOWER TWO SLATES, projecting about one inch all around, THUS EFFECTUALLY HIDING the PROJECTING HALF INCH OF THE NOTE.

But at this point I, eagerly wishing to see the whole process repeated, in order to be doubly sure of my details, and wishing to get another chance to see the wedge and whether the letter was at this stage still between the slates or not, told her that I had written the note in such a hurry that I was afraid neither the "spirits" nor I could read it. She said I certainly ought



to write plainly, and "moreover," she added, "I do not think you held the note long enough to magnetize it." Thereupon she lifted the top slate off, brushing the note off with it, which fell on the table beside the two bound slates, handed me another small piece of paper, and turned her back. Steadily and rapidly I raised and turned the slates, as before described, and this time not only saw but felt the wedge, estimated its size and shape, and gazed into the space between the slates. THE LETTER WAS NOT THERE. All this took but a second or two. I calmly replaced the slates, wrote the note to "Mary Smith," folded it, and more carefully, though with assumed indifference watched her as she took it, placed ink blot on it as before, and then dropped it on FRAME of upper slate in such wise as to have half an inch of it projected outwardly, and simultaneously cover it with the large slate. But before proceeding, let us see HOW THE LETTER WAS REMOVED. Namely, as follows: At the end of the paragraph about the clairvoyant initials S. L. K., I said, "She then picked up the slates." Remember, at that point they already had the wedge between them, which she had just pushed into place. She moved the slates carelessly and naturally (talking all the while) towards HER end or edge of the table, and there *tilted them up a moment* (a brief moment, so brief it would not have attracted the attention much less aroused the suspicion of the average careless or "believing" sitter, especially when that sitter's attention was diverted to what she was saying in her voluble talk) SO THAT THE LETTER COULD NOT HELP BUT SLIDE DOWN INTO HER LAP, all unobserved. And there is where the letter is lying at the stage of the proceedings to which we have now arrived. I know it was there, first from the negative evidence that it was *not* between the two slates, and secondly from the extremely positive evidence that I SAW IT WITH MY OWN EYES IN MY LITTLE LOOKING GLASS UNDER THE TABLE.

We now proceed. First, recognize the situation: The sealed letter is in her lap and the note to "Mary Smith" projecting under the large upper or third slate. Recourse is again had

*to the tablets.* Pretending to see some more initials in the air and to write them down on the tablet, she straightened up in her chair, and thus carelessly moved the tablet over the pile of the three slates, and with the finger of her right hand UNDER THE TABLET, she slips the projecting note out and HOLDING IT UP AGAINST THE UNDER SIDE OF THE TABLET removes it to her lap as easily as you please, while she asks me to think who the new initials stand for. And whilst I am trying to think (for they stand for nobody, being any letters that first enter her head), she deliberately unfolds the note in her lap, looks down and reads it. Then, apparently to secure a more restful position in her chair (but afterwards seen to be a CRITICAL MOVEMENT IN THE CHAIN OF PROCESSES), she turns half around to the right *towards the door* which in our preliminary conversation she had told me connected with the house of her sister, half rises, SPREADS OUT HER SKIRTS, and resumes her seat, *facing the door.*

At this point an unexpected digression occurred, which came very near spoiling the whole affair. You see I was so eager to observe her every movement at this stage of the game, so anxious to discover the remaining secret, namely HOW THE WRITING WAS DONE INSIDE A SEALED ENVELOPE, which would round out the whole trick and my discovery as well, that I must have gazed too persistently and intently down into my lap-glass, for she suddenly exclaimed, looking directly and searchingly at me, "Have you a looking glass in your lap?" A Fourth of July dynamite cracker exploding under my chair would not have astounded me more. But I had presence of mind enough to reply. "Why, what makes you think so? Because I look down? The fact is I have studied hypnotism some and having heard that mediums sometimes hypnotize their visitors, and desiring on this most interesting occasion to keep a clear head, and make a fair and impartial investigation, I did not wish to expose myself to the power of your eyes, whether you can hypnotize or not." Whether this idea satisfied her reason or tickled her vanity, I do not know, but it had the much-desired

effect of removing her dangerous suspicions and allowing the proceedings to proceed, without her getting up, as I momentarily expected her to do, to come around the table and catch me with the tell-tale glass. The suppressed excitement of the moment was something unusual, as of all things I wished to avoid a scene, and yet was eaten up with an equally intense desire to continue the experiment (which had so obligingly turned into an expose), unto the climax and unto the end. My longings were destined to be gratified in a manner that left nothing more to be desired.

We now pick up the thread of the narrative where the medium, with the sealed letter in her lap, and the "Mary Smith" note too, which she had just secured in the manner above described, had turned toward her sister's door. THAT SISTER, OR SOME OTHER ACCOMPLICE, WAS JUST ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT DOOR, WAITING TO DO HER PART. The sealed letter and the note must be gotten over to her, the letter opened, the questions answered as her ingenuity might suggest and as she was aided by overhearing any answers that the sitter might make to the questions of the medium, or as the "underground system" (see future article) enabled her, the letter must then be resealed and gotten back again to the medium, and into the slates. How was all this to be done? Well, I tried to keep my eyes both above and below the table, and ON THE MEDIUM'S EYES TOO AS OFTEN AS SHE LOOKED AT ME AFTER WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. I longed for another eye, or one in the back of my head, as Dr. Wilson said our evolutionary ancestors, the apes, had long milleniums ago. What I succeeded in seeing with only two eyes was this. Miss Bangs picked up a tablet (as usual, a new act begins with a tablet) and saw the name "Mary" in letters of fire in the air. "Do you know a Mary in spirit life?" was asked. "Yes." "Does her last name begin with the letter S?" "It does." "Let me see, I'll try to get the whole last name. Is it Smuggle? No.—Shrive?—no—Simmer?—no—oh! yes, I see it now. It is Smith. Do you know anyone in spirit-life by the name of Mary Smith?" This,

remember, is the name I had written *on the note*. Another sitter would have been surprised at her knowledge of it, as I was the *first* time I had a seance with Miss Bangs; but as I was now familiar with the peregrinations of that note, I wasn't surprised a bit, *mirabile dictu!* though pretended to be, in order to allay her suspicions. And now, notice, it was the moment while laboring under the crest of this wave of mimic surprise, which she, however, judged to be genuine and is genuine in other cases, that she chose to deliberately *stoop down, place the sealed letter on something dark colored* and about half a foot wide or less on the floor, which was in a moment or two DRAWN BACKWARD AND DISAPPEARED WITH THE LETTER AND NOTE ON IT UNDER THE CLOSED DOOR.

My Miss Bangs then, *i. e.*, the visible Miss Bangs, *i. e.*, the Miss Bangs on the hitherward side of the door, immediately began to see more clairvoyant (!) letters and messages, such as that I wanted "Mary" "to communicate," etc. Wonderful how she got this knowledge! (*Sic!*) She then asked me a lot of questions about "Mary," whether she was my sister, aunt, cousin, how long dead, married or single, etc., etc. This consumed eight or ten minutes of time. In the midst of it I heard a slight sliding sound and instantly looked into my glass as Miss Bangs, as though to change her position in her chair, stooped forward toward the door. I SAW HER PICK UP A SMALL PIECE OF PAPER from that before-mentioned dark-colored slide on the floor at the door, PLACE IT IN HER LAP AND READ IT. Whereupon she immediately began to see more clairvoyant names in the air, a number of them in fact, and, in short, mentioned ALL THE NAMES I HAD WRITTEN IN MY SEALED LETTER, giving them EXACTLY, name for name, letter for letter, as well as the substance of the questions I had asked of each one. She asked me a good many questions about "Jack (see the letters in subsequent article), and about "Mary S." and "Yonkers," and do you know why? Simply because the questions I had written to these "spirits" were *difficult to answer*, and she wanted to elicit as much information as possible from me re-

garding them in the hope that I would let fall some remark or hint that would enable her sister, who was listening at the door, to frame a passably suitable reply for the letters, all of which, of course, *she wrote in the other room* on the blank sheets provided for the "spirit" replies.

All this manœuvring consumed considerable time, time enough to do twice as much writing as was actually done.

At last I saw, through the glass (glorious little policeman!), the letter thrust through beneath the door on the dark slide, and safely lodged in Miss Bangs' lap. Now, *how is she going to GET IT BACK BETWEEN THE SLATES?* The thoughtful reader may easily judge in advance, namely, by manipulating the tablets. Even so. She coolly placed one tablet against her end of the lowest slate, which tablet was just as thick as the slate so as to bring its surface *even* with the crack or opening between the two bound and wedged slates. Under another tablet she held the letter fast by a finger or two and after placing this second tablet over the other one and *partly too over the pile of slates*, easily, with a quick fillip of the finger reënforced by a lead-pencil which *she deliberately used to push the letter in*, SLID THE LETTER BACK INTO PLACE BETWEEN THE SLATES, withdrew the wedge between her fingers under the tablet, removed the tablets, and all was done, in far less time too than it takes to tell it.

(Remark. This manœuvring with the tablets does not arouse suspicion in the unprepared or unsuspecting beholder, for it did not arouse it in the hundreds and thousands that have sat with her during the past 10 or 15 years, simply because they firmly *believe* it is but the preparation to receive other clairvoyant messages, or are *overawed* by the entire ensemble and their wishes, prejudices, hopes and expectations, and so lose keenness of observation.)

After the wedge is withdrawn, we held the slates between us as we did at the outstart, and in a moment or two three faint raps are heard—easily made by the finger nails on the hard slate or knuckles, and in other ways—which she an-

nounces as the "spirit" signal that the messages are written and all is over, "the spirits have done their work." I took off the upper slate. The note was, of course, gone. I untied the other two slates, and found the letter there with the note inside of it and messages in reply to the questions I had asked. (See second article.)

Does any one wonder how Miss Bangs No. 2 opened the sealed letter without tearing the paper or otherwise marking or disfiguring the envelope? This is a very simple matter, as I have since ascertained by repeated experiment. Just wet the sealed envelope along the lap or line of mucilage, let it stand three or four minutes, when it will open almost of itself. Take off the water with a blotter, or iron over the blotter with a hot iron, which dries the lap sufficiently to permit resealing. The fold will bring it down with accuracy upon the place it occupied before, and thus any crosses or other marks put on it will fall exactly into their places. Or the letter can be opened by steaming the lap.

In conclusion, this is the whole of the trick, this the secret of the fraud. It consists of various stages of development, carefully thought out, naturally connected, cleverly executed. *The tablets form one of the most essential features, the wedge another, the crack under the door a third, and all else is grouped around these.*

On this particular occasion, after the whole was over, I arose and thanked Miss Bangs for the most interesting exhibition she had given me, whereupon she kindly offered still more, namely, to take me into her sister's house and show me the "spirit portraits" there. This was precisely the one thing I still desired, the only thing remaining to complete the discovery thus far made, for I wanted to get near the door, which was on *her* side of the table, in order to see HOW THE LETTER AND NOTES WERE PASSED THROUGH IT. At her offer, therefore, I instantly stepped over near the door, engaging her in conversation about some trivial matter on the wall in order to prevent her opening it at once, and there I saw that the *door*

*was uneven*, fitting close to the carpet at the hinge side, but being FULLY A HALF INCH OR MORE AWAY FROM THE FLOOR AT THE KNOB SIDE, just in front of which Miss B. sat during the entire seance, thus making a crack wide enough to pass even larger packets to and fro than a letter and a note. This opening is hidden from the eyes of the sitter at the table by an innocent-looking waste paper basket placed at the corner of the table.

As Miss B. opened the door, I caught a glimpse of her sister, a woman older and larger than herself, who at that particular moment, with a look of surprise and annoyance on her face, was flying out of the opposite door into the hallway, where she disappeared up the stairs.

These are the facts of that Chicago seance. Comment is unnecessary. "*Facts speak louder than words.*" In the name of truth, let them speak.



## II.

### THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN AS THE KINGDOM OF REDEMPTION.\*

BY JOHN G. NOSS.

"Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand," was the remarkable message which not only constituted the chief burden of the ministry of John, the Baptist, but with which also Jesus Himself, and the Twelve by His direction, commenced to preach "the Gospel of the Kingdom." The full import of such an announcement, so emphasized, almost thrilling as it must have been to those to whom it was first made, was not understood by them. It may not even yet be fully comprehended. However it was clearly intended to make known the fact that the powers of the heavenly world were present in a form and for a purpose in and for which they had hitherto not been at hand, either in the history of the Jews or in that of the world at large. And this message, whatever impression it may have conveyed to most of those who first heard it, has meant for the Christian Church, from the beginning, the announcement of the presence of the Kingdom of Heaven as the Kingdom of Redemption.

The idea of Redemption can only be conceived in connection with the necessity for it; and that necessity can only lie in the fall of man as represented in revelation. If the modern theory of man's status at the time of his creation were correct, there would be occasion for his instruction and illumination, but not for his redemption. The inspired record tells us that

\* The writer of this article knows very well that the term, Redemption, ἀπολύτρωσις, is not the strongest in the New Testament by which the new creation in Christ Jesus is expressed, but it will answer the purpose in view, which is the emphasizing of the fact that the kingdom established by our Lord is different in its nature from that of the Kingdom of God in any other form.

man was created good—good as man, of course, and not as an angel above him nor as an animal beneath him. As thus created he was limited in knowledge, in power and in every way as over against God. And the consciousness of this limitation on his part furnished Satan the opportunity for his temptation. Satan's method of making man like God in knowledge, however, involved the subversion of his will, a violation of God's law and therefore sin and conscious guilt. There is a vast difference between the consciousness of ignorance, which man had from the beginning, and that of sin. The consciousness of his ignorance led man, before the fall, to commune with God for more light and afterwards still to seek for knowledge; but the consciousness of sin impelled him to hide himself from God and to seek for redemption. The very cry of humanity, not merely for more knowledge, but for better being, confirms the truth of the inspired record of the fall of man and his need of redemption.

And it is redemption, not instruction merely, that constitutes the contents of the Gospel from the beginning. The promise that the seed of the woman should bruise the head of the serpent constituted the first ray of hope for fallen humanity, and the negative factor in redemption—the destruction of the destroyer, the victory of man over his great and powerful enemy. The promise to Abraham, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," is the positive factor in redemption—the blessing coming to humanity in an individual as the antithesis of the curse coming in and through Adam. The old view is undoubtedly the correct one which makes God's covenant with Abraham the covenant of redemption. Paul leaves us no room for doubt here. But the emphasis on the *promise* of redemption is not to be overlooked. The covenant of redemption was made sure by the oath of God, but it was made to Abraham by promise. Only in Christ, the promised Seed, was it to be actualized; and when that promised Seed came those who "looked for redemption in Israel" rejoiced that God "remembered His holy covenant." And when John,

the Baptist, and Jesus and His disciples, declared that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand, it was this fulfillment of the promise to Abraham that was proclaimed. The Kingdom of Redemption was at hand because the promised Seed stood in their midst. The Redeemer in His own Person brings into the world the Kingdom of Redemption. That the Son of Mary is this promised Redeemer was made known to Joseph and is the key-note of the inspired *Magnificat*, the *Benedictus* and the *Nunc Dimittis*.

The coming of the Kingdom of Redemption brought a crisis to those who hitherto were in the Kingdom of God as the Kingdom of Law, which intervened between the promise and its fulfillment. The Law was intended not only to make the people under it conscious of their actual transgressions, but, what is more, to make them conscious also of the sinful condition of the adamic nature. True repentance before God is grounded not merely upon the consciousness of sins but of the "body of sin," which lies at the basis of sins. This is the "body of death" from which deliverance can be had only through Jesus Christ as Redeemer. Forgiveness of sins, whether on the basis of the Law or that of the christian life, is one thing, redemption from sin is altogether another. The Jew through the priesthood offered sacrifices for the remission of his transgressions under the Law and prayed for the coming of the promised Redeemer; the redeemed christian believes in the forgiveness of sins and prays daily to the Father for the forgiveness of his debts, but he does not pray for Redemption. It was not enough, therefore, that those to whom the message of the presence of the Kingdom of Heaven first came were the children of Abraham, nor that they had Moses and the prophets. The burning question was whether they were prepared to believe in Him who was at hand as the Redeemer of Israel. The crisis of salvation or condemnation rested and still rests upon the decision of this question by him to whom the message comes. The purpose of John's ministry was twofold in its character, preaching re-

pentance and baptizing for the remission of sins under the Law and preparing a people for the Lord by awakening in them the consciousness of the need of that which the Law could not give them. To the poor in spirit belongs the Kingdom of Heaven. This twofold mission is also strikingly expressed by him in his two sayings: "The axe is laid unto the root of the trees" and, "Behold, the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." John himself lived and died under the Law, one of the greatest born of women, indeed, but less than the least in the Kingdom of Heaven as the Kingdom of Redemption.

If the Kingdom of Heaven, thus declared to be at hand, were simply the bringing in of a new ethical principle, perfectly actualized in the life of Christ and set forth as a rule of life for His disciples, then all His acts must of necessity be illustrative of this principle. And if human nature is divine and the Son of Man, born of a woman, came only to make manifest this fact in His ideal life, then He is the Teacher only and not the Redeemer, and Christianity an ethical school and not the Kingdom of Redemption. But if He is the eternal and only begotten Son of God and brings into manifestation in His own person the Kingdom of Redemption, then this fact must be shown, not merely by a sinless life, but in the redemption of the adamic nature He assumed. As He was made under the Law He must not only fulfill that Law, but must take away the curse of the broken Law resting upon it; and until the death, resurrection and glorification of the Son of Man were accomplished Redemption could not be actualized for man. The miracles of Christ, therefore, before such Redemption, could only bear witness of Him as the Redeemer of man, but all of them together could not be the miracle of Redemption itself. He healed the sick, but the healed would be sick again; raised the dead to life, but the living would die again, and cast out demons, but the cleansed might be possessed again. Even the sins which He forgave (and He did not take away *sin* during His ministry on earth) could only

be forgiveness on the basis of the Law while He Himself was yet under the Law. His miracles differed from the miracles of the Old Testament only subjectively. The source of them was not from God through Him as the medium, but in Him as one with the Father. Perhaps there is no greater evidence of the Divinity of Jesus of Nazareth than the fact that His disciples were empowered to work similar miracles in *His Name*. If God was back of the miracles which Moses wrought in the Name of the Lord God of Israel, who was back of those which the disciples wrought in the Name and by the authority of Jesus of Nazareth?

These miracles of Jesus, though wrought only upon the bodies of men, partook of a redemptive character and were a foretaste of His work of Redemption in its highest form—the deliverance of the whole man from sin and the power of the Devil, and his living union with Himself after His glorification. For this union of man with Christ did not come into effect by the fact of His incarnation, His teaching, nor even by His death, resurrection and ascension, but by the coming of the Holy Ghost into His disciples on the day of Pentecost. All that went before in the life and work of Jesus was outside of them, the meaning of which they could not comprehend. But after they were made one with the life of the glorified Christ by being begotten of God (over against their creation) and born of the Spirit (over against their birth of the flesh) they were the children of the Kingdom of Redemption.

The miracle of Pentecost is the counterpart of the miracle of Christ's conception by the Holy Ghost. If the eternal Son of God did not become the Son of Man in the one case then these sons of men did not become the sons of God in the other. As they were united with the sinful and the dead Adam only through their birth of the living Adam (human nature), so also were they united with the incarnate, suffering, crucified and risen Christ only through their birth of the ever-living, glorified God-man. As Adam's fall and its consequences could not harm man except as he is in organic union with him,

so Christ's work of redemption could not benefit him except as he is brought into like union with Him. The Heidelberg Catechism (see question 20) needs no revision on this point. The sum of Paul's teaching in this matter is: We are crucified and risen with Christ because we live in Him, and not, We live in Him because we are crucified and risen with Him. The expressions, "Christ and Him crucified" and "Jesus and the resurrection," emphasized as they are in the New Testament, are to be regarded as chief factors of the Gospel to those who believe rather than to those who do not believe, and the emphasis in both expressions is on the Person of Jesus, the Christ of God.

But it may be objected that Jesus taught His disciples while He was still with them in the flesh, and especially in the sermon on the Mount, that His Father was already their Father and that He declared their living union with Him, even before His crucifixion, by the words: "I am the vine, ye are the branches"; and that therefore those addressed were either the children of His Father by their birth of human nature, or that they became such by their discipleship of Jesus. There are not a few, indeed, who, being in need of facts to prove a theory, hold that the sermon on the Mount, whosoever the first auditors may have been, is addressed to all human beings as such. Not only is the historic setting, however, against this view, but it would be a strange contradiction that He who claims to be the Saviour and Light of the world should teach that all men are their own salt and light. And the supposition that the disciples became the children of God and one with Christ, either on the basis of their birth of flesh and blood, or that of their discipleship, makes unessential not only the chief facts in Redemption, but Redemption itself.

But we are by no means confined to such alternative. If Christianity is a new creation having for its essential element the theanthropic life of the glorified Christ, then all that Jesus taught His disciples, as the first members to be of this new creation, must be based upon the fact of this relation. When

could He have so taught them their prerogatives and duties as children of the Kingdom of Redemption except while He was still with them in the flesh? Does not the form of the powers and duties defined in a charter precede the existence of the corporation? Does not the form of the organic law, with all its provisions for the functions of government, precede the organized nation itself? Do not the teachers of pastoral theology in our seminaries teach the candidates for the ministry under their instruction what to do and what not to do as pastors before they are pastors? Yea, did not our Saviour institute the forms for the administration of the two Sacraments of the Church before the conditions were present for their administration? Only as the disciples received the promised Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, to abide with them and in them forever, could the sayings of Christ, which were words of spirit and life, be brought to their remembrance by making them words of spirit and life also for them. And only as they thus had received the Spirit of adoption from the Father could they do the will of the Father as the teaching Christ commanded them; and only as others were made disciples and were baptized with water and the Spirit were they also to be taught to observe the same commandments.

For the Twelve at least the miracle of Pentecost was their ordination as well as their newbirth. From this time on the Kingdom of Redemption was to be effective in and through them. The miracles that Christ wrought upon the bodies of men they wrought also, and greater works than these, according to His promise, they were now in a position to do; and yet not they, as they were also careful to state, but Christ in them, for without Him they could do nothing. All power was given unto Him, in Heaven and in earth, for this work, and these powers were to be as effective in the new creation as the powers of the Kingdom of God were and are in the old. For it is to be borne in mind that this Kingdom of Redemption is a real kingdom and not a mere utopian dream. The ever-present power of God's Kingdom in nature and in civil governments is not ques-



tioned. Neither should we doubt His ever-present and effective powers in the Kingdom of Redemption. The nature of any kingdom determines its powers and these powers are effective wherever its organs are. No thoughtful reader of the Acts of the Apostles can fail to see that, without exception, this is true in the sphere of Redemption. The Redeemer as the Head of this Kingdom does not contradict Himself by ignoring the organs of His own Kingdom. Even the cases of Cornelius and Saul are no exceptions. In order that the blessings of the Kingdom might be made effective for them and in them, Peter is sent to one and Ananias to the other.

The foremost work of this Kingdom, as thus established, is the preaching of the Gospel, according to the commission of Christ, to all the world and the baptizing of those who believe in Him. The relation of the Word, Faith and Baptism to each other is very close in the Kingdom. The Word of the Gospel is, of course, the glorified Christ who is to be preached to all men as the only Redeemer. By such preaching the sinner and the Redeemer are brought into contact. The consciousness of sin, or the need of Redemption, is the first requisite, and faith in Christ as the Redeemer is the second, and Baptism the third, in order to Redemption. But faith in Christ in order to Redemption is one thing and faith in Him because of Redemption is another. The one opens the way to the life of the Kingdom, the other is one of the fruits of the life in the Kingdom. It is in the latter sense that faith is the gift of God and one of the fruits of the Spirit in the redeemed christian. By Baptism the believer has sealed to him the blessings promised in the covenanted Seed of Abraham, which consist, fundamentally, in the remission of sin and the gift of eternal life. For by whatever name Baptism is designated in the New Testament it always means one or both of these things. The present low view of this Sacrament is entirely without justification in Holy Scripture. The formula for Baptism: "In the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," declares, *ipsissima verba*, the meaning and nature of

this Sacrament. If a government of the world authorizes its representative to do a certain thing in its name, the only rational assumption is that the will and power of such government are made effective in the official transaction, and in that way only. If one man authorizes another, by the use of his name, to draw money out of a bank, the transaction would be meaningless if the money had already been given, or were to be given, in some other way, and fraudulent if there were no funds to draw upon. And if in the sacrament of Baptism God does not become the Father, the Son, the Redeemer, and the Holy Ghost the Sanctifier and Comforter, to the sinful child of Adam, then its authorized administration is without meaning and the Kingdom of Redemption is weaker in its constitution and administration than the weakest government of the world. The faith of the Roman centurion still puts to shame that of many of the children of the Kingdom.

Nor should the charge of holding the *opus operatum* theory deter us from this view of the Sacrament. So long as we believe Baptism to be "the operation of God," there need be no fear that the Redeemer will find fault with our too great faith in this respect. Rather is it for the little faith that He has now, as in His days on earth, manifest occasion to rebuke His followers. In the domain of faith it is always done to us according to our faith; and only those come to grief who, like the sons of Sceva, standing outside of this domain, nevertheless attempt to make use of its powers, or expect to receive its benefits.

But if the consciousness of sin, faith and Baptism are essential to the washing of regeneration, what—and it is a legitimate question in this connection—is the status of little children as to the Kingdom of Redemption? Infants are unconscious of sin and cannot believe; nor does God ask them to be or to do what is impossible. It is not to be forgotten, however, that this dispensation, like the preceding one, has to do with a covenanted people and a holy nation, and therefore with the relation of the children of such covenanted people to God

and not with that of children in general. Confusion follows upon the attempt to make the law of the covenant hold outside of its realm. In the covenant God made with Abraham He gave him the promise not only to be his God, but the God also of his seed throughout their generations. This promise determines, for all time, the status in the covenant, not only of the children of believing parents, but of all those who, according to the terms of the covenant, constitute their household. As soon as the covenant was made with Abraham the males of his household were circumcised, as was Isaac also afterwards when he was eight days old. The question was not whether any or all of these could believe, nor yet whether the faith of Abraham could be a substitute for any inability to believe on their part, but whether Abraham himself had faith in God's covenant promise by giving them the "token" of it in the sacrament of circumcision. Without it the covenant was broken and the child cut off from all its blessings.

While in the christian dispensation the lineage of the Spirit takes the place of that of the flesh, and therefore the Sacrament of Baptism that of circumcision, the covenant promise itself is not thereby made void, whether the believer be a Jew or a Gentile, but is sure to all the seed of Abraham. And "they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham." This truth is affirmed by Peter on the day of Pentecost, when he tells those Jews who were ready to believe in Jesus as the Christ, that the promise is to them and their children. It is inconceivable, indeed, that a Jewish convert to Christianity could doubt for a moment this status of his children in the covenant of Redemption. And the facts in the case of Cornelius, the first Gentile member of the Church, by the exceptional impartation of the Holy Ghost before the administration of Baptism, were intended, no doubt, to determine for all time the status both of the believing Gentile and that of his household in the kingdom and covenant of Redemption. The Redeemer Himself foreshadowed this truth by healing the possessed daughter of the Canaanitish woman and the

servant of the Roman centurion on the faith, respectively, of the mother and the master. And when we call to mind that of the comparatively few persons mentioned by name as having been baptized during the ministry of the Apostles, at least four of them included their households; and that of the three persons baptized by Paul himself in the Church in Corinth one was Stephanas together with his household, the deduction is conclusive that in the Apostolic Church the children and slaves of believers were baptized according to the requirement of the covenant. And there is just as much ground to believe that of the tens of thousands who were baptized during this period, the proportion of households to the whole number of those baptized was greater as there is that it was less than that given in the record.

As is well known, the custom, in some quarters of the post-apostolic church, of deferring the Baptism of infants and adults was due to the supposed impossibility of the forgiveness of sins—especially of certain sins—committed after Baptism and not from any lack of faith in the efficacy of the Sacrament itself.

The Kingdom of Redemption, as thus constituted of the whole number of those who were baptized into Christ, while in the world was in its deepest sense not of the world. Its nature, powers and aim are separate and distinct from those of God's Kingdom in every other form. Its life is not the life of humanity, but is the eternal life which, first manifested in the God-man, is imparted to the children of the Kingdom by the washing of regeneration, for "this is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life." Its powers are not those which are manifest in the natural order, creating, upholding and governing the things which are seen and temporal, but they are redemptive, regenerative and spiritual—powers "exceedingly great toward them that believe," and "effectually working in them" until they all come to perfection and are thus made meet to be the Bride of the Lamb in the eternal world.

It also has its hidden wisdom, or mysteries, which can be made known only to those who are one with its life; as is the case also in the natural order; for only man who has the highest form of life in the visible creation can know the mysteries of that creation. But "the natural man cannot discern the things of the Spirit, for they are spiritually discerned." And the love of God as manifested in the children of this Kingdom is greater than that which is manifested outside of this family. The same God who is Lawgiver and Judge to the race of Adam, created by Him, is the Father of those who are born of Him and are brethren of the Elder Brother. God is indeed love, but love is not God, and therefore John can write to his brethren in the Kingdom of Redemption, as distinguished from mankind in general, "Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the children of God."

The growth of this kingdom is also entirely dependent upon the powers and forces from within as flowing from the Father and the Son through the Spirit. No power from without can effectively help its development. The organized governments of the world, though their authority be of God, cannot suppress it by persecution, nor invigorate it by their favors. For the governments of this world can only be governments of Law, not of Redemption. And no government of Law can be based or conducted on the principle of the Kingdom of Redemption. Neither can the Kingdom of Redemption be based or conducted on the principle of Law. Every attempt, therefore, of the Church to govern the State or of the State to govern the Church, or to unite them both in one government must of necessity be a failure. And all this does not involve the destruction of the idea of the unity of the Kingdom of God; for any true conception of that unity only demands that no part of it shall be essentially antagonistic to any other part, but it does not demand that all the parts shall manifest the same forms of His life, wisdom, power and love. Christ was manifested to destroy the work of the Devil, but not the work of

God. Neither Christ nor His Kingdom is antagonistic to man as man, nor to the kingdoms of the world, for both are of God. Only the perverted powers of both are hostile to Christ and Christianity.

And this Kingdom of Redemption, glorious as it is in its constitution, is neither to supplant nor glorify the institutions of the world in this age. The world is indeed the field, but not the basis, of its activity, nor can it be transformed into the Church. The Church can only glorify the individual as he is chosen out of the world by being brought into union with its life. It is never less nor more than the Body of Christ, outside of whose members there can be no such process of glorification. And this process of glorification is to go on from the day of Pentecost to the second advent of Christ, and is to issue at that time in the consummation of redemption and bliss in those who have part in the first and glorious resurrection. All this, and much more, is delineated by our Lord in His incomparable parables of the Kingdom of Heaven. Whilst this consummation is the limit of the work of Redemption and glorification in the Church, and is the next great crisis for both the Church and the world, we cannot conceive that the work of Redemption itself shall then cease; for we are assured that the glorified Church is only the first-fruits of the spiritual harvest. This pentecostal season of rejoicing is to be followed by that of the full and final ingathering. The very term, Redemption, indicates a process which can only issue at last in a state in which Redemption is either impossible or no longer needed; for every knee and tongue in the universe of God shall sooner or later pay homage to the Redeemer-King.

And when all things have been made subject to the Son then shall He deliver up the Kingdom—no longer the Kingdom of Redemption—to the Father, that God may be all in all. And this Kingdom of the Father is the Kingdom of the Lord's prayer. The prayer is addressed to the Father. It is His name of Father that is to be hallowed by and in His children, and it is His Kingdom and not the Kingdom of Redemption,

for the coming of which His children are taught to pray, as the great consummation of the mystery of the ages. We can, indeed, pray for more laborers in the Kingdom of Redemption and for the prosperity of this spiritual Zion in every department of its activity, but to pray for the coming of the Kingdom of God as the Kingdom of Redemption implies either great ignorance, or great want of faith. We might as well pray, as citizens, for the coming of the government of the United States.

In the early part of His ministry the Redeemer was asked by two blind men to have mercy upon them. He withdrew from them into a house, whither they followed Him. Then He asked them, "Believe ye that I am able to do this? They said unto Him, Yea, Lord. Then touched He their eyes, saying, according to your faith be it done unto you." All men born of flesh are "under sin," and are therefore blind to the things of the Spirit, whose office it is to convict men of sin as well as to impart to them the quickening powers of the Kingdom of Redemption. For many centuries these convicted ones have called upon the Redeemer in His Kingdom for mercy and for the blessings of the Light of eternal life. And the Church has always been truest to her Head and truest to herself when she could evoke this cry from the hearts of men and then challenge them by the question, "Believe ye that I am able to do this in His Name?"

Alas, if she should now teach that there is no sin—only sins—in the natural man and that therefore he is not born spiritually blind, and that he only needs to have his sight directed to the light already within him, and he shall be every whit whole! In that case, whatever mission she may be conceived to have in the world, hitherto supposed to be "lying in sin," she can have none as the Kingdom of Redemption. And is it at all strange that men should withdraw and withhold faith from her when she has no longer faith in herself as a real kingdom—the only Kingdom of Hope for the world?

NEW HOLLAND, PA., November, 1901.



### III.

## THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING REWARD.

BY REV. H. M. J. KLEIN.

That Jesus made use of the idea of reward in His teaching is evident to any one who reads His sayings in the Gospels. The question is, in what sense did He use the idea. Did He look upon the blessings of the religion He came to proclaim as in any shape or form a recompense for service previously rendered on the part of His disciples? Did He concur with the Jewish thought of His day in making the benefits God had to bestow, man's chief motive to righteousness? Or did He use the reward-idea in a sense peculiar to Himself? What was the highest good that He offered to men? How did His promises and the expectations of His disciples agree? Are His teachings on this whole subject of Reward compatible with the highest ethical instincts of humanity?

There are reasons for these questions. On the one hand, we are constantly told by certain disciples of so-called Pure Ethics that Jesus made use of inferior motives by appealing to rewards as an incentive to righteousness. We are informed by Modern Altruists that even the expectation of an eternal reward from God is ignoble. Asceticism tells us that the moral ideal and all thought of happiness must be forever kept separate. Scientific morality never tires of its sarcasm for what it sees fit to call "Christian other-world selfishness." On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the Christian Church has sometimes laid herself open to attack by the way in which she has presented the Christian doctrine of reward. The Roman Church in her *Consilia Evangelica* has taught the contract-idea of merit attaching to good works. In her doctrine of the higher morality she virtually puts God under obligations

to return blessings, like wages, proportionate to the works of supererogation. Thus the individual acquires merit which the Church can transfer—hence indulgences. *Quid pro quo.* The Protestant Church in spite of the fact that she owes her very existence to a protest against the wage-idea has at times consciously or unconsciously proclaimed this same forensic doctrine of merit in subtler fashion but with no less harm. It has often been taught that the blessings which come to the disciples are theirs because they have been earned. The righteousness of Christ is looked upon as a merit by which God is under obligation to give us blessings, even though that righteousness has not in a living way become in us through Him *our* righteousness. The Romanist virtually says: "We earn a reward by our works." The Protestant often says: "Christ earned for us a reward by His works." In both cases the thing in common is the contract-idea that God has given so much or will give so much to men *because* they or some one for them has given so much to Him. *Quid pro quo.*

What is the teaching of Jesus on this whole subject? We believe His position to be: (1) That all the blessings of God to man are gifts, not earnings. (2) That the *modus recipiendi* by which those gifts become ours is righteousness as seated in the heart. (3) That the content of the reward or gift is the Kingdom in its twofold sense of God-like character and blessed fellowship with God and the god-like here and hereafter. In other words we will look at this subject from the standpoint of the Giver, the Recipient and their Relation, or; from Jesus' conception of God, of Righteousness and of the Kingdom.

I. If we see clearly how Jesus' conception of God, the Giver, differed from that of His contemporaries, we will see by a swift and easy logic how His idea of God's gifts and blessings differed from theirs in its very basis. The origin of religious rewards can be viewed from two standpoints according as the giver bears to the recipient a judicial or a paternal relation. To Judaism in the days of Jesus the relation of Jehovah to His people was looked upon mainly as being a legal or judicial

relation. Religion seemed to have assumed the aspect of a contract. Man was one party to the agreement, God the other. Man was servant, God was Master; Man was subject; God was King. Service on the part of the One meant a claim to counter-service on the part of the Other. The covenant-idea was carried to a literal absurdity. Originally the idea of the covenant had been ethical. With what sublime moral earnestness the prophets had insisted on inner righteousness! But the post-exilic Jews in their unbounded zeal to preserve intact every jot and tittle of their religion so emphasized the letter of the Law and the judicial position of the Law-giver that the outcome was an externalism and a literalism so extreme that every act of obedience was looked upon as having an exact, definite recompense and that every blessing of Jehovah was carefully measured out as the result of some proportionate previous service. There were some, of course, who still attempted an inner obedience to the law of God. But the mass of the Jews held to the idea that the favor of God could be merited by strict adherence to the letter of the law. Their Messianic hopes were along the same grossly external line. The One to come was to be a King, a Prince—the vicegerent of Jehovah, the Mediator of His blessings. The benefits they looked for as individuals consisted in earthly welfare, peaceful enjoyment of possessions, long life and a powerful posterity. The Kingdom while supernaturally established was to be an earthly one. The heathen would be destroyed and sinners driven out of their dominion. After the King had reigned a certain time and the Jews had earthly glory enough—then would come the end of the world, the resurrection and the judgment. Here again, it must be remembered that the Messianic ideas of the early prophets with the beautiful ethical and religious relations that were to exist between Jehovah and His people were not entirely lost, but were still maintained by some of the devout as the Psalter of Solomon shows. But that the ideas of the Jews in the days of Jesus, concerning Jehovah, the coming Prince and the Kingdom were grossly external and

forensic may easily be seen by referring to The Revelation of Baruch, The Fourth Book of Esdras, The Assumption of Moses, the older part of the Jewish Sibyl and the Book of Jubilees.

Now Jesus, though in a formal sense a child of His people and of His time, approached the whole subject of religion from a different point of view. He did not receive His religious ideas from the tendencies and modes of thought that prevailed among the Jewish people of His day. You cannot class Him among the Essenes and you cannot say that He was visibly influenced by the Pharisees or the Rabbinic schools. Out of His own consciousness and out of the Old Testament there spoke to Him One who was not primarily Judge, but above all was Father, full of grace and mercy, ready and willing to give His gifts to all, even to the sinner, and yet who at the same time as righteous sovereign required from men such love as He Himself gave. This conception of God as Sovereign Father was the unifying principle of His Gospel, out of which as from a fount there sprang all His teachings—among others His doctrine in regard to the gifts which the Father bestows upon His children. If according to the consciousness of Jesus the Giver is Father, then the blessings that come to men come primarily because of the love that the Father bears to His children. This love is in the heart of the Father not because of what the children are, but because of what He is, viz.: Father. It is the love that *must* communicate itself. Because He is Father He is the great and eternal Giver. He is under no legal obligation to give; there can be no external claim or merit on the part of man; the Father's only obligation is that of Love. His bestowals are therefore *gifts* not wages nor earnings. There are "wages of sin," but no wages of God. There is a "gift of God." "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?" Matt. 7:11. "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to *give* you the kingdom." Luke 12:32, The Kingdom is something that "comes" to men, Matt. 6:10;

that is "given" to the nations, Matt. 21:43; that is "prepared" for men and "inherited" by them. Matt. 25:34. It is primarily what the *Germans* would call a "*Gabe*," only secondarily an "*Aufgabe*." There are words of Jesus which teach that the Father dispenses immeasurable natural bounties even to the unworthy. "He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil," Luke 6:35; "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." Matt. 5:45. The Father is ready and willing to give pardon to the sinner and to grant him boundless spiritual blessings, not as he earns them but as he fulfills the filial conditions. Take the locus classicus on this subject, the Parable of the Prodigal Son. See how beautifully it brings out the contrast between a Judge who grants rewards only on merit and a Father who gives pardoning grace to a son on the simple condition of his penitent return and acceptance. The claims of the elder brother are interesting in this connection. His plea is: "Have I not served thee faithfully all these years. Have I no claim to reward." No, the Father's household is not conducted on the principle of merit—debit and credit. The parable teaches that the relation of the giver of pardon and the recipient is that of person to person, father to child. No sum, not even ten thousand talents could earn that forgiveness. Matt. 18:24. When Jesus sent forth the seventy on their divine mission he reminded them of the fact that they had "freely received" and in consequence they were to give freely. Matt. 10:8. The Parable of the Talents teaches us that the several talents were originally gifts to the bearers. Matt. 25:15. Jesus looks upon His power as a gift from the Father. "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth." Matt. 28:18. Was not His very Sonship a gift? Did not God so love the world that He gave His only begotten Son? This is one of the great eternal truths that spring from Jesus' conception of God as Father, viz: that the Son, the Kingdom, Life eternal and all natural and spiritual benefits and blessings are "the gift of God."

II. In the second place, Jesus teaches that the condition of receptivity on the part of His disciples is the higher Righteousness. The gift of God is not given arbitrarily. His grace is not antinomian. It can become ours only according to the moral order of things. There is a correspondence between things striven after by man and things given of God, between human susceptibilities and the divine satisfaction of them, between the "Gabe" and the "Aufgabe." There is a *modus recipiendi* by which the gift becomes our own. Men call it faith. Correctly so, if by faith they mean not simply *notitia*, belief in the historical; or *assensus*, general assent; but also *fiducia*, the turning of the whole inner being to God. It means the acceptance of Sonship with all its relations and responsibilities—ethical Sonship. This acceptance of the filial relation—the moral counterpart of God's fatherhood—is what is meant by "becoming" or proving one's self to be a Son of God. Matt. 5: 45; John 8: 41-44; John 1: 12. Those who refuse this filial relationship with all its consequent obligations cannot, in the nature of the case, receive the gifts which are peculiarly paternal. As Harnack puts it: "God has not only offered men a gift, but He has set them a task." This task is righteousness. Jesus and the Jews had one thing in common,—viz.: that man owed it to God to fulfil righteousness toward Him. There was no necessity for Jesus to impress that on their minds. They differed however in their conception of what righteousness was. To the Jews it was an external thing, consisting mainly in the performance of ceremonies that had a claim as meritorious. To Jesus it meant a disposition of the heart, a temper of the mind, a moral quality which demanded of its possessor the fulfilment of all the duties of Sonship. It was primarily an affair of the heart and meant love to God with one's whole inner being and love to fellowman as to self. Love lies back of all Jesus' demands for righteous conduct. "It is the great unexpressed presupposition," says Beyschlag. And why? Because God is a

Father. Because of His ethical nature. Jesus knew from personal experience and taught that the highest revelation of God could come only to the godlike; that the love of God could reach those only who of their own free will loved Him and lived the life of love in fellowship with Him. Julius Müller expresses it thus: "This is the unfathomable mystery which is yet plain to every simple Christian heart, that love, which is absolutely the highest element in the life of the creature, is not subject to compulsion even from the omnipotent will of God Himself. Consequently, love is a good which God cannot give to Himself, but can only receive through the freedom of the creature; He can only attract man by His own infinite love, can only fill and animate man's heart with the desire to give God his love by an act of his own free will."

This filial love is "love that serves." Only thus can it continue to exist. It does not mean mere quiescent waiting on God. It expresses itself in righteous conduct towards God, in trust, in prayer, in acts of worship. It expresses itself also in social service. The son becomes a servant. He has active duties and responsibilities to God and man. His devotion to the Father, viewed in its totality, is so great that he is willing to work like a slave (*δοῦλος*) for righteousness' sake. Thus the disciples are the *δοῦλοι* of God. Matt. 18: 23; 21: 33; 24: 45; 25: 14; Luke 17: 10. This relation of servant is not contradictory to the filial relation. It is simply the Son serving his father. Luke 15: 29. To serve God as the One Master (Matt. 6: 24) is characteristic of His children. "Him only shalt thou serve," Matt. 4: 10. But this service of sonship is not to be understood, by any means, in the sense of merit or title to reward. The ancient servant or slave had no claim. "Doth he thank the servant because he did the things that were commanded? Even so ye also, when ye shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do," Luke 17: 9, 10. Thus the sons become stewards, servants and laborers in the vineyard. But they are not machines; their life is



still that of sons who work in love and trust the Father for the outcome. As stewards they know that if the Master has given them but one talent they will receive approval as high as will the man who has ten, if they but use it in love and faithfulness. As laborers they know that if they serve honestly to the best of their ability they will have a Father's plaudit. They deal with Him and He deals with them not on the principle of debit and credit but on the moral principle of love. Love was their motive and by love will they be rewarded.

There is no higher motive in ethics than this love which impels the Sons of God in their service to a Father in heaven and to their brethren on earth. It is the unifying principle of all truly Christian conduct. Not prudence, not self-seeking, not calculating gain, but love to God that means allegiance, allegiance that means obedience, obedience that means service. This love-motive is the dynamic of the religion of Jesus. It sets all the faculties of the human soul into operation. How it prompts to Christian deeds, both great and small; to laying down one's life for righteousness' sake as well as to giving a cup of cold water only unto one of these little ones. How obedient it is! "If any man love me he will keep my words." How great its rewards! "My Father will love him." "We will come unto him and make our abode with him." John 14: 23.

III. Jesus taught that the content of God's gift to men was "the Kingdom of Heaven." This was the summum bonum. "The Kingdom," says Harnack, "is ultimately nothing but the treasure which the soul possesses in the eternal and merciful God." This Kingdom is what the Father desires to give to His children, Luke 12: 32; it is to be the object of their desires before all earthly goods, Luke 12: 31; they are to plead for its coming in their prayers before all particular gifts and blessings, Luke 11: 2; it is the great treasure and the goodly pearl for whose sake the finder may part with all his other possessions, Matt. 13: 44, 45. This Kingdom of God which is to become the possession of the disciples means two things:

(1) the character of God in men, the life of God in the souls of men; (2) and the fellowship that this godlike life gives to the saints one with another and with their Father. Thus is the kingdom in them and they are at the same time in the kingdom. The life and fellowship begin here on earth and reach their consummation in the world to come.

The Kingdom as Godlike character. Jesus said, "It is at hand; it is among you." That meant nothing else than that, inasmuch as Jesus was fulfilling the condition of perfect love to the Father, the Father was giving the gift of His own perfect character to Him as Son and was so ruling in Him that Jesus was convinced that He was the One sent of God to bring the realization of this same character into the souls and lives of men. When Jesus said "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom of God; but unto them that are without all these things are done in parables," what does it mean but the character of God was beginning to realize itself in men as they were, through the help of Jesus, responding to a Father's love. This divine character continues to realize itself among men more perfectly as the inter-relation between Father and child becomes more ethically and spiritually perfect. "We are changed into the same image from glory to glory even as by the Spirit of the Lord." This is the reward: the formation in us of godlike character. It all comes about most naturally. Those who love and serve as sons—the Kingdom is coming into them. Those who love not and serve not as sons have nothing in common with the kingdom, no trace of it in them. The poor in spirit—theirs is the Kingdom, since humility, "the opening up of the heart to God," what is it but love.

This same gift, the Kingdom, is termed by Jesus in the Synoptists and especially in St. John, "life," "eternal life." This life of God in the souls of men is a present reality and an immediate possession. Jesus is the medium of it. "I came that they might have life and might have it abundantly," John 10: 10. He brings us to a knowledge of the Father; and this

is life eternal—that we should know the Father and Him whom the Father did send, even Jesus Christ, know Him not in a purely intellectual but in an ethical, a spiritual, a filial sense. This knowledge of God, the perfect intuition which the sons have of the moral being of the Father, opens the way for the life of God to come to them;—that life which is “born of the Spirit,” that life which shall know no death, that life which has the assurance of a heavenly resurrection, that life the atmosphere of which is blessedness, in which is a fullness of joy, a peace such as the world giveth not, and glory as of the Father.

This life and character of God in men will be perfected in the world to come. The full realization of divine character in the lives of men is guaranteed. The reward is already adjudged to the disciples. This is the “treasure in heaven” which is laid up for them. To be perfect as the Father is perfect—that is what the sons of God are waiting and praying and striving for. Every service of love accomplished by them is nothing but a striving after this perfection of divine life and character, and the reward is nothing less than the attainment of that which in every service they strive after—only, the attainment is infinitely more than the mere fruit of the effort. Their works do follow them, *i. e.*, incorporate themselves in their character but the character of the Sons of God will be more than the product of their moral efforts. Those who have been faithful over a few things will be made rulers over many things. Dörner beautifully sums up the whole truth in these words: “One day God will see reflected from His world, in the manifold diversity of its organized life, an image of His own perfections—created, indeed, but still pure and majestic; and humanity together with the higher world of spirits will form the perfected City of God, in which nothing will be lost that was ever won by moral effort upon earth.”

While the Kingdom, the life, the character of God is *the* gift of the Father there flow from it, at the same time, certain benefits which are worth consideration in detail. This does

not mean material gain. Nowhere are we told that the members of the Kingdom would attain to any extraordinary external good or well-being or obtain any wonderful earthly glory and power. On the contrary, we are constantly warned of crosses and persecutions. True, Jesus did say: "There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for my sake, and for the gospel's sake, but he shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life." Mark 10: 29-31. But this is not to be taken literally. The idea of hundreds of mothers, sisters, etc., is an absurdity. It manifestly must be taken in an ideal sense to mean, that those who make sacrifices for righteousness' sake will receive what will replace the lost an hundredfold—so superior is the spiritual gain to the material sacrifice. Again, when Jesus says: "I appoint unto you a Kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdom," Luke 22: 29; we have no promise of material advantage, but simply the assurance that, while the disciples were not serving for wages, still they would receive ample compensations for all their self-denials, in the fellowship with the Father, in the beneficent hospitality of the brethren and in their own self-perfection. Jesus was constantly pointing them away from the external and the transitory. "What shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world." "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." He was constantly reminding them that the real benefits of existence had to do with "the higher life." "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul." He that loseth his lower ego for My sake shall find his higher self. For this reason he tells them not to fear;—since no real harm can come from any external source to their true, higher life. They have absolute protection against all dangers to their real good. Not necessarily immunity from all external ills, but immunity from real injury to their spiritual well-being. He

further teaches them that those who live this higher life of the Kingdom will receive of the Father a happiness that is true and lasting. Again and again He says to His disciples: "Blessed are ye." Of course we must remember how differently Jesus looked at things as really valuable or valueless for men, and judge of the benefits of the Kingdom in that light. He offers rest to those that come to Him, meaning thereby that, amid all the woes and trials of earth, their real, higher life could remain undisturbed in His presence, or could find rest in fellowship with God. He gave them the assurance that all the externally hard and evil experiences laid upon them would be for their real good. He told them that all that was really helpful and salutary would be given them for the asking. This is implied by those words of Jesus in which he requests His disciples to pray. "Ask and it shall be given you." Matt. 7: 7-11; 17: 20; 18: 19; Mark 11: 23; Luke 17: 6. Those who seek first his Kingdom and his righteousness shall have all these other things added unto them. For your Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Jesus did not despise the things of the natural life. He showed how they might be used as means to moral ends. Thus the Parable of the Stewards and of the faithful Servants teach that the right use of earthly goods has an educational significance for the moral life. Hence he was willing that His disciples should pray for necessary natural gifts, Luke 11: 3, and the Father would grant them. Such are a few of the blessings that accompany the possession of the Kingdom.

The reward of the disciples, however, is not only godlike character with all its immunities and inspirations. It is also *fellowship* with those of like character and with God himself. The Kingdom is not only something that enters into men; it is also something into which men enter, viz.: a fellowship that helps in the exaltation and glorification of life. There is first the blessed fellowship of those who are bound together on earth in a common love and likeness to the Father—the communion of saints with all its quickening, strengthening inspirations.

That ethical bond of Christian brotherhood continues in the world to come. The grave cannot break it. There is such a thing as Heaven with all its associations and fellowships of kindred spirits. Not a Mohammedan Paradise, but a coming together of the Sons of God, "from the east and from the west, from the north and from the south to sit down in the Kingdom" of their Father in holy fellowship. Of this truth, the words of Christ give a variety of figurative representations. The righteous sit on thrones, Matt. 19: 28; rule over cities, Luke 19: 17; share the joy of their Lord, Matt. 25: 21; a joy like that of a wedding feast, Matt. 25: 1-11; share the abiding places of the Father's house, John 14: 2. These are all figures of spiritual truths valuable as such, but not to be taken as literal descriptions of eternal destinies. But through all these figures there runs this idea of the fellowship of the saints.

Then, there is the Fellowship with the Father. This relation of love between parent and child endures. Death has no power over it. As the love-bond is strengthened, glorification of character continues. And some day—this is a hope too dazzling to think of and yet it is promised—there will be perfect purity of heart on the part of the sons of God and that consummate fellowship with the Father which the imagination calls the Beatific Vision. Dante, at the very thought of that fellowship, sings in the last Canto of the *Paradiso*: "O Supreme Light, O Infinite Goodness, O abundant Grace—in thy depths I see the universe bound with love in one volume. That love which moves the sun and stars moves my will like an evenly balanced wheel in perfect harmony with Thy will." This hope, eternal in the heavens, is a stimulus to more earnest godly living. It serves by its reflex influence as an inner quickening in the hour when the disciple's heart is apt to be troubled, and as a strengthening help in gaining the victory over the world.

We cannot believe with Reuss that the idea of reward in the discourses of Jesus refers only to the reward which the good deed finds in itself. We cannot believe with Weiss, even

though we make all allowance for his anti-Tübingen bias, that the reward-idea of Jesus was much the same as that of the Israelitish theocracy. We cannot become fully reconciled to Robertson's position, viz.: that the expressions of Jesus on the subject of reward were meant to inspire His disciples with hope by promising them an illusion; nor with Jacoby when he claims that Jesus out of pedagogical considerations employed the idea of reward as used in the Jewish theology of His day. We rather believe for reasons already given, viz.: interpreting the sayings of Jesus on this subject in the light of His Conception to God, of Righteousness and of the Kingdom—that He used the term "reward" as He used many others (righteousness, for instance)—in a sense peculiarly His own; that He so far elevated the original wage-idea of the term as virtually to annul it; substituting for the contract-idea the Father's gracious bestowal of His own Life of Love to His children on the simple condition of their willingness to live that life.

YORK, PA.



#### IV.

### FORMAL CHRISTIANITY.

BY REV. HIRAM KING, A. M.

As Christ is the Author of Christianity, His Person, it is plain, must be its exponent. As, accordingly, no true conception of the character and functions of Christianity can possibly be formed without a correct knowledge of Christ Himself, the question at once rises, Who is Christ? The identity of Christ, has, indeed, been the one great, persistent problem ever since His strange advent. His Jewish contemporaries identified Him, hypothetically, with John, the Baptist, or one of the prophets (Matt. 16: 14). After His death, the Docetæ abolished His physical organism and made Him an apparition; while the Socinians eliminated His divinity and made Him a creature.

Such a Christology, it is perfectly plain, could not supply the key to Christianity, and account for the presence, in the world, of this potency, which is evidently at the root of history.

"But who say ye that I am?" (ver. 15) was the Lord's interrogation of His disciples as to their personal conception of His identity. "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (ver. 16), was the answer, and its correctness is beyond controversy. Not, however, because St. Peter was wiser, personally, than his learned countrymen, but because he was made the spokesman of God to reveal the identity of His Son: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bär-Jonah: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven" (ver. 17).

While, however, this formative article of the Christian creed is a correct confessional statement, its exegetical construction varies, and the most thoughtful people are ever chal-

lenged in person by the original interrogation: "What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?" (Matt. 22: 42).

It is answered as follows:

1. The Person of Christ is *theanthropic* (divine and human). Revelation developed through its Patriarchal and Hebrew stages to the incarnation under stress of the joint factors of the divine manifestation and human faith. "The Word became flesh" (John 1: 14), therefore, as the climax of revelation. The union of God and man in the Person of Christ is, however, not subject to analysis like chemical compounds. Nor does the divinity dwell in the humanity, in His Person, as contents fill a vessel. The incarnation, on the contrary, is the union of its divine and human constituents in *essense*. While, therefore, duality is very properly predicated of the natures of Christ, their *functional unity* is, nevertheless, to be understood.

As the Person of Christ is thus *theanthropic*, this most important conclusion follows, namely, that nothing can be predicated, distinctively, of His divinity or of His humanity, but that His life, His experience, His words and His works are, not divine or human, but *theanthropic*.

2. The Person of Christ is *generic* (the source of spiritual humanity). If the Lord's nativity were but *genealogical*, it would suggest the divine humiliation, since the mere lineal descent of the Messiah from Adam would really have subordinated God to man; nor, indeed, could such an advent of Christ to man have eventuated in the real union of the race with God at all. What was essential to an incarnation (and really took place) was the new creation of the *human order* in the constitution of the Person of Christ, who would thus become the spiritual Progenitor of mankind. Christ is, therefore, as truly generic for man by birth as Adam is by creation.

The two progenitors of man are, however, not *coördinate*. Adam was in order to Christ. The first Adam only prefigured (Ro. 5: 14) the "last Adam" (I. Cor. 15: 45). The last Adam is generic for the first Adam as well as for his race.

Adam is, therefore, subordinate to Christ, and is as much dependent on Him for the grace of Christianity as are his descendants.

As the human race are thus born of God through Christ, it is plain that Christianity must be the historical expression of the Person of Christ in the world, just as natural humanity is the historical expression of the person of Adam. Do the Scriptures, however, sustain the conclusion? and does Christ, in true analogy to Adam, fill the world as the Church occupies it? Yes. "For as in Adam all die (present tense), so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (I. Cor. 15: 22). So also, the Christians, collectively, are the "body of Christ" (I. Cor. 12: 27); individually, they are the "members of His (Christ's) body" (Ep. 5: 30). From Christ, moreover, as the Head, "all the body, being supplied and knit together through the joints and bands, increaseth with the increase of God" (Col. 2: 19). Christ, finally, is the "true vine" (John 15: 1) and the Christians are its "branches" (ver. 5). These symbols not only imply that Christ is in spiritual humanity as Adam is in natural humanity, but they also signify: (1) That Christ is the source of Christianity; (2) that Christianity is a new creation; (3) that men become partakers of the divine nature in the regeneration quite as really as the Word became flesh in the incarnation; (4) that Christianity is *theanthropic* as well as the Person of Christ; (5) that Christianity must necessarily be formal for its functional effectiveness.

Is then the new creation conditioned on the forms of Christianity, just as the old creation is conditioned on the economic functions of nature? Faithful adherence to the Gospel, and an unbiased recognition of its terms, require the affirmation of the interrogative proposition.

In the first place, the forms of Christianity are not empty ceremonies, on the ground that atonement was made for the "sin of the world" (John 1: 29). As, indeed, the incarnation was not consummated on the plane of nature, it plainly

cannot be remedial for man in his natural generation. The new order of life could not possibly express itself in natural birth, because the incarnation, in the nature of the case, does not associate Christ with Adam at the fountain of man's natural life. Natural mankind are necessarily the offspring of the fallen Adam, pure and simple, and are, therefore, his moral duplicates. The new creation, on the contrary, expresses itself from the Person of Christ in the *regeneration* of men by the Holy Spirit, and is neither conditioned on their natural generation, nor connected with it.

The complacent assumption, then, that original sin was cancelled, by the wholesale, in the atonement, and that, therefore, the natural birth of man is immaculate is, indeed, wholly gratuitous. It is, however, true that the renewal of human nature in the Person of Christ was coincident with his conception by the Holy Spirit. But then, the constitution of the Person of Christ, in the spiritual aspect, was *miraculous*, and, therefore, not a fact of generation at all, but an act of *creation*. Christ, like Melchizedek (Heb. 7: 3), his Gentile type, is, in that important particular, without genealogy.

In the second place, the world cannot be evangelized by the mere preaching of the Gospel to the exclusion of its rites. Although Christ is truly human, a direct relation between Him and the race is not established in the incarnation; nor is His saving presence fully mediated by the mere preaching of the Gospel. The new birth is, therefore, not conditioned on faith as only a mental attitude, or a subjective state. If, indeed, men could come into immediate, and therefore remedial contact with Christ in their simple knowledge of Him, then, also, might the Gospel be communicated to the heathen world by cablegram. Or the Bible, in the respective tongues of the races, might be sent them instead of missionaries. The history of Christian missions, however, proves the contrary, as Christianity has not risen spontaneously among any people.

The new creation, on the contrary, is an order of life, and men become new creatures by spiritual generation as really as

they receive prior existence in the analogical process of natural generation. The new birth is, therefore, not miraculous any more than is the natural birth that precedes it. The new man is not *created* any more than is the natural man. Both, alike, are *generated*. Neither is, however, directly related to his progenitor, since the process of generation is, necessarily, mediated. Man's natural generation is conditioned on the womb; what is the medium of his regeneration?

Not only does the Author of Christianity answer the question in person, but His answer is in *unmistakable terms*. The condition of celestial citizenship He declares to be a birth "of water and the Spirit" (John 3: 5), and He enjoins upon the evangelists of all ages to "make disciples of all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. 28: 19).

No one would venture to dispute the *right* of the Author of the new creation to ordain a formal medium of regeneration, and surely the *fact* of such appointment ought to remain sacredly unchallenged. The assumption is warranted, moreover, that the Apostolic Church was placed on record, in the Scriptures themselves, as an example of the loyal care with which the Lord's ordinances should be observed. Thus, the practice of the first evangelists was scrupulously conformed to His injunction to administer the ordinance of baptism, and the performance of the rite, in every recorded instance, promptly followed profession of faith. At Pentecost, the inquirers were instructed to repent and to be baptized unto the remission of their sins (Acts 2: 38). Later on, Ananias bade Saul "arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on His (the Lord's) name" (Acts 22: 16). It can certainly not be objected that the obscurity of Ananias disqualified him for pronouncing authoritatively on the ritual significance of baptism. He was not an apostle, to be sure, but then he was the Lord's messenger to Saul, and, therefore, His spokesman. Besides, St. Paul not only quoted Ananias' reference to baptism to the mob from the stairs of Antonia (Acts 21: 40), without disapproval, but

he subsequently fully endorsed his high estimate of the ordinance by affirming the transfer of the subjects of the rite from nature into grace: "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ" (Gal. 3: 27).

The foregoing citations from the highest authorities on the ritual significance of baptism characterize the whole period of Apostolic Christianity. The evangelist founders of the Church not only accepted the Lord's teaching, that baptism is the medium of man's spiritual generation (John 3: 5) and salvation (Mar. 16: 16), but they loyally obeyed His command to administer the ordinance in their work of "making disciples" (Matt. 28: 19). As, moreover, these men were under special inspiration, the neglect of their example would not only be a crime against Christianity, but also the crime of insubordination to its Author.

Do the conclusions of logic as well as the teachings of the Gospel warrant the affirmation that the new creation expresses itself from the Person of Christ in the ordinance of baptism? Yes.

In the first place, the popular conception of baptism is, to some extent, incorrect, and the attempt is made to reduce the ordinance to a *rite without a function*. The popular designation of the ordinance as "water baptism" is, to say the least, a misnomer, and is wholly due to the singular misconception, that "water and the Spirit" (John 3: 5) are *separate*, although this statement of the Lord is, in itself, the clearest possible affirmation of their *union* as the medium of man's new birth. Of course, if this unthoughtful conception of baptism were correct, then, truly, would the rite be the empty ceremony, which it is claimed to be, and could, therefore, express nothing at all—except a sickly sentimentalism. In that case, however, St. Peter could not possibly be correct in conditioning the salvation of the subject of baptism on the ritual transaction: "Wherein (the ark) few, that is, eight souls, were saved through water: which (water) also after a true likeness doth now save you, even baptism" (I. Peter 3: 20, 21). The

Apostle evidently means that the deluge, in its *saving* aspect, prefigured baptism. As the water of the flood saved the eight persons in the ark by floating it, so water, or, appositionally, baptism, now saves its subjects by floating the ark of the Church, as it were. Baptism, it is, however, carefully explained, is "not the putting away of the filth of the flesh," but it (baptism) is the sinner's appeal to God for the purification of his conscience from guilt "through the resurrection of Jesus Christ" (ver. 21).

This inspired teacher, unlike many of His modern interpreters, apparently assumes the *union* of "water and the Spirit" to be so complete, in the ritual transaction, that he actually attributes, comprehensively, the saving agency to the visible element (water) of the ordinance (ver. 21).

In the second place, baptism is neither human nor divine, but *theanthropic*. The ordinance belongs, therefore, not to the natural order of man's life, where it might very properly be called "water Baptism," but to the new creation, whose organ it is for the transformation of the natural man into a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven, just as naturalization is the agency of the State for the civil regeneration of the alien. Baptism is thus not magical, nor even miraculous, since it is the perfectly normal medium through which the incarnation expresses itself as the world's new, its *theanthropic* order of life. Like the womb in the natural order, baptism cannot be filled with contents as a vessel, but is *functional* through the agency of the Holy Spirit. Like the womb, moreover, baptism is not only functional for its own order, but its functions are *generative* (John 3: 5) as well.

As, therefore, the ordinance under consideration is not "water baptism," and is not only *theanthropic*, but also *generative* for the *theanthropic* order of the incarnation, the conclusion plainly follows that it is in the baptismal transaction that the new creation expresses itself from the Person of Christ.

The ordinance of baptism is, however, discounted in its



*administration* as much as in its essence, and the objection is raised that the new birth cannot be conditioned on the acts of a *mere man*. This bill of exceptions would be filed to better purpose if the assumption on which it is based were not wrong. Those who perform the mystical rite at the font of the Church, are, in fact, not mere men at all. They are generated from the Person of Christ, and, in common with their fellow Christians, they are *theanthropic*. Besides, and chiefly, the Christian ministry are appointed to perform the ritual function by the Founder of the Kingdom of Heaven himself, just as ambassadors are accredited by one government to another to perform international functions. The functions of the Christian ministry are, accordingly, not personal, but *official*. The presence of Christ is therefore mediated in the *authorized acts* of the Christian minister, just as the presence of a government is mediated at a foreign capital in the functions of its diplomatic representative.

It is also objected that the grace of baptism cannot be *coincident* with its administration. This objection is, to say the least, unthoughtful.\* As already pointed out, baptism is not the ultimate source of regeneration, but only its *medium*, or the organ of the new creation for the individual new birth of men. The washing away of sins therein (Acts 22: 16) is, accordingly neither magical nor miraculous. The cleansing of the soul by the Holy Spirit is, indeed, *normal* to the ordinance, and must, of course, coincide with its administration. The coincidence is, moreover, proven by universal analogy. Thus, the reproductive energies of nature operate, without fail, in the *forms* of nature. The animal propagates its species in the *organs* of generation. The oak emerges from the acorn in the *function* of growth. In the sphere of government, legal *form* and legal *disposition* are coincident. Title to property, for example, is vested, neither before nor after the formal transfer

\* The gift of the Holy Spirit to the converts at Samaria was coincident with the laying of the Apostles' hands on them (Acts 8: 17), and not with their prior petition for the grace (ver. 15).

of ownership, but instantaneously with it. In the social community, social functions are enjoyed when in progress. In the intellectual realm, mental development proceeds with the employment of educational means. In religious worship, spiritual edification is coincident with the offices of devotion. In the celebration of the Holy Eucharist, the communicant receives spiritual nourishment in the act of participation. To the thoughtful, it will seem unreasonable that form and substance should coincide everywhere,—*except in the administration of baptism!*

It may be objected, however, that, as neither natural, legal, social, intellectual nor devotional forms are similar to the baptismal formalities, the analogy claimed cannot exist in point of fact. There is certainly a distinction in all forms, because the orders to which they are functional are not identical. But then, it is really dissimilarity in form that makes analogy possible. Forms are analogous in the particular, not that they are similar, but that they are similarly dependent on conditions. Thus, naturalization is the form of admission to citizenship in the State. The application of the alien for admission, together with the prescribed personal qualifications, are the conditions of the formality which is to be observed by the State. Baptism is the form of admission to citizenship in the Kingdom of Heaven (John 3: 5). . . The application of the natural man for admission, with the personal qualifications of repentance and faith, are the conditions of the formality which is to be observed on the part of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is self-evident that actual admission to citizenship in the State is coincident with the formality of naturalization. No one denies that the alien becomes a citizen in the *formal act* of admission by the State. As this is certainly a true analogy, it is demonstrated (and, therefore, quite beyond controversy) that admission to citizenship in the Kingdom of Heaven is coincident with the administration of baptism.

In the last place, the modified objection is raised, that the

new birth cannot be conditioned *absolutely* on baptism (as the products of nature are thus conditioned on the processes of nature), and that consequently the foregoing analogy proves too much. It is indeed true that form and substance do not coincide *absolutely* in baptism, just as formal Christianity and essential Christianity are not commensurate. Nor are other orders, in every particular, analogous to Christianity. The procreative energies in natural birth, for instance, are natural forces, and are, therefore, not free, but are so fully conditioned on the generative organs, that without the functional efficiency of the latter, there could not possibly be a generative process at all. The agency of the new birth is, however, the Holy Spirit, Who is not a blind force, but a personal Intelligence. Unlike the forces of nature, He is not absolutely bound to forms, and may, therefore, confer His gracious gifts, under certain conditions, without the mediation of prescribed forms. While, therefore, baptism is the organ of the new creation for man's spiritual generation from the Person of Christ, it does not, necessarily, follow that the new birth, in every instance, takes place in the administration of the ordinance. Doubtless, many are born again, under various conditions, without the baptismal formality, but more especially in times of great religious revival, when forms are subordinated under the floodtide of the Spirit's power. There is, in fact, an instance of the Spirit's self-enlargement from prescribed rite on record in the New Testament itself, as if to warn the Church in after ages of the danger of formalism. While St. Peter was yet speaking to Cornelius and his associates, it is related (Acts 10: 44), the Holy Spirit fell on them. As this special gift of the Spirit, nevertheless, involved the personal regeneration of those who received Him, it is plain that the new birth, in this instance, was conditioned on preaching instead of baptism. At Jerusalem, the Apostle instructed those, under conviction, to submit to baptism in order to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2: 38); at Cæsarea, he directed the converts to be baptized after the Holy Spirit had fallen on them (Acts 10: 48).

In the former instance, the procedure was regular, since the form was observed *in order to* the substance. In the latter, the procedure was exceptional, since the form was observed *in addition to* the substance.

As exceptions however cannot be made a rule, it follows that regeneration, under exceptional conditions, only proves that the renewing grace of the Holy Spirit is not *absolutely* restricted to its ordinary medium in formal Christianity.

V.

THE GOSPEL FOR A WORLD OF SIN.

BY REV. A. THOS. G. APPLE.

This is the title of a recent work from the pen of Dr. Henry Van Dyke, and published by the Macmillans. As one lays down the book it is with a feeling that when the author resigned the pastorate of an influential church in New York city in order to take up literary work, he was not leaving the ministry, but only finding a larger congregation to which to preach. This one of his latest works comes as a voice of the twentieth century, speaking to men of the twentieth century, and brings help and encouragement to many hearts with its clearly reasoned, charmingly persuasive, and broadly sympathetic defense of the Gospel, especially in this age with its strong tendencies to deny the reality of sin, or to make it merely a partial stage in an evolution that progresses regularly from the simple to the complex. What he says has no doubt been said many times before, but it is doubtful if the author's manner of saying it has ever been surpassed.

A few examples of the epigrammatic vigor of the author's style, culled at random may serve to illustrate:

"Sin is not a thing to be defined. It is a thing to be felt."

"Original sin makes originality in sin impossible."

Referring to the sad contradiction between the life and the precepts of some of the writers of Scripture, he says of Solomon:

"The king who made these diamond proverbs was the man who showed us how easily they may be burned to coal in the flame of passion."

No terser introduction to the Book of Ecclesiastes has ever been written than these five lines:

"The Book of Ecclesiastes, whoever wrote it, contains the epitaph of Solomon. 'Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.' It is the hand-book of pessimists; the tragic monodrama of man's

self-betrayal; the epic of the suicide of hope. Close the book and write upon it this sentence, 'the world by wisdom knew not God.'"

But we forbear culling single flowers among the wheat—we will turn our view to the sweep of the waving grain.

The view point of the work is soteriological, as is to be expected where the main question is the need of a sin-stricken world. The sacrifice of the cross fills the view; and the doctrine of the atonement occupies the whole of one of the four main divisions of the book. And yet the whole subject is so placed in the light of the living, reigning, present Christ that the insufficient presentation of a century and more ago is left without foundation in one's mind long before the author's direct attack utterly demolishes it.

The four main divisions just mentioned are I, The Sin of the World; II, The Bible without Christ; III, Christ's Mission to the Inner Life; and IV, The Perfection of Atonement. These are opened by an introductory chapter, The Mist and the Gulf, and gathered up in a conclusion, The Message of the Cross.

#### I. THE SIN OF THE WORLD.

The proof of sin lies in experience and intuition rather than in rational demonstration. It is assumed as a fact by the individual in all his theories or plans of life. It is taken for granted and provided for by society in schemes of legislation and systems of punishments. All philosophy teaches it—at least all that goes to the least degree beyond what our author calls "the skin-deep philosophy of Rousseau with his 'original goodness and unlimited perfectibility' of human nature." Science acknowledges it; witness that famous utterance of Dr. Huxley shortly before his death, a picture of humanity so hopeless and despairing, that it is doubtful if it has ever been exceeded. The fact of sin, however, must be looked honestly and bravely in the face—"It is better to know the saddest truth," we are told, "than to be blinded by the merriest lie."

The question of the origin of evil cannot be answered, be-

cause, among other reasons the mind that is to comprehend the answer is itself blinded and twisted by the very influence it seeks to account for. All we can know is that evil exists, and that its possibility is coincident with the freedom of a created will. This is the door: beyond this door all is darkness and impenetrable mystery. But the question itself sounds a note of hope; for its very asking is an evidence that to him who asks, evil is an intrusion—it is not eternal but temporary, not essential but accidental. To quote again: "If a man should ask 'How came good into being?' he would be in the region of despair. While he continues to ask, 'How came evil into being?' he is in the region of hope." In the investigation of the problem of evil two insufficient views, and therefore false, are to be guarded against: the evil is not merely a negation of the good.

"The evil is naught, is null, is silence implying sound."

Nor is it, on the other hand, a necessary condition in the course of the world's development. To say this is to deny its evil character, and find its origin in God. It is the *ought not to be* (as our author puts it) which *actually is*, and which manifests itself in the experience of every one through volitions of choice or compliance. "To go farther than this is to abandon fact for fancy."

Leaving the question here we are led to a consideration of the effects of evil, and one of these, so far as personal life is concerned, is found to be the sense of sin revealed through conscience. Conscience, like the stamp on the lost coin is the evidence of a high origin and of better possibilities. The sense of sin is to be distinguished from the consciousness of evil, and is the realization of a personal offense against a personal God. It is not hopeless, but possesses "an evidence of life in its very pain; of enlightenment in its very shame; of nearness to God in its very humiliation before Him." In it are felt the emotions of shame, of pain, of fear, and of hope. Shame is the result of its ugliness and defilement; pain comes from its enslaving power; fear is produced by the sense of disobedience to



a high, mysterious, inexorable command; while hope is the evidence of the abiding sense of God's unbroken hold upon the heart of man.

In respect to the third of these elementary emotions, the author enters at some length upon a discussion of the wrath of God. This he holds is not an illusion born of man's fears, but an actual thing whose activity in the penalty of sin is justified by every conscience.

"There must be," he says, "a moral necessity in God which calls for the condemnation of evil as sin. This necessity comes from every side of His nature,—from His justice first, but also from His purity, His wisdom, His goodness, His love. And the condemnation expresses every side of His relation to the world. As Creator, He disapproves the marring of the ideal. As Judge, He condemns the transgression of the law. As Lord, He resents and reproves treason and rebellion against His government. As Father, He is wounded and offended by ingratitude against His love and separation from His fellowship. All these holy perfections are included and implied in that mysterious reality of which the Scripture speaks as 'the wrath of God coming upon the children of disobedience.'"

But while the objective reality of God's wrath must be most earnestly insisted upon, no words of condemnation are too strong, and no feelings of righteous indignation too deep with which to repel the caricature which pictures it in forms of sinful human wrath, and thereby blasphemes God as a vindictive tyrant.

Through all this discussion of the sin of the world the great strength of the presentation lies in the fact that while on the one hand the dread malady of the race is earnestly searched out through all its horrid depths and laid bare with unsparing hand, on the other it is done with a heart full of tenderest sympathy and sublimest hope.

## II. THE BIBLE WITHOUT CHRIST.

If Christ saves men from sin, then He must be the All in all of the Bible. Dr. Van Dyke's method of discussing this

familiar fact is striking and original. As the heading of the section indicates, he draws out the warp threads and exhibits what a tangled mass of woof the Bible then becomes—or, to use His own figure, what a crumbling heap of rubbish it becomes without the mortar to give it strength and beauty. "To take Christ out of the Bible," he continues, "is to make it worse than useless to a sinful world. It is to make it crushing, disheartening, terrifying,—the saddest book that was ever written. The Old Testament casts upon us an unbroken shadow of gloomy fate. The New Testament pierces it with an intolerable light of conscious guilt and coming judgment." To illustrate this he passes on from point to point—from Genesis to the Law, from the Psalms to Wisdom and Prophecy, and shows how at every point where especially the world waits with bated breath God's answer to its deepest need—at those very points to deny the Promise of a Saviour dissolves the Word into the darkness of despair.

Still more strikingly, if possible, is the all-pervading presence of Christ pointed out in the New Testament. Here it is insisted with no uncertain emphasis that a full acknowledgment must be made of the Divine Sonship and heavenly exaltation of Jesus. It is a thing unique and not to be taken in the general sense. "Jesus, the example of a noble manhood, a teacher of moral truth, a worker of social reform," will never satisfy the world's deepest needs. The "new kind of New Testament" which self-styled cultivators of advanced thought would substitute for the genuine, goes down before the shafts of a justified scorn. A book whose real value is merely its "picture of a beautiful character, its rules of good conduct, its spirit of piety and virtue, the clear light which it throws upon God and human life and immortality; a book which would be sufficient and complete with only the Sermon on the Mount, the substance of which could be put into an ethical creed"; such a book might be good enough in its way. But when it professes to satisfy the soul's deepest longings and give comfort to its direst misery, it becomes a fraud that mocks at the

malady it does not profess to cure. Those who would have us believe that all in the New Testament which goes beyond the purely ethical is partly imaginary, partly superstition and really unnecessary—who would explain away or deny the unique character of Jesus as the Divine Son coming forth from the bosom of the Father, to reveal Him and bring back a perishing world, reconciling them by the birth in Bethlehem, the life of service, the death on the cross, the resurrection and ascension—these would-be reconstructors of Christianity and revisers of the Scriptures are summoned to the test. One by one the passages that have brought deepest peace to repentant men and women, are subjected to “the Russian censor’s process of ‘blacking out’” and a practical example of the New Testament without the Saviour Christ is held up to view. And as this eviscerating process proceeds from gospel to epistle, it is borne in upon the mind with a force that is overwhelming, how in the dying reigning Christ is the very fiber of which our hope is woven (a hope that enters as an anchor within the veil), and that anything, which to any degree falls short of this steals the grain and gives the chaff to the starving children. If Jesus is the teacher of what sin is—who but a divine Christ can lead us and lift us up to the high ideal of His teaching? If Jesus teaches the existence of a dark, dominant, destroying power lying back of all sin, who but a divine Christ can fight for us so as to deliver us from Satan? Jesus is our example, only if He is our Saviour.

### III. CHRIST’S MISSION TO THE INNER LIFE.

“The ultimate mission of Christ was to the inner life of man.” This is the announcement of the third head, but we think it should be said rather that the Mission of Christ not only *was*, but *continues to be* to the inner life. We have here to do with the influence of the risen exalted Christ upon the Christian consciousness. This last seems to be what is meant by the expression Inner Life which is being so much used of late. Once the author uses the term “subliminal consciousness,” but this we do not think exactly synonymous with the

idea of the Inner Life. To let the author explain his own meaning, the Inner Life has to do with "that inner region of the heart which lies behind audible utterances and visible action, below social ties and bonds of human fellowship, underneath conscious reasonings and formulated theories,—that undiscovered country where the moral sentiments, the religious feeling, the sense of dependence, and the joy or grief of living, have their home."

The actualizing of this mission of Christ to the inner life of man began of course with the apostles. The new creating influence of a living Saviour upon the religious consciousness of these men, saving them from sin and giving them peace with God—this was the new power that began to regenerate the world. When the testimony concerning it gained expression in preaching and letters of apostolic men, this constituted what the author calls "the original gospel." For it is from this that the fourfold gospel as we have it to-day, is derived. This view, which also is so clearly pointed out and strongly insisted upon by Dr. Weiss in his *Life of Christ*, sets the epistles in their true position as coördinate in importance and origin with the gospels. For they are both equally the crystallized results of the apostolic preaching. "The epistles ante-date the gospel." "They are forever sacred and authoritative to all Christian hearts, because they are the place where we first catch sight of Jesus Christ in this world."

The preaching of the apostles told, and still continues to tell the world of peace with God through Jesus Christ, "expressed in His life, summed up and crowned in His death," and we would add, pledged in His resurrection. This comes from their inner personal experience of the blessed fact; and by the faith kindled by this personal experience the faith of the world has been set aglow. This experience it is which interprets the meaning of the cross. In its light the cross is an expression of God's love; and at the same time it appears as a necessary sacrifice. As an expression of God's love on the one hand, it forever excludes the horrible idea of a vindictive God quench-

ing His flaming sword in His own Son's vital flood; and as a necessary sacrifice it finds its necessity in the dread fact of sin, and on the other hand excludes the unsatisfactory view which limits the results of the cross to a more or less dramatic exhibition of God's love, and measures its influence by the force of the moral suggestion it becomes to man. But when it is asked further, why necessary? we are told, "no man knoweth nor can any man explain them and set them in order."

The New Life set up by Christ in the soul begins in justification by faith. This, our author holds, is no legal fiction. There can be no transference of merits from one person to another. Christ's obedience can never become our obedience by any such "reckoning" or "counting." When St. Paul speaks of justification by faith, he "means that faith is regarded as an actual beginning of righteousness, a seed of divine promise and power in the soul of man, to be unfolded, by the grace of God, into a holy life." The author thinks the legal fiction theory, as it might be called, is but a transference from one law to another, while Paul's idea was of an escape from the *law into life*.

#### IV. THE PERFECTION OF ATONEMENT.

The fourth main division of our work is a most fascinating discussion of the doctrine of the Atonement. Space permits but the briefest sort of a sketch. Free from all theological technical terms, and using examples and analogies appealing strongly to the moral sense, it is popular: confining itself only to that which we can know, and carefully defining the limits of our knowledge, so as to exclude the unknowable, it is clear: taking into account all the elements that enter into this most complex conception, it is broad. Broad in scope, clear in treatment, and popular in style, there is also brought to it from the personality of the writer that subtle power of a quick sympathy, a lively imagination, and deep poetic insight which is such an essential endowment in fathoming the profound fact of the Atonement or in comprehending the apostles' conception of it.

The Atonement, it is contended, is not to be defined; because (1) its final definition is impossible; (2) because the attempt at definition has always led to misconception and strife; and (3) because a definition is not needed—*the word itself is clearer than any definition can make it*. As to the etymology of the word itself it means an *At-one-ment*. It begins in the love of God which impels Him to reveal Himself to man—to give Himself. This self-communication of God is accomplished in the Incarnation. This, the writer thinks, would have come to pass even had sin not entered into the world. The Atonement is however the form given to the Incarnation by the presence of sin in the world. "Christ must now reveal the divine love as a suffering love, a sacrificial love, a reconciling love, in order to bring man back to God." "It is love put to the test."

The four aspects of the sense of sin, mentioned above as shame, pain, fear, and hope, are each met by one of the four aspects of the Atonement. As it removes the shame of impurity it is a *sin-offering*;<sup>\*</sup> as it frees from the pain of bondage it is a *ransom*;<sup>†</sup> as it claims the apprehension of guilt, it is a *satisfaction*, the payment of a debt;<sup>‡</sup> as it crowns the hope of mercy it is a reconciliation.<sup>§</sup> These terms must however be used with the new meaning which an enlightened Christian consciousness has poured into them, and not in the antiquated sense of a theology that has grown lifeless.

The substitution of the sin-offering, for instance, was not a putting of Christ in our stead, as if our guilt had been assumed by Him, or punished in Him. Such a substitution is a moral impossibility. The substitution was the substitution of humanity *plus* Christ for humanity *minus* Christ. He bore our sins not *apart from* us, but *with* us.

The redemption was not a buying back from Satan nor the payment of a price to God: we were ransomed in the sense

<sup>\*</sup> Heb. 9:19-28; I. Jno. 1: 7; Rev. 1: 5.

<sup>†</sup> I. Tim. 2: 6; Gal. 4: 5; Eph. 1: 7; Col. 1: 14.

<sup>‡</sup> Gal. 5: 3; II. Cor. 5: 21; I. Peter 3: 18.

<sup>§</sup> Eph. 2: 14, 16; I. Tim. 2: 5.

that Christ's victory over the power of Darkness was the beginning of our own victory.

In explaining the Atonement as a satisfaction, the author with true poetic instinct as well as theological insight says, "the emphasis is not to be laid exclusively, nor chiefly, upon His sufferings, but upon His holiness, upon His willing and complete obedience to the Father in all things. The mind which was in Christ Jesus, taking upon Himself the form of a servant, and humbling Himself even unto the death of the cross—this mind of obedience, he says, was the priceless jewel worth more than enough to pay the whole debt of righteousness.

Viewing the Atonement as a reconciliation we must put away from our minds anything like the thought of an unwillingness on God's part to pardon the guilty that must in some way or other be overcome. "The Atonement is never to be regarded as the cause of God's grace. It is the result and the seal of His grace . . . the channel made by grace through which all the blessed effects of divine love may flow, across the bitter waste that sin has made, to all who hunger and thirst after righteousness in order that they may be filled."

The Atonement as viewed by Christ Himself is described by figures which go more deeply into the heart of the mystery and had they been more frequently in mind in past discussions, they would have contributed much to an understanding of the character of the mystery, even though they would not have solved it.

According to one of these figures, His sacrifice is the falling of a corn of wheat into the ground, and dying, producing much fruit. Again, the Good Shepherd gives His life for the sheep, and dying, saves them. Again, Christ's Atonement is a sanctifying of Himself as the first-fruits of a universal sanctification of believers. And finally His blood is the blood of the New Covenant which God has made with us. Here again Jesus' mode of presentation of the mystery has frequently yielded deeper insight to the poetic sense than to the scholastic temperament.



The fourth main division of our work closes with a rich section referring the Atonement to "the Love that passeth knowledge," justifying the doctrine against the caricatures of it which have done so much to discredit it in thoughtful minds, and also showing how in it mercy and justice meet and are satisfied. Nothing short of a reproduction of the whole section would give anything like an adequate representation of its value.

There remains only the conclusion which shows triumphantly that the "Message of the Cross" which has spoken to every age is exactly suited to this age. "It is neither low, nor narrow, nor immoral, nor obsolete; nor is it a gospel to be ashamed of in the presence of learning and refinement and moral earnestness. The spiritual experience it brings is neither unreal nor fantastic,—a matter of sentiment of no large influence in the world."

"We need," says the author in concluding, "in this day of deepening insight, increasing labor, and heavier pressing burden of the soul—now, more than ever, we need to know a God who is above us, but also with us and for us. A God who is willing to suffer with His suffering children; a God who Himself freely pays the greatest price that ever can be paid for the vindication of the holy law of life and the redemption of mankind from evil; a God whose sacrifice is *the* Atonement, taking away the sin of the world, covering alike the transgressions of the ignorant and the degraded and the deeper offenses of the enlightened and the privileged, and giving to all who repent a sure pledge of Divine forgiveness and help,—to believe in such a God is peace and courage and a new hope for the world. Where shall the men of to-day find this Immanuel, this present, sympathizing, suffering, redeeming Love?"

"On the Cross of Calvary this God is revealed, crowned with thorns and enduring death for our sake."

## VI.

### THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIENCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS SOCIAL FUNCTIONS.

BY THE EDITOR.

Conscience in general, as a developed faculty, may be defined as the sense of moral worth, or the organ for the cognition of the good and the right. This definition implies that moral goodness and right are objective realities, and not mere creations of the organs through which they are subjectively realized. They exist in the nature of things, and primarily in the being of God; and man's function in relation to them is to cognize them and through the exercise of volition take them up into his own spiritual life. As man's moral life, however, is lived in society, or in the fellowship of his kind, and as the good for which he is destined is a social reality, namely, the kingdom of God, it will follow that the organs through which it is to be realized, especially the conscience, must be socially conditioned. These are the fundamental propositions which are to be maintained and illustrated in the following pages.

Verbally conscience may be defined as *joint-knowledge*—*conscientia* being derived from *con* and *scire*. If this definition be adopted, the force of the connective particle may, in the first place, be construed in a subjective sense, that is, in the sense that in such knowledge there are united at least two knowing subjects, namely, the *self* and *God*. The self knows its own acts and its own states, and it knows that in this knowledge it has a partner, namely, the infinite and all-knowing God, from whose eyes there is no hiding. Men may conceal their inner states from the cognizance of their fellow men; but they can not conceal them from God the omniscient judge of the universe; and the consciousness of this being open to the

eyes of God may be said to be the *conscience*. But the connection supposed to be involved in the word may also, secondly, be taken in an objective sense, namely, in the sense of knowing one thing in relation to another thing—in this case an act in relation to a law. Thus Robert South has said “that conscience imparts double or joint-knowledge, to wit, one of a divine law or rule, the other of a man’s own action.” A man always knows his acts in relation to an objective law which he feels himself under obligation to obey.

These definitions are interesting, and accord pretty well with our present conceptions of the foundation and nature of morality; but they could hardly have been in the minds of those who first formed the word *conscience*. They had in mind something more simple and more directly obvious. Now the particle *con* or *cum*, in Latin, is often *intensive* rather than *connective*. Thus we have *fido*, *confido*; *facio*, *conficio*; *dono*, *condono*; *cremo*, *concremo*; *credo*, *concredo*, and many other words of like formation. In Greek the corresponding particle *σύν*, in composition, has often the same force. Giving the particle this force in the word *conscience*, then this word will mean *thorough, complete, perfect moral knowledge*—knowledge about which there is and can be no doubt, of which one is personally certain, from which there can be no getting away, with which there can be no trifling, of which a man can not rid himself, whose validity he can not deny without denying the integrity of his own mind, and which he is always bound to accept as an infallible witness either for or against himself—a witness, moreover, whose voice grows the louder and the more imperious, the more it may be resisted or neglected. The two interpretations of the word, however, come in the end to the same result, namely, the notion of *direct, personal, undoubted moral knowledge*, that is knowledge of an ideal or law by which we feel ourselves to be unconditionally bound in our conduct.

From what has now been said it will appear that the *conscience* is essentially and primarily a *personal* function of the

human soul. It is something that belongs to each man personally, and is all his own. One man does not share his conscience with any other man, just as he does not share his personality with any other. A man's conscience is not part merely of the current moral opinion transmitted by tradition from one generation to another; for it may often have to pass judgment upon this opinion. Nor does one man's conscience form part of a common entity called *universal conscience*. There are no universal entities apart from concrete and particular things. That philosophy of logical realism, which transforms general conceptions of the understanding into real metaphysical entities, has now but few adherents, and these are generally out of sympathy with the whole modern universe of thought. For us, therefore, such terms as race-conscience, race-sin, race-guilt, and the like, no longer denote any existing realities. They are abstractions only, by which the thinking mind expresses a law of relations between individuals past and present. This law of relations is the only reality corresponding to such general conceptions. The general conception of humanity expresses the idea that all men stand to each other in a relation of solidarity, or of organic unity, and that their personal qualities are developed in this reciprocal relation; and it does not mean at all that there exists somewhere outside of and before all individual men some metaphysical essence called humanity as the subject of qualities which are imparted to individual men by division. If, then, we speak of national intelligence, for instance, or of national honor, or national conscience, or social conscience, the meaning is not that there is an intelligence, or honor, or conscience belonging to the nation, or to society, as a sort of universal moral personality, but that there exists an influential reciprocal relation between the intelligence, honor, and conscience of all the individuals of a nation or community. Every man's conscience is his own, as every man's personality and character are his own, notwithstanding the fact that each one is what he is only in consequence of his relation to all, and in consequence of a process

of development going forward in the body of the related individuals. We believe that in these propositions we have expressed the facts of human nature as they are. Every man is an independent subject or person, existing for himself, and responsible for himself. And yet every man is a member of a larger organic whole by whose presence and power he is largely influenced and determined. We may not be able to understand the facts, but there they are.

This implies that while the developed conscience of the individual is his own personal endowment, or gift bestowed upon him by His Maker, it is not given him in utter isolation, nor as a ready-made or finished faculty. The individual conscience is not a stock of innate ideas, bestowed upon each man separately. It is a growth, the result of an evolutionary process, embracing in its movement, along with the present individual, all individuals of all past time. In fact, as the organ of moral knowledge, the individual conscience is the immediate gift of *heredity*, in which has been capitalized the moral life of all past generations; while its proper exercise is conditioned by the accumulated moral thought and sentiment of the present generation of men. And yet it is not for this reason any the less divine in its nature. Mr. Charles Darwin, in the fourth and fifth chapters of his *Descent of Man*, has written a natural history of conscience, showing how it must necessarily have developed out of the social instinct which appears in the higher species of animals; and yet Mr. Darwin joins in all that Kant has said of the mysterious and imperious power of this solemn sense of *ought*, that lays down for men a law of conduct which they may not with impunity transgress. So wonderful, indeed, is this power that the conscience has often been called *the voice of God in the soul*. But this can be regarded as true only in the sense that the divine constitution of the human soul has the law of God written in its nature, which in course of time the soul learns to read and interpret to itself. This ability to read the hand-writing of God impressed upon its own nature, which writing itself may be

regarded as progressive through generations, the soul does not possess from the beginning. It is an acquired ability, an ability that grows gradually, and an ability that grows under the stimulating influence of the accumulated moral thought and feeling now present in the social world of man. The conscience, then, though a divine faculty in man, which he as the offspring of God brings with him into the world, is yet, like every other faculty of the human soul, subject to the law of development and growth. It is, as we have already seen, the organ for assured, undoubted, personal knowledge of the right and the good. But before this organ can properly exercise its functions, it needs itself to be developed, trained, disciplined; and this requires the presence of developed conscience in the social organism of which the individual is a member. It follows, accordingly, that both the individual conscience and the social or collective conscience must be reciprocal factors as well as products in an *organic process of moral evolution*.

In this process of moral evolution which, accordingly, characterizes the individual and the race alike, we may distinguish three main stages. These may be denominated the *essential*, the *empirical*, and the *spiritual*, or *Christian*. The essential stage of moral development is the stage of childhood. The essential conscience is the immediate or instinctive perception of moral worth, into which there enters as yet no reflection. It is the conscience of the child. The child, during the process of awakening self-consciousness, has a *sense* of moral distinctions, and is instinctively moral, in the sense that the moral law written on its heart tends to manifest itself in a corresponding moral life; as the law of vegetation tends to manifest itself in the form and motions of the plant. Young children are not demons, nor are they possessed of demons. They are not even young lions or tigers. But neither are they as yet *formally moral*. The idea of law has not yet entered into their consciousness. They are still "living without law." There was a time in history when the human race was in a like infantile condition. Of that condition the story of Paradise is a sym-

bolical myth; but it is only that. Historically we know nothing of the primitive condition of our race. We know nothing of our own infancy or childhood. It lies beyond the period of our memory. We know childhood only by observation of others. But we have never had the opportunity of observing the beginnings of a race; and so we can not know the precise condition, either intellectual or moral, of our own race in its origin, except that we may suppose it to be highly probable that it resembled in general the condition of childhood. There is a law of physical development which has been called the law of recapitulation: it is the law that in its embryonic development a living being passes through the same forms through which its ancestors passed in the evolution of the race. This law doubtless applies also to intellectual and moral development; the moral history of the individual must be regarded as a recapitulation of the moral history of the race; and so we may conclude with a considerable degree of certainty that the human race must have begun its moral as well as its intellectual career in an infantile state. No moral being *could* begin its existence in any other state. Developed morality, moral character, could not be given offhand in the process of creation, no matter how we may suppose that process to have been accomplished. A machine may be constructed offhand with all the qualities which it is ever to possess, but not so a moral being. Morality is morality only when it is self-chosen and self-acquired. But in order that it may be self-acquired, there must be a state in which the moral subject does not yet possess it, that is, an *infantile state*. How long this state may have continued, by what influences it was at last brought to an end, how much the physical and animal worlds, and how much divine agency may have had to do with the process of development, we do not and can not know. Mr. Darwin has painted a very plausible picture of the beginnings of moral development; but that the picture is an exact counterpart of reality, Mr. Darwin himself would have been the last to claim.

But we do know that in the case of the individual human



being there comes a time when the child passes into the youth, and then into the man. The instinctive life of childhood gives way to reflective life. The moral idea awakes in the soul. The sense of obligation arises. The boy comes to be under the law, and is confronted by precepts, mostly of a negative kind, like the ten commandments; and now he is compelled to choose between good and evil, obedience and disobedience, and makes mistakes. This is the beginning of the empirical stage in the process of individual moral development. The empirical conscience is the perception of concrete moral duties, at first mainly of the negative kind; or it is moral knowledge in its process of development, in which it is not yet always certain of its contents, but is liable to error. The right is recognized as something objective, and outward authority is sought for as the guide of life; but in the choice of right and in obedience to authority mistakes are frequent, and the moral life runs in uncertain and tortuous channels. Why does the conscience in its moral decisions ever make mistakes? It would be an easy thing to say that this is a consequence of the "Adamic fall." But why does a child, when beginning to walk, make slips and get falls? Or why does a boy make mistakes when learning to read or to cipher? Is that, too, a consequence of the fall? We may, indeed, with St. Paul ascribe the liability to moral error as well as to perversity of moral choice, to the "flesh," or to "the law of sin in the members." But whence comes that law of sin? What have we gained when we have referred its origin to the fall of the first man? That there is such a thing as a hereditary tendency to evil in human nature is doubtless true; but if we account for its existence by the "Adamic fall," how shall we account for that fall? Was human nature ever essentially different from what it is now? These are questions whose answer is not as easy as many may think. We can easily enough see that error and sin in a developing moral being must always be possibilities; but to explain the reality is not so easy. In fact, if we could explain it, that is, refer error and sin to antecedent causes, would they not then cease to be evil? They

would thus become *necessary*, and so *unmoral*. But *through* error and sin, under the environing influence of human society, the moral individual now passes from its *essential* into its *empirical* stage.

This empirical stage of individual moral development must likewise have had its counterpart in the moral history of the race. The race, too, must have passed from the condition of moral childhood, in which there was as yet no sense of law and consequently no possibility of sin, into the condition of moral youth with its sense of authority, its commandments, its temptations, its moral lapses, and its legal restraints. The beginning of this stage of moral development in the race, as we believe, is symbolized in the old Semitic story of the temptation and fall in Paradise. There we have, first, the idea of law and of commandment, and then the idea of temptation and of transgression, and also an intimation of the part played by the vegetable and animal worlds in the moral awakening of the youthful race. The empirical stage of moral development in the history of the race was the stage of law; which in large sections of mankind is not past yet. And the law was believed to be based upon outward authority—upon the authority of Jahveh in Israel, and upon that of the gods among other nations. Lycurgus is said to have received the laws of Sparta from the oracle at Delphi, and Numa Pompilius was reported to have received the laws of Rome from the nymph Egeria, while the laws of the Old Testament were supposed to have been communicated to Moses in the desert of Sinai. In these representations there is a witness to this truth, that all real law has its origin in the bosom of God; although its revelation may not come by an immediate miracle from the sky, but mediately through the moral nature of chosen and enlightened men. That the claim of a direct divine promulgation of any legal code can not be taken literally, should be plain from the fact that all such codes contain provisions of which the Christian conscience can not now approve. Outward authority and inward uncertainty, along with much moral formalism and

hypocrisy, have always been characteristics of the legal stage of morality, whether as existing in ancient Judaism, where the law crucified the Christ, or in the modern Catholic Church, where the true freedom of conscience has never yet been acknowledged.

But the end of moral development is freedom in the truth. The stage of youth, with its legalism, its aberrations, its restraints, and its discipline, must give way to the stage of manhood, with its firmness, its self-reliance, its certainty of moral knowledge, and its freedom. This is the spiritual or Christian stage of moral development; although it should be observed that the two stages are not separated by any hard and fast line, so that it could always be definitely made out where one stage ends and another begins. With some men, like Paul and Augustine, the process of transition may be comparatively sudden and soon relatively complete; but with the majority the process of conversion is slow and gradual. They attain to the stature of manhood in Christ Jesus by no means with the years of physical maturity; and many a full grown man is only a babe in Christ. From the writings of the New Testament we are all familiar with the distinction between the *natural* or *psychical* and the *spiritual* man in the human individual. The psychical man is the man of the finite understanding, the man whose mind is governed mainly by principles of sense and worldly prudence, and whose conscience is often distracted by the discordant claims of a worldly wisdom. The spiritual man, on the other hand, is the man of the *reason*, that is, of the faculty for the infinite and eternal, the man who, in the phrase of Coleridge, judges not according to sense, but according to the eternal principles of right and truth—the man whose conscience no longer apprehends merely scattered rays, but takes in the full-orbed light of the Eternal Reason in God. The spiritual conscience, then, in its completed form, is the absolute or perfect conscience. It is moral knowledge in its certainty, in which there is no longer any hesitation or doubt. And in reference to this stage of moral development Kant's

proposition may be accepted, though with some modification of its meaning, that "an erring conscience is a chimera." Here the spiritual nature of man has come to its full realization. For it should be observed that the spiritual element in man, that out of which the spiritual conscience, or the *pneumatic* man, grows, is not an element added to the natural, or psychical, at any time subsequent to the individual's creation. Potentially the spiritual is present in the natural from the beginning, and moreover to some extent always looks through the natural, and thus announces its presence and power. The human soul is one, and from the beginning involves, as latent capacities, all the powers and faculties which are subsequently to come into full exercise. Thus the faculties of intelligence and reason are present more or less already in the life of sense, making sense-perception in man something essentially different from what it is in the animal. The animal can see *color* in a flower or picture, but man can see *beauty*. In order really to see beauty, however, the eye must be trained. And so, while the higher principles of reason and conscience are present in the understanding and will of the natural man, yet they can perform their proper functions only after a long process of spiritual discipline and training under the stimulating influence of a corresponding moral environment.

The legal stage of moral development in history was bound to pass into the Christian; as boyhood is bound to pass into manhood. The law must give way to the gospel, in order that a spiritual conscience and a truly spiritual life may be possible; not that the eternal principles of the divine law of righteousness and goodness are ever to be abolished, but that they are to be transfigured in a new manifestation of the divine life of love. It is the principle of love which constitutes the essential difference between the law and the gospel. The law could command love, but it could not realize a life of love. That is possible only after a personal manifestation of the love of God in the gospel. In the legal stage of morality a conscientious man does right because it is commanded; or, rather, he does

what is commanded, whether he knows it to be right or not. In the Christian stage a man does the right because he knows it to be right, and loves it as right. And it is this identity of moral knowledge and love that constitutes the essence of the Christian conscience in distinction from the conscience in its empirical or legal form. Now of the conscience in this spiritual form Christ is the author. He is Himself the principal conscience of humanity. It is true that there were anticipations of it in old Israel, in Judaism, and in the civilized nations of antiquity generally. The spirit that was in the heart of humanity was often piercing through the outward shell or crust of law, producing such men as Isaiah, Jeremiah, Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, and John, the Baptist; but the first complete man of the Spirit, the first perfect *ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός*, was Jesus Christ. In Him the spirit which had been in the prophets, the light which had been shining in and struggling with the darkness, became man; and in consequence of this a new day, a new moral age, arose for humanity, that shall never have an end. The result of the appearing of Christ is a new moral humanity, in which the original idea and spirit of humanity are realized—a humanity which has the mind of Christ, and in which there is gradually formed a new “crust of custom,” a fixed moral order and life, that shall serve to mould the mind and life of every human individual into the same fashion.

We all understand to how large an extent our life universally is moulded by the life of the society into which we have been placed by the dispensation of providence. While each individual man is a person, existing for himself, making himself, and being responsible for the result, yet this work of self-realization is possible for the individual man only in connection with others of his kind. It is essentially a social work. This is true of the realization of our physical nature. We inherit the color of our skin, hair, and eyes, the shape of our nose and lips, in fact, our whole physical frame, from the race and family to which we belong. The same is true of our in-

tellectual attainments. The very words of our language, which have so much to do with our intelligence and thought, are an inheritance from the past generations of our race, which we possess in common with our kindred. Both language and intelligence, accordingly, are social possessions. There is a story of an Egyptian king, Psameticus, that desiring to know what was the first and fundamental language of mankind, he had some children brought up in total isolation from others of their kind, supposing that the words which they would learn to form would be the primitive speech of men. But they formed no words at all. They uttered only inarticulate, animal sounds. It could not have been otherwise. Man in isolation would not be man; as Aristotle says, he would either be a beast or a god. He becomes man only in society. How the beginnings of society were made, or how the first man was socialized, is a question which perhaps we can never solve. We all know how eagerly the question as to the origin of language has been debated. But the debate is not yet ended. We can only say now that it could neither have been an immediate divine gift nor a human invention. It could, then, only have been an evolution of a potentiality innate in human nature—an evolution which must have required long æons of time, and in the accomplishment of which countless generations of men must have had a part.

And now what is true of language and intelligence is true also of conscience and morality. Man is indeed by nature a moral being, and is bound to have moral ideas and live a moral life. But under what precise conditions primitive men first began to develop their conscience, and to form what has been called "a cake of custom" as the basis of law, we may never be able fully to understand. We have already seen that the transition from the natural or unmoral to the formally moral condition of mankind must have resembled the transition from childhood to youth in the individual, and also how the most advanced peoples of antiquity pictured to themselves the nature of this transition. But that does not bring us any



the nearer to a real understanding of the process. We do understand, however, that *now* the development of conscience, like the development of language, is *possible only in society*, and takes place under the reciprocal influence of collective bodies and representative individuals of men. The individual gets his conscience, like his language, from society, and then reacts upon the common conscience and helps to develop it farther. Individual consciences, at the same time and place, do not differ much. They are all cast in the same general mould. King David's conscience could not have been like the conscience of St. John or St. Paul. It could only have been generally like the consciences of other men in the same age; and the spirit of the age had much to do with the formation of it. Every age has its own moral spirit; which, moreover, is something more than the generalized moral temper of the men and women then living; for in the life of every age there must be supposed to be present something of the Spirit of God, pervading the social atmosphere, and stimulating men to the formation of higher moral thoughts and sentiments. And hence the conscience of a David, for instance, while it could not sever its connection from the general temper of his age, could yet at times at least rise above that temper, and become a light to other consciences.

The example just referred to will serve to explain how moral progress may be made within an age. We have already seen how with the appearing of Christ a new moral spirit, or a new manifestation of the divine spirit of truth and love, came into humanity, forming the beginning of the Christian age. But this spirit was by no means all at once fully appropriated. In fact it has not been fully appropriated yet. The time is not yet long past when theologians and preachers endeavored to justify human slavery by appeals to the Bible. They were honest and conscientious men. But their conscience was in the main the conscience of their time, and it is now generally acknowledged to have been erroneous. But there were also other men, whose sense for the right was more acute,



and who had a keener ear for the heart-beats of a loving and impartially just God, who said, "No, the reduction of one human being by another to the condition of a *thing* can never be right, as God understands the right. However it may have been in those primitive times, when men were perpetually at war with each other, and when making slaves of prisoners may have been more humane than killing them; yet now, in this advanced Christian age, slavery can not be justified in the light of eternal right. It may, indeed, be entrenched in state and national constitutions, and in acts of Congress; but our conscience tells us that there is a 'higher law,' the 'unwritten and unchanging ordinance of Heaven,' which condemns slavery as wrong." Whence got these men this new conscience? In its origin their conscience was but the common conscience of their age; and what gave it this peculiar keenness and penetration was not a profounder study of the Bible, or a more careful reading of church authority, but a readier susceptibility to the stimulating influence of the ever present and active spirit of Christ in the Christian world. It was this quickening spirit that made these men's consciences beacon lights to the moral life of their time, which finally overthrew slavery, and compelled the recognition of the manhood of men. It is thus that moral progress is achieved. But there are still wrongs existing even in the Christian world, to which the conscience of the many seems to be asleep. In our age, for example, capitalism is putting on airs, and assuming rights over against humanity, in which there is all the old selfishness, and hardness, and greed of the slave-system, and for which theologians are still heard apologizing, on the pretended ground that it is not the will of God that all men should be equal. God, it is said, has not made all men with equal capacities. Some are by nature strong, while others are weak; and as far as the goods of this world are concerned, "it must be right for those to get who have the power," although the few should get all, and the many have nothing. These are claims which we may be sure the conscience of the future will not approve. It has not

sc learned to understand Christ. We believe that the time is not far off when the Christian conscience will thoroughly agree with Prof. Nash, to the effect that the social problem now before the Christian nations is to individualize and moralize the downmost man, and so to make him really count for one in the social organism. And we believe, further, that there is a time coming when these "privileges" and these "franchises," about which we now hear so much and which are so shocking to the better moral sense of mankind, will not bring more money in the market, than a colored man would now bring on a Virginia auction block. And it is the social conscience, now forming under the influence of the new Christian spirit which has taken possession of our theology and literature, that will work the social regeneration.

To speak of a social conscience, then, implies, in the first place, that there exists a relation of solidarity among mankind, which extends to the moral as well as to the physical and intellectual life of men. And this means, on the one hand, that the individual's sense of right is partly hereditary and partly the result of environment. The stage of development of the individual conscience is conditioned by the progress of moral evolution in the race and in the nation. All men are children of their age, and no one can escape from the moral influence which the age exerts. Nor should the moral authority belonging to an age or a community ever be lightly set aside. To disregard it would lead to a moral individualism and sectarianism that would make any true social life impossible. But the idea of solidarity means also, on the other hand, that individuals are bound to react on their age, either for better or for worse, and that it is in this way that new ages and new stages of moral development are prepared. Progress in the development of the social conscience must ever be the result of new and higher forms of action on the part of the individual conscience. The men whose conscience towers above that of the common mass, and who are not satisfied with the moral opinions, or with what may be called the moral consciousness

of their time, are ever preparing the way for new moral ages, and for the final coming of the Kingdom of God as the absolute moral good. And these are the prophets and teachers of the race. They are the men who speak for God, nay, the men in whom God Himself speaks to the world. They are the organs for the progressive manifestation of the divine truth and righteousness. How they come to be such organs we can not tell. That is their own secret. Who can tell how the artist comes to have the ideal which he embodies in marble or on canvas? And so, who can tell how the prophet gets his inspiration? Doubtless much study and reflection on the works of nature and on history, and an anxious listening for the voice of God "in the mass of things forever speaking," form a condition of this inspiration. But the inspiration implies something more: it implies an immediate touch of the human spirit with the Spirit of God, which enables a man, without having heard any audible voice from heaven, to say, "I have the mind of the Lord." The prophets of Israel were men of this character. They knew that they had the Spirit of God, and could begin their discourses, therefore, with a "Thus saith the Lord." In a lower degree men like Socrates and Plato fulfilled the same office among other nations; so that among the Gentiles, too, God left Himself not without witness, and there are evidences everywhere of moral development. And such men are never wanting in any age or among any people. The Reformers of the sixteenth century were such men. They were in an eminent sense men of conscience. In regard to moral and religious things they were not satisfied with mere authority, that is, with mere tradition and report from the past; they preached to their contemporaries "the things which they themselves had seen and heard" with the inward eyes and ears of the soul, and of which, therefore, they were entirely certain; and thus they created a new moral and religious conscience for the modern world. And all preachers of the Gospel should be men of this type. Their calling is not merely to declare the dogmatic and moral traditions of the past; but

knowing what the mind of the Lord is in regard to existing problems and conditions, they are to get that mind into the conscience of the present generation. The preachers of the Gospel are to be the moulders of the common conscience of their time, and thus the leaders of the moral and social life in their communities.

But this leads us, finally, to the consideration of another application of the idea of social conscience, which is of special importance in view of the social conditions of the present time. The idea of the social conscience may be taken to denote the conscience in its special direction to the social, organic, political, and institutional affairs of men. In this sense it has to do with the public policies and pursuits of communities and nations, and with the duties of individuals in relation to these policies and pursuits. This is in analogy with other applications of the term conscience. We speak, for instance, of a scientific, a theological, a commercial conscience. The scientific conscience is the conscience in relation to scientific pursuits, and forbids the acceptance or teaching of anything in science that contradicts accepted scientific principles. The scientific conscience requires that in science nothing be accepted that is known to be false, or that can not be verified in the court of strictest reason. It would be a violation of the scientific conscience, if a modern teacher of geography were to maintain the Ptolemaic theory of the earth and the heavens, because it seems to be the theory which is implied in the Bible, and because the presentation of any other would still be offensive to some good Christian people. It was a violation of Galileo's scientific conscience when he was required to recant a theory of the earth which he knew to be true. So the theological conscience requires that in theology nothing be accepted or taught on mere authority or tradition. It says, "Let each man be fully persuaded in his own mind." Theological truth, especially where it trenches upon the domain of the moral or practical life, must authenticate itself in the form of conscience. "If the Bible teaches the lawfulness of

slavery," Albert Barnes is reported once to have said, "then so much the worse for the Bible." That illustrates the attitude which the theological conscience must assume over against all merely external authority. It bids the theologian above all things to be true to the truth.

And, now, in a similar sense we may speak of the conscience in its relation to the public or social life of men. And this, then, is in a preëminent sense the *social conscience*. It has to do with the conduct of politics, with the formation and execution of governmental policies, with the administration of justice, with the management of elections, and with the innumerable details of men's relations to each other in organized society; and it demands that in all these relations the same moral principles should prevail by which a man governs his private life. It is the function of conscience, in this view, to guard public honesty and justice, and to compel men to respect the dictates of the moral law in the performance of political and civil duties. It says to the citizen that he may not vote for a man whom he knows to be corrupt, or for a policy which he knows to be morally bad, because they are endorsed by his party; and it says to the legislator that he may not assist in the passage of a law that violates moral principles, because it may be useful to his constituents, or because it is demanded by the party which elected him. The social conscience says to every man that in the discharge of public functions he can not excuse himself for wrong doing by pleading public opinion. If public opinion is wrong, then his social conscience will make it at least the Christian's duty to do what lies in his power to correct it; and in doing what public opinion approves, a man's social conscience will warn him that he must give his own personal account to God, and that in the last great tribunal nothing but personal integrity will be accepted. The fact that so many men in public life are disregardful of the common principles of morality, is due doubtless to a lack of conscience in this social sense. If there are good men who question whether public affairs come within

the sphere of morality at all, what wonder is it that public men should seem to be wholly without conscience, and that political corruption and dishonesty should run riot? And, finally, it is the function of the social conscience to insist on strict and impartial justice to all men; which means that, in the language of J. S. Mill, "each man shall count for one, and nobody for more than one," in the social order, or that every man shall have an equal chance with every other man for the development of his personality. Whatever interferes with that principle must receive the condemnation of every conscience that is according to God, who is no respecter of persons. The social conscience can never be satisfied until the downmost man has been completely individualized and moralized, and the law of liberty, fraternity, and equality has become the universal law of social life.

And these ideals of the social conscience form a goal which we believe must and will be realized in the moral history of the world. But the world seems not yet to be very near this goal. In fact, it seems as if at the present moment the march of events were rather away from it, than towards it. When a large part of the press and even of the pulpit of a country has nothing but sneers for the struggles of a brave but feeble nation trying to save itself from extermination at the hands of a mighty but merciless bully; when the desires and efforts of the working men to improve their condition, are frowned upon as impertinent and preposterous by many of the leaders of public opinion, and even by some administrators of law and justice; when great and wealthy churches derive revenues from rows of tenement houses which shelter sweat-shops, and in which women are worked to death on starvation wages, and children are killed off by lack of food, and air, and sunshine; when politicians mock at decent honesty, and elections are purchased with money, and votes sold openly in the legislature, and the scales of justice swayed by big lawyer's fees; and when bank wrecking, and railroad robberies, and kidnapping, and murders and lynchings are things of daily occur-



rence;—when such is the social condition of any country, surely the social ideal is yet far off, and there is need for men with the courage of prophets to stir up the conscience of the people, and to work for the realization of a better state of social morality. And such a work is not an impossibility. The popular conscience is not dead, but only dormant, and waiting to be aroused into action by the prophets and teachers of the people. And these will not be wanting. Any one who has faith in God and man will not despair. For “God is in His Heaven”; and though we may not yet be able to say with Browning that “All’s right with the world,” we can at least say that all *will be right*. The Kingdom of Heaven may have to be entered through much tribulation, but humanity will enter it—at last. And that “at last” may be hastened in its coming. It will never come so long as the mass of men are satisfied with their low ideals, and wave aside all suggestions of higher and better social conditions with jests about the “millennium.” Things will never be right in the social, political, and economic world, we often hear it said, until the millennium shall have come. But the millennium, understanding by that term a condition of “peace on earth among men of good will,” such as the first gospel message holds out to the world, will never come so long as men do not really believe in it or desire its realization. The millennium, or perfected Kingdom of God, can only come through the agency of men of good will and good conscience. And it will come when the social conscience shall have become so enlightened and sensitive that it will no longer tolerate any lower or less ideal conditions. Just so soon as the social conscience shall have been sufficiently informed and developed to believe in a higher and purer social life, and to demand its realization in a measure answerable to the first gospel promise, so soon that realization will come; and surely it must be considered to be the duty of preachers of the gospel so to quicken the popular conscience by informing it with the Christian idea, that the result may speedily be a new moral and social world.



## VII.

### THE TEACHING OF JESUS.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN C. BOWMAN, D.D.

The teaching of Jesus must ever be regarded as fundamental and regulative for christian thought and life. In connection with the person of Jesus it constitutes the foundation of the christian system.

But while the teaching of Jesus is thus closely related to the origin of christianity it is yet a comparatively recent science. It is included in New Testament Theology, which holds a very prominent place both in the curriculum of theological schools and in theological literature.

New Testament Theology is the product of the historico-critical method applied to the New Testament Scripture. It deals with the material of the New Testament purely on its own basis and in its own light, uninfluenced by later doctrinal development. It asks and aims to answer the questions: What did the writers of the New Testament believe? What did they teach? It takes no account of confessional doctrines or ecclesiastical traditions, but confines itself to its own clearly defined province.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the effect of the science upon Dogmatic Theology and traditional belief has been of a most telling character. It has served as a touchstone to test the claims of the doctrines of the church, and has become a potent factor in the present process of theological reconstruction. Its influence has been similarly felt in the department of Exegesis. The rigid lexico grammatical method which hitherto has generally prevailed and which may be said to have culminated in Meyer, who is regarded as the prince of exegetes, is fast yielding to the biblico-theological method of interpretation, which is far richer and deeper, and more satisfying to

the religious and moral life of men, and to the demands of the intellect as well.

Of this new theological science the teaching of Jesus, as might be expected, occupies a very important place. Gradually it has come to occupy the chief place, and latterly has grown into such importance as to be regarded as a science in itself. I shall direct attention to some of its chief and characteristic features.

In studying the Teaching of Jesus, as scientifically presented in the works written by New Testament scholars in recent years, one is impressed, first of all, by the silence observed by each and all respecting some of the leading doctrines of the church. Conspicuous by their absence are chapters on the Trinity and the Miraculous Conception of Jesus.

In the discussions of Weiss, Beyschlag, Holtzman, Bruce, Adeney, and Stevens, these doctrines are passed over without any recognition. However influential they may have been in shaping the thought of the church, and however necessary they may be, or seem to be, to the science of theology, to the mind of the New Testament theologian of the present generation they have no place in the teaching of Jesus.

Nor is this an oversight. New Testament theologians are not ignorant of the text of the Gospels. On this alone they claim to build. Yet neither in the Synoptics, nor in the fourth Gospel do they find a Trinity-doctrine. Impliedly they deny a warrant for the doctrine in the Gospel records. The last words accredited to Jesus by St. Matthew: "Go ye, therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" (28: 19), seem to drop entirely out of account. And one may be even more surprised to find that the New Testament theologians assign no reason for the exclusion of the passage from the teaching of Jesus. This, of course, does not satisfy the average reader. He therefore consults other authorities, those of well-known exegetical and critical scholarship, and, as a result, finds the silence of the New Testament theologians

explained and vindicated. The "Expositor's Greek Testament," in its exegesis of the concluding verse of the first Gospel, says: "Perhaps it is not to be taken as an exact report of what Jesus said to his disciples at a certain time and place." Sanday, who is generally cautious and conservative, says in his very able article on "God" in Hasting's Bible Dictionary (vol. 2, p. 213): "A definition of the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament would be an anachronism. As related to the New Testament, the most that can be said of the doctrine is that it has been worked out of data contained in the New Testament. \* \* \* \* The command to the apostles at the end of the First Gospel belongs to a comparatively late and suspected part of the Gospel." This view is confirmed by Weiss-Meyer: "The evangelist here presents in summary form what the christian community had come to recognize as the will and the purpose of their exalted Lord." If, then, the group of authors referred to are to be followed as trustworthy guides, we may no longer rest the argument for the doctrine of the persons of the God-head on the teaching of Jesus, not even on the teaching of the Pauline epistles. We must look to a later time, and trace the evolution of the doctrine through the theological controversies on the subject of the Trinity, which found its fullest expression in the Athanasian creed.

As to the other notable omission, that of the Miraculous Conception, I have yet to discover any reference to it on the part of any of the writers on the Teaching of Jesus. Nor is it mentioned in any recent work on New Testament Theology. From this it is to be inferred that the Infancy-Narratives of the first and second Gospels, which have been made the foundation of the Church's doctrine of the deity of Jesus Christ, have no place either in the teaching of Jesus or in the theology of the New Testament. This becomes more remarkable in view of the fact that writers on the Teaching of Jesus seek to prove that Jesus to a greater or less degree was influenced in His teaching by the conditions and the thought of His age. Prevailing religious ideas, it is claimed, entered into the "thought-

world" of Jesus; and historical criticism traces the influence of contemporaneous belief in the conversations which Jesus held with His disciples, and in His controversies with opponents. It is admitted at the same time that Jesus possessed a religious knowledge and belief far in advance of, and superior to, the thought and belief of His age. Did the Doctrine of the supernatural birth enter into the knowledge of Jesus and perceptibly influence His teaching? It would seem not to have done so, if we rightly interpret the omission of all reference to the matter from the books written by biblical theologians. They show no trace of the knowledge of a Miraculous Conception in the teaching of Jesus, nor, indeed, in any of the New Testament writings, apart from the Infancy-Narratives in the first two Gospels. Here is an *argumentum e silentio* which points in two directions: (1) The Infancy-Narratives, while included in the New Testament literature, are not regarded as belonging to the earliest tradition, and are not to be reckoned as a factor in the teaching of Jesus and of His apostles. (2) The doctrine of the Miraculous Conception is not a doctrine taught by Jesus, and forms no chapter in the theology of the New Testament.

From these instances of silence, no less than from their explicit teaching, it is very apparent that these later interpreters in their presentation of the teaching of Jesus make large use of the results of Biblical Criticism. In calling attention to their silence respecting the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Miraculous Conception, I would not be understood as representing the writers as assailing these doctrines. They simply let them alone, as they let alone much else that has held, and still holds, a prominent place in systems of theology.

What may be their personal opinion or belief concerning the doctrines to which special reference has been made, we do not, and need not, know. We do know, however, that they exclude these doctrines from the teaching of Jesus. This is a consensus of judgment on the part of writers who have pursued their course of study independently, and with the one aim of setting forth the teaching of the Master.

The omissions which have been cited as a characteristic feature of the recent literature on the Teaching of Jesus, are not the only instances of silence respecting important doctrinal tenets. The doctrines of Predestination, the Fall, Total Depravity, the Atonement, the Sacraments are likewise passed by in silence. As in the former instances, so here, there is a presupposition, if not certainty, that these doctrines did not originate with the teaching of Jesus. Whether purposely or not, the writers draw a line of demarcation between the religion of Jesus, and theological beliefs and ecclesiastical practices. They do not regard the latter as coördinate with the former, whatever may be the relation which they sustain to the church, its teachings and usages.

In our consideration of the class of biblical literature under discussion more than ordinary emphasis has been laid upon what is not written in the books,—upon what the authors do not say. But there are times when silence may be of much greater significance than utterance. In a professedly unbiased scientific treatment of the teaching of Jesus it is a matter of no small importance to find that no notice whatever is taken of doctrines which have been regarded, and by some, are still regarded, as the very pillars of Christian belief,—necessary, indeed, to salvation itself.

It counts for much, that teachers, distinguished no less for Christian piety than for Christian scholarship, should omit altogether from their studies of the teachings of Jesus, doctrines which by many are made the test of loyalty to Jesus. It is claimed in behalf of these later pupils of Jesus, that their only purpose is to learn and to teach the truth as it is in Jesus. What He taught by word and deed they will accept and apply as the ultimate test of all doctrine. If Jesus is found to be silent respecting the doctrine of a school or of an age, whatever may be the strength of its following, His silence must be reckoned with in estimating the value of the doctrine.

The application of this test to existing doctrinal beliefs does not necessarily involve the overthrow of dogmatic systems,

or the rejection of particular doctrines which may not be directly traceable to the teachings of Jesus. It simply determines their relative value.

Dogmatics is far from being relegated to the limbo of desuetude. It will continue to hold an important place in the sphere of religious thought and life. But it should be apparent to any one who has carefully studied the progress of religious thought that Dogmatics, along with all other theological sciences, is becoming more and more subservient to the teachings of Jesus. The enlightened consciousness of the age, in seeking a standard of orthodoxy, looks with misgivings upon the decisions of ecclesiastical courts, and turns with increasing confidence and certitude to the teaching of Jesus. While accepting this primal standard, we need, however, to guard against unwarranted restrictions. It is the nature and the need of the religious mind to reproduce truth in new forms from age to age. Truth thus formulated into doctrine may render valuable service, even though the explicit teaching of Jesus be lacking as proof-texts for its support. Many doctrinal beliefs of this character have arisen in the past, and have served well their day, and they have their value still.

In the process of reconstruction of religious belief, now going forward, the question is not so much, whether certain doctrines shall be accepted or rejected, but whether or not they are essential to christian faith and life. In the reconstructive process it surely is of utmost importance to know what is the teaching of Jesus. And, as has been already stated, the silence of Jesus counts for much, very much, in estimating the value of a doctrine, and in adjusting it to its rightful place in the scale of christian belief. I may claim, therefore, not to have exaggerated the significance of the silences as a conspicuous feature of the class of biblical literature which has been brought under review.

Only briefly shall I refer to what appears upon the printed page. This is open to the public, and invites and merits its attention.



Of the several contributions to the comparatively recent science of the Teaching of Jesus, the two volumes by Wendt: *Die Lehre Jesu* (Eng. Trans., T. & T. Clark), may be regarded, in many respects, as the most comprehensive and scholarly. Several later and more popular works rest upon Wendt as their chief support, notably "The Revelation of Jesus," by Professor Gilbert.

The latest contribution is by Dr. George Barker Stevens, Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University.\* Of the minor works bearing upon the science this is the best representative. Dr. Stevens is favorably known to the theological world by his several works on New Testament studies. He possesses the admirable art of presenting in clear and precise form the best results of German critical scholarship, without wearying the reader with the minute details and the intricate processes which generally characterize the German mode of thought. To his skill in reproducing the thought of other minds is added the charm of his own clear and forceful thought.

The immediate precursor of the present little volume was the more comprehensive work by the same author on "The Theology of the New Testament," which is one of the series of the "International Theological Library" issued under the general editorship of Doctors Briggs and Salmond. The "Teaching of Jesus" is in large part a reproduction in succinct form of the twelve chapters which appeared in the earlier work, under "The Teaching of Jesus according to the Synoptic Gospels."

The revision shows marked improvement in the more sharply defined form of statement, and, in several instances, in modification of thought.

The author is not bound by that kind of consistency which is said to be the vice of small minds. He advances beyond some of his former positions with the freedom that is born of the love of truth. One who is engaged in the work of recon-

\*"The Teaching of Jesus," The Macmillan Company, New York.



structing theology should not shrink from the reconstruction of his own thought.

The contents of the book appear under fifteen chapters. Three of these are mainly of an introductory character, followed by the discussion of twelve general themes, as follows: Jesus' Attitude towards the Old Testament, The Kingdom of God, The Father in Heaven, The Son of Man, The Son of God, The Value and Destiny of Man, The Natural and Spiritual Worlds, The Religion of a Good Life, The Means of Salvation, The Believing Community, The Second Coming, The Resurrection and Judgment.

The Kingdom of God, according to the author, is the first and central theme of Jesus. It underlies and controls all His teaching. "If comprehensively understood, there is no better symbol of the truth which He came to impart and of the work which He came to accomplish" (p. 69). The chapters, though very compact, clearly present what the author conceives to be the Gospel of Jesus, a Gospel which has not been colored by doctrinal thinking, and which cannot be rightly interpreted under the influence of doctrinal preconceptions. It is hard to resist the temptation to reproduce many of the paragraphs which exhibit the author's free and fearless method of treatment. Only a few instances can here be given. After citing from the teaching of Jesus many passages which bear upon the value and destiny of man, proving his kinship with God, Dr. Stevens adds: "How absolutely inconsistent is all this with the idea that all men are and have been from their birth morally dead and incapable of any right desires, high aspirations, or noble efforts." With the emphasis of marginal notation he says: "Jesus did not teach total depravity" (pp. 113-115).

On Demoniical Possession he marshals all the Gospel references, and sums up as follows: "If the term 'possession' were not used in describing the seven cases of physical and mental maladies, we should experience no difficulty whatever in ac-

counting for their symptoms as characteristic of various disorders of mind and body. \* \* \* This is the conclusion to which all the known facts point. \* \* \* Jesus used the current thought-forms of His age for His purpose—the teaching the way of God in truth. “He must work with the media furnished by the thought-world of His age, and offer men His heavenly treasure of truth and life in the earthen vessels of human pictorial language and thinking” (p. 129).

The chapter on the Second Coming, while it aims to keep close to the Synoptic record, departs very widely from traditional belief. By careful comparative study of the three Gospels the author discovers “a special tendency in Matthew, a tendency to transform general statements of Jesus, which might not have referred to a visible second coming, into a form which could have no other meaning. May not all the Synop- tists have shared this tendency to some extent?” Dr. Stevens is “forced to the conclusion that there are two widely different conceptions of the kingdom and its coming embodied in the Synoptic Gospels: (1) the conception of a spiritual kingdom, coming gradually \* \* \* whose progress is to be a great historical world-process; (2) the popular apocalyptic conception of a kingdom to be inaugurated suddenly with startling displays of Divine power—a kingdom of Danielic vision in which the Son of Man shall be manifested in splendor and power.”

Misconception and error are to be traced “either to Jesus, or to those who heard Him and who had to do with the preservation of His words.” \* \* \* “I, therefore, conclude that the representation that Jesus would return to earth during the generation then living was due to misapprehension and confusion on the part of the disciples” (pp. 172-176).

Here we have an interesting instance of the changing attitude of an honest scholar's mind. The genial author will take it kindly, I hope, when I place the above quotation by the side of a contrary judgment expressed in his “Theology of the New Testament” (p. 133), where he calls to account, “the scholars

in our time who, however discerning and candid, undertake to reconstruct the thoughts of Jesus, and to disentangle them from the supposed subjective reflections of His disciples." I assent to Dr. Stevens' right to express his later and larger view of the province of Biblical Criticism.

As a rule the author keeps within the lines which he has defined as the proper scope of the science of the Teaching of Jesus, and contents himself with the positive consideration of the Synoptic material. Now and then, unwittingly, perhaps, he makes a sharp thrust at beliefs that have become entrenched in standards of confessional orthodoxy. If this be a fault it will be extenuated when the peculiar situation of Dr. Stevens is understood. While he is primarily a biblical theologian, he is at the same time officially a dogmatician, for he occupies the very honorable position of the Dwight Professorship of Systematic Theology.

It is not surprising that in this dual relation there should be an occasional tilt between Dr. Stevens and himself, his official self. The dilemma is a very interesting one, but we may look for a very happy reconciliation. Systematic theology will lose nothing, but has much to gain, at the hands of the biblical theologian.

The "Teaching of Jesus" is one of the heralds of the new Dogmatic, a Dogmatic which will be mellowed, clarified and simplified through the moulding influence of Biblical Theology.

The few citations which I have given from the "Teaching of Jesus," and which to some may appear too advanced, if not startling, do not adequately represent the general character of the work, which is a fair, honest, scientific treatment of the Gospel of Jesus. It is a valuable contribution to the theology and New Testament literature of the age.

Let it be noted that this little volume is not simply to serve as a help to teachers and students of theology; it is a handbook intended for the general reader as well.

It enters, therefore, upon a wide and very responsible mis-

sion. It is not unlikely that it will contribute to the unsettled state of religious belief, and to the unsettling of many minds. To what end? To the end, it is hoped, that the state of religious belief may become more settled in truth; that minds by their unsettling may be led into the possession of the rest and peace which can be secured alone through the larger apprehension of the teaching of Jesus. Those who know the mind and heart of the author will receive the handbook as a contribution designed to clear a broader roadway for the truth of God.

While laying aside the handbook for future reference, an important question arises, which is being asked by theological students in the class-room, and which will be repeated by the larger class represented by the "general reader": Does the increasing value which is placed upon the teaching of Jesus imply that in the teaching of Jesus is embraced all that is necessary to christian faith and christian life?

Let the Biblical Theologian, or the Professor of Systematic Theology, give answer, if he will.

## VIII.

### EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

#### THE DISTINGUISHING DOCTRINE OF LUTHERANISM.

On this subject we find a series of articles in the *Lutheran Observer* for June and July, 1901, by Prof. J. W. Richards, D.D., of Gettysburg, Pa. Prof. Richards contends that the distinguishing mark of Lutheranism, that which separates the Lutheran Church from the Reformed Churches, is not, as has been popularly supposed, in its doctrine of the Lord's Supper, but in its doctrine of justification by faith. The doctrine of justification by faith alone, accordingly, is the distinguishing doctrine of the Lutheran Church. Prof. Richards, however, somewhat qualifies this position by admitting that the Reformed Churches, too, teach a doctrine of justification by faith, and by saying that it is the *Lutheran* doctrine of justification by faith that is the distinguishing mark of Lutheranism. And by this he means that it is not so much the doctrine of justification itself, as the relative position in the dogmatic system which the Lutheran Church assigns to this doctrine, that makes the doctrine distinctive for the Lutheran Church. The Lutheran Church, Prof. Richards contends, together with some German theologians, like Guericke, Graul, and others, makes the doctrine of justification central and determinative in the dogmatic system, while "the Reformed Church puts it decidedly in the rear of the doctrine of predestination." In fact, according to Prof. Richards and his German authorities, the doctrine of predestination not only nullifies the doctrine of justification by faith in the Reformed Church, but even vitiates the Reformed Church's doctrine of the two natures in Christ as well as her doctrine of the means of grace. Where the absolute divine decree is made to be the principle of salvation, it is clear that only a secondary importance can be as-

signed to the person of Christ, on the one hand, and to faith and the means of grace, on the other. If, then, the Reformed Church makes central in its system of faith the doctrine of predestination, it will follow that it can not hold to the doctrine of justification by faith in the same sense in which the Lutheran Church holds to it; and consequently the Lutheran doctrine of justification must be the distinctive mark of Lutheranism. Such seems to be, in brief, the process of Prof. Richards' reasoning.

Prof. Richards' motive for taking this position seems to be to save his church from the charge of *sacramentalism*, which has been brought against it in modern times because of the emphasis which it puts upon the doctrine of the *real presence* of Christ in the eucharist. Assuming that the fundamental principle of the Lutheran theology is the doctrine of justification by faith, and the fundamental principle of Reformed theology the doctrine of predestination, Prof. Richards says: "The Lutheran doctrine of the real presence has nothing to do with this difference as a primary principle, for the simple reason that that doctrine does not stand at the center of the Lutheran system, but out from the center, and has its place determined by the central principle. For a teacher in the Lutheran Church to affirm otherwise is to affirm something *appalling*, for such teaching overthrows the center of gravity, and makes the Lutheran system essentially a sacramental system; for it must follow, as the night the day, that just as soon as it is determined that the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence is the real distinguishing doctrine of the Lutheran Church, all other doctrines will be viewed from that standpoint. And that is Romanism; for we take it for granted that every intelligent reader knows that the Romish system is a *sacramental* system, and that it was exactly from this system that Luther and his coworkers delivered the Church by his central, *all-determining* doctrine of justification by faith." Clearly, Prof. Richards is not a sacramentalist, or Romanist, and we are glad that he is not. We believe that he does well

to exert his influence, both within his church and outside of it, against that tendency in theology which has obtained distinct expression in the doctrine of the *real presence*; from which, however, we are not as sure as is Prof. Richards that Luther has delivered the Lutheran Church. And to say that this doctrine is not primary and central in the Lutheran system does not prove that it is not the distinguishing mark of Lutheranism—that which separates the Lutheran Church from other Protestant Churches. There is a difference between a *principle* and the *distinguishing mark* of a system of theological thought; and two systems, each having its distinctive mark, may be developed out of the same principle; and the more rich in contents any principle may be, the more likely it is that such divergency in its development will take place. Now, it is an historical fact, known to everybody, that it was the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence that originally caused the breach in Protestantism, and that has kept its two sides asunder up to the present time. There may be other differences between the Reformed and Lutheran systems, but the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence was from the beginning the real standard of division. It may be true that the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence had no necessary inward connection with the fundamental principle of the Lutheran system of faith—it may have been a mere excrescence upon the body of that system, or a patch torn from the old Romish garment and outwardly tacked on to the new Lutheran robe—but the fact nevertheless remains that its importance was so magnified that it became a mark of division in Protestantism. And this fact by no means proves that there was originally any difference in regard to the principle of justification.

Indeed, so far as the doctrine of justification by faith itself is concerned there seems to be no essential difference at all in the forms in which it is usually stated in the confessional and dogmatic writings of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. Here, for instance, is the doctrine as stated in the Augsburg Confession, Art. IV.: "Also they teach that men



can not be justified before God by their own powers, merits or works; but are justified freely for Christ's sake through faith, when they believe that they are received into favor, and their sins forgiven for Christ's sake, who by His death hath satisfied for our sins. This faith doth God impute for righteousness before Him." Compare with this, now, the 60th Question of the Heidelberg Catechism: "How art thou righteous before God? Answer: Only by true faith in Jesus Christ; that is, although my conscience accuse me that I have grievously sinned against all the commandments of God and have never kept any of them, and that I am still prone always to do evil, yet God, without any merit of mine, of mere grace, grants and imputes to me the perfect satisfaction, righteousness, and holiness of Christ, as if I had never committed nor had any sin, and had myself accomplished all the obedience which Christ has fulfilled for me, if only I accept such benefit with a believing heart." Surely, there is no perceptible difference between these two statements of the doctrine of justification; and, if it were necessary, such statements might be greatly multiplied. The phraseology of the two statements may be slightly different, but the sense is the same. The same theory of atonement is implied in both forms of statement, the same idea of imputation, and the same aversion to any notion of human merit. Some of the conceptions entering into these formulations of the doctrine of justification may not be considered quite adequate now in the light of modern theological and ethical thought; but such as they are, they are at least common both to the Lutheran and Reformed systems of confessional thought in their original forms.

But Professor Richards may answer now, that all these statements of the Reformed doctrine of justification are nullified by the doctrine of predestination. According to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination only those are justified whom it is God's eternal purpose to save; and according to both the Reformed and Lutheran doctrines of justification,

all, and only, those are justified who believe. Now, different as these views may be, there is after all no essential contradiction between them. The doctrine of predestination, or election, relates to the moving principle of salvation in God; the doctrine of justification relates to the manner of appropriating salvation on the part of man. And on both sides, the Lutheran and Calvinistic, it was taught that faith is not a matter of man's own determination or will, but that it is the gift of God. Only those can believe to whom the gift or power of faith is given. This is implied in the doctrine of total depravity, which was accepted by Lutheran and Calvinistic Reformers alike; and in its most extreme form by Luther himself, who likened the unconverted man to a mere block or stone, so far as any moral or spiritual capacity for good is concerned. See Form of Concord, Art. II., and compare Heidelberg Catechism, Questions 21 and 65. In the former we are told that, "as impossible as it is for a dead body to revivify itself, even so impossible it is that man who by reason of sin is spiritually dead, should have any faculty of recalling himself to spiritual life;" and in the latter, "that the Holy Ghost works faith in us by the gospel." If, then, man is as incapable of any spiritual action as a corpse is of physical action, and if faith is really a function of the Holy Ghost in man, then after all the exercise of faith implies a divine election. Only the elect can believe; and those who do not believe must be non-elect. If, then, the doctrine of predestination nullifies the doctrine of justification by faith, it will do so as much according to the Lutheran system as according to the Calvinistic.

Let it not be forgotten that *all* the Reformers, Luther of course included, were strong predestinarians. Their horror of the doctrine of good works and of justification by merit caused them to be extreme in their opposition to Pelagianism, with its doctrine of moral ability and free will; and led them to adopt the Augustinian doctrine of grace, and of election, in its most extreme form. In this respect there was no dif-

ference between the different Reformers; or if anything, Luther was the most extreme of all. In his book *De Servo Arbitrio*, of the year 1525, he takes the most extreme view of the bondage of the human will, and teaches the doctrine of unconditional predestination both to salvation and damnation in language which even Calvin regarded as exaggerated. And this doctrine Luther never retracted. He stood by it to the day of his death. In fact his extreme views of the depravity and moral impotence of human nature, and of the sole agency of God in the process of human salvation, made no other view possible. It is generally said that the difference between Luther and Calvin in regard to the doctrine of predestination consisted only in their respective methods of approaching it. Luther's method, it is said, was anthropological. He started from the side of the utter depravity and helplessness of human nature, and was from thence led to the conclusion that only they can be saved whom God wills to save by an exercise of irresistible grace, leaving others to perish in their sins. Calvin's method, on the other hand, it is said, was theological. He started from the principle of the divine sovereignty, which demands that God's will should be regarded as the sole determinative agency in the universe. But even Calvin, too, came to his conclusion, not by way of an *a priori* process of deduction, but by the *aposteriori* consideration that the gospel does apparently not lead to the salvation of all men. The "covenant of life," he says, "not being equally preached to all, and among those to whom it is preached not always finding the same reception, this diversity discovers the wonderful depths of the divine judgment. Nor is it to be doubted that this variety also follows subject to the decision of God's eternal election." Institutes, III., XXI., 1. There was, then, on this subject no essential difference between Luther and Calvin. And the same agreement existed between Luther and Zwingli. When Luther and Zwingli met at Marburg neither of them thought that there was any difference between them either on the doctrine of justification or on that of predestination.

They agreed on the doctrines of original sin, of redemption through Christ, and of justification and salvation through faith, such faith being regarded by both of them as "the gift of God through the hearing of the gospel of Christ." On the subject of original sin, indeed, Zwingli's views were somewhat peculiar, as he questioned, not the reality of a sinful tendency in human nature, but the quality of guilt in this tendency. At Marburg, however, this did not prevent him from uniting with Luther on the article concerning original sin. In fact, of the fifteen articles discussed they differed only in regard to the last half of the last one, and that related to the mode of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper. On everything else Zwingli was willing to be *Lutheran*, and Luther *Zwinglian*, but *that* was the sign of division.

But it may be said, now, that no matter what may have been the teaching of Luther and his immediate followers on the doctrine of predestination, this doctrine, in its double form at least, gradually sank into oblivion in the Lutheran Church, and is not now held as an accepted dogma. And there is some force in this representation. Melancthon gradually softened the doctrine of election and grace and developed the doctrine of synergism which gave rise to much controversy in the Lutheran Church. This was one of the points to be settled by the Form of Concord. The questions at issue, however, were only covered up and their difficulties concealed in that wonderful document. For it is not a surmounting of the difficulties of Calvinism to say that the elect are chosen on account of their faith which is foreknown to God, so long as this faith itself is declared to be absolutely the gift of God; or to say that "the election of God extends only to the good and beloved children of God, and this is the cause of their salvation," while refusing to make any declaration concerning the cause of the destruction of the wicked. Here, indeed, is a logical contradiction in the Lutheran system, which has never yet been solved. Hence also the Lutheran Church has not been entirely free from outbreaks of this old controversy in the course of its history. One

of these occurred, not many years ago, among some of its German theologians in this country, which was quite as animated as were some of the debates in the time of the Reformation. This shows that the Lutheran system still contains within itself the poison of the old doctrine of predestination, in spite of its soundness on the doctrine of justification by faith.

But no matter what may have been the fate of this doctrine in the history of the Lutheran Church, there is no question of its having been held by the original Reformers and creed-makers of that Church, in the same form essentially in which it was held by Zwingli and Calvin, and others. And the point which we want to make now is that, if Luther and his immediate followers could hold the doctrine of a double predestination consistently with the doctrine of justification by faith, then it is difficult to see why Calvinistic and Reformed theologians should not be able to do so too. If Professor Richards would deny to Dr. Hodge, for instance, the ability of holding a correct doctrine of justification, because he is a predestinarian, then he must, for the same reason, deny it also to Luther; and thus Luther himself would be in danger of ceasing to be a good Lutheran. But this we presume is a position which a Lutheran professor of theology would scarcely want to assume. So, then, this effort to convict the Reformed Church of unsoundness in regard to the material principle of the Reformation, because of its supposed acceptance of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, must be considered a failure. The fact that it was first suggested by some German theologians does not save it from that conclusion. And besides it is to be remembered that all parts of the Reformed Church have never accepted the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. It was never accepted by the German Reformed Church either in Europe or in America. Individual theologians have held it, but not the Church as such. It is not in the Heidelberg Catechism; and those who pretend to find it there, can do so only by inference and construction. Even the most that could be said of the relation of the Catechism to the

doctrine of predestination is that by implication it affirms the election of the good, though in language not nearly as strong as that which is used in the Form of Concord, while it leaves the question as to reprobation entirely untouched. The German Reformed Church differs from the Lutheran Church on the subject of the Lord's Supper, but not on the doctrine of justification. The Westminster smaller Catechism is Calvinistic throughout, and yet its definition of justification could hardly be improved on by any Lutheran divine. Here it is, Question 33: "Justification is an act of God's free grace, wherein He pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in His sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." But while Presbyterians thus agree with Lutherans on the doctrine of justification, they differ with them quite radically on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper.

It appears, then, that after all, in spite of certain German Lutheran theologians, "than whom there are no greater," the distinctive mark of Lutheranism is its peculiar doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, which we would designate by the term *consubstantiation*, if that term were not generally considered offensive by Lutheran theologians. But at any rate it is the doctrine that the real body and blood of Christ are present *in, with, and under* the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper—a doctrine which the Reformed Church has always opposed with the proposition that Christ is *really* present in the Lord's Supper, but his presence is *personal and spiritual*, and in no sense local and carnal. That Lutheran doctrine of Christ's presence *in, with, and under* the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper must, then, most certainly be regarded as the distinctive banner of the Lutheran Church. There are doubtless other points of difference between the Reformed and the Lutheran Churches. There is a difference in their respective "spirits," as Luther said to Zwingli at Marburg—a difference arising out of the national temperament, education, and history of the respective peoples which they



mainly embrace. But this is not an essential difference. No such intangible and undefinable thing as this "different spirit" could have kept the two Churches apart, if it had not been for their difference in the doctrine of the real presence. That doctrine of the real presence was the real battle-flag of Lutheranism in its distinction from other forms of Protestantism. This was true in the time of Luther, and in the generation next succeeding Luther. Speaking of the leading Lutheran divines of this generation—the generation that produced the Form of Concord—Dr. Seeberg says: "The specific Lutheranism of these circles consisted properly only in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper and of the *communicatio idiomatum*, and in the denial of synergism," *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. II., p. 369. But, although thus elevated into the position of the distinctive mark of denominational Lutheranism, may not the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper after all be a very unessential part of the Lutheran construction of Christian doctrine? Might it not be possible for the Lutheran Church to drop out this doctrine without suffering any injury? We think that Professor Richards, and with him many other Lutherans, have done this very thing; and their only mistake consists in denying that they have done it. But such theological changes involve no sin or dishonor. Some of those Reformed Churches which once had nailed to their mast-head the doctrine of absolute predestination, are now taking it down, and putting in its place the idea of Christ. The idea of Christ is a deeper and a better principle of theology than either the doctrine of predestination or that of justification by faith. And when the theologies of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches shall have ceased to be either *theocentric* or *anthropocentric*, and shall have become distinctly *Christocentric*, then their respective one-sidednesses will have been overcome, and the reunion of Christendom will have been brought a long step nearer than it is now.



## SOME THOUGHTS ON FREE PRAYER IN PUBLIC WORSHIP.

Our Reformed Church is not unliturgical. Indeed there is a sense in which no church, that engages in *public or people's* worship at all, can be unliturgical; for the very meaning of the word *liturgy* implies that worship is an action or work of the people. Public worship is not worship by the minister in behalf of the people, or in the name of the people. When he leads in prayer the minister does not pray *for* the people, but *with* the people as their organ and mouthpiece. So also as to other exercises of worship, they are all expressions of the common faith, and devotion, and aspiration of the congregation. For this reason they must all proceed in a regularly fixed order. The order in which different acts are to proceed can not be left to chance or caprice. In the same denomination, at least, it should be fixed and uniform. It is both disorderly and undevout for some congregations to begin their worship, while others end theirs, with the doxology. And so also the contents as well as the order of the leading acts of worship should not be left to chance. The hymns can not be sung extemporaneously. The reading of Scripture can not be extemporaneous. And there is no reason why the contents of the forms of prayer should not be definitely fixed. It is only of such prayer that the attributes of truth, beauty, and universality can properly be predicated. A congregation can really participate in an act of public prayer only if its contents are known beforehand, and fully express the mind of the congregation. Hence also the Reformed Church has never been satisfied with the extemporaneous worship of the so-called unliturgical churches, but has long striven to provide for the wants of public worship in her congregations by the preparation of a suitable liturgy.

But for reasons that need not here be mentioned, a complete liturgical service can not now be realized in all our congregations. There is generally no difficulty in getting the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Gloria in Excelsis, and

similar old liturgical formulas established in our congregational worship. But there is difficulty in many congregations to secure a proper appreciation of the other liturgical prayers, and free prayer is, for the present at least, in many congregations a necessity. Hence it is important that the subject of free prayer should from time to time be discussed in our periodicals, and studied in our schools of theology, as is the case in our Seminary at Lancaster now. Much attention is usually given to the history and principles of the liturgy; but where free prayer is used at all, it ought to be so well understood and managed as to answer, to some extent at least, to the idea of liturgical worship. Even free prayer should not be left entirely to the unregulated caprice and uneducated fancy of individual preachers.

Much of what may be said on the subject of liturgical principles and practice, will apply also to free prayer. For instance, as in set forms, so also in free prayer, the language should be correct, chaste, and rhythmical. It may contain no errors in grammar, rhetoric, or logic. The thoughts should be progressive, following each other in regular logical sequence. There ought to be no repetition of the same thought in the same or different language, and no confusion of thought. To mix up confession, thanksgiving, petition, intercession, etc., in one heterogeneous mass of words, is unfavorable to the spirit of worship, no matter with how much earnestness the words may be spoken. Such disorder of thought is confusing both to the understanding and feeling of a congregation. Let the thoughts be well arranged, and expressed in clear, direct, and dignified, but simple and modest language. This will of necessity require premeditation and preparation. No minister can get up and offer an edifying free prayer without preparation, especially since variety is generally supposed to be a necessary quality of such prayer. And no minister has a right to inflict upon a congregation forms of prayer that are distracting to the spirit of worship. What is sometimes said about inward sincerity and emotion being better than "the best

forms of speech," may be true of prayer in the closet, but it is not true of leading a worshipping congregation. Then propriety and devoutness of form are equally requisite with devoutness of spirit. We hardly suppose that any body now holds that disorder of form will minister to correctness of devotion.

In the second place, an extemporaneous prayer in public worship should possess the qualities of *truth* and *generality* no less than one of fixed form. An act of public worship must be true to the principles of the Christian religion, and it must be an actual expression of the spirit of worship existing in the congregation. The minister should remember that in prayer he is the organ of the congregation, and that he expresses, not merely his own individual feelings, desires, and aspirations, but those of the whole congregation; although it may be that the words spoken in the prayer may first have to arouse the proper feelings in the hearts of the people; in which respect, of course, an extemporaneous prayer must be at a disadvantage as compared with a precomposed one, with which the congregation is familiar. The temporary mood of the minister should never in any case be the determining motive either of the matter or form of his public prayers. This would be subjectivism in the worst sense. If, for instance, a minister should feel that he is a sinner above all other men, that would be a matter with which he ought to wrestle in his private prayers in the closet; while in his public confession of sin he should utter neither more nor less than what the common conscience of the church can truthfully assent to. To do otherwise gives to the whole transaction an air of unreality and cant that must act unfavorably upon the minds of those present. So also in regard to thanksgiving, petition, and intercession. In all these the minister expresses not merely his own feelings and desires, but those of the congregation, and should so frame his prayers that all the members can easily join with him. This will, of course, be a matter of no small difficulty, and will tax to the utmost the highest mental and spiritual power

of a minister; and any man who thinks that he is equal to any task at any time, and can easily dispense with the help of liturgy or prayer book, shows that he has no just conception of his duties as a Christian minister. A careful study of liturgical literature will be a good preparation for a minister, and so also will be a study of the devotional portions of the Bible; though in the latter case it will be necessary to distinguish between the language and thought of the Old and New Testament; as dwelling too much upon the former may give to our devotions a somewhat hard and Jewish tone, as in Puritanism. Let a minister, then, saturate himself with the devotional thought and language of the Bible and of the old liturgies, and always premeditate the matter and form of his public prayers, and then his free prayers may have something of the unction and effect of a true liturgical form.

We notice, next, some of the *faults* to which extemporaneous prayer is peculiarly liable, and which should by all means be avoided. First among these are *verbosity*, *tautology*, and the *repetition of meaningless words and phrases*. These faults may sometimes be due to a feeling that the words used are not intelligible to the people, like the "acknowledge and confess" of the Episcopal Prayer Book; but in public prayer a minister has no right to use words which he supposes to be unintelligible, and to need explanation as he is passing along. But the faults here referred are more frequently due to a lack of thought on the part of those who lead in prayer. Nothing is more common than for a man offering prayer without any premeditation or preparation, to run out of ideas. Then what does he do? He can not stop, and shade his eyes with his hands, and wait until the broken thread of thought has been connected again, as he would do if he were delivering a discourse. He must go on as if nothing had happened, and as if all was right; and so he continues to string together words without meaning. In prayer it is especially true that "eben wo Begriffe fehlen, Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein." It may be lucky for the minister that in such circum-

stances meaningless words do thus continue to come; but it is most unfortunate for the devotion of the congregation, which is seriously marred by such failures. The people, indeed, may not *know* what has happened, but they will nevertheless feel the shock of incongruity.

In the second place, there should be avoided in public prayer any "displays of eloquence." A pompous style is to be shunned as much as a low or undignified style. The slang of the street is, of course, unbecoming at the altar. Vulgar words and phrases, abbreviations of words, and similar marks of defective education, would never be indulged in consciously. But the affectation of what is commonly called a *grandiloquent* style, which is more likely to be a conscious process, is equally, if not more offensive. *Sesquipedalian* words, and words that convey no meaning to the congregation, are to be avoided even more strictly in the prayer than in the sermon. There is certainly no use in praying in words which the people do not understand; and therefore flights of the imagination, and what is sometimes called "flowery language," are things which are out of place in prayer. No minister ought, in any circumstances, to give way to the ambition of having it said that he has made an "eloquent" or a "grand" prayer. To have it said that one has made "the most eloquent prayer that was ever addressed to a Philadelphia audience," is praise of a most ambiguous kind. Genuine beauty and genuine sublimity will never be apt to draw forth such remarks. Should a man ever hear it said that he has made an eloquent prayer, then he ought to suspect that he has done something foolish or wrong.

Thirdly, the privilege of prayer should never be abused for the purpose of lecturing the congregation, or any part of it, for its delinquencies and faults. In using a fixed form there would, of course, be no room for anything of this kind to occur; but in extemporaneous prayer it is sometimes heard. Rebuke, correction, and exhortation belong to the sermon, not to the prayer. It is cowardly to thrash people over the shoulders of the Lord—to tell them with closed eyes what one would not

like to tell them with open eyes. When people have done evil, and have sinned, the minister is authorized to tell them so, and call them to repentance; but he should do this from the pulpit, not from the altar.

Fourthly, prayer should not be used as a vehicle for teaching the truths of religion. Teaching also belongs to the sermon. The prayer is not the place for defining doctrines. Of course, prayer must be true; it must be based upon truth, and must involve truth, but it must not be made a means for proclaiming and maintaining truth. Prayer should not be didactic, but devotional. The object of prayer is not to instruct the congregation in regard to the truths to be believed, but rather to confess the truth which is already in the heart of the congregation. Hence the language of technical theology, and the forms of ratiocination, like the syllogism with its formal terminology, are to be avoided in the prayer. In the sermon we reason, we instruct, we exhort, we admonish; in the prayer we pour forth our feelings, our sentiments, our requests, our praises. A violation of this law is at once a perversion of the nature and purpose of public prayer. Of course, this does not mean that facts and truths may not find expression in public prayer. It is the purpose that makes it either right or wrong. It is wrong when the purpose is discussion, controversy, teaching or defending of doctrine; it is right when the purpose is the intensification of emotion, feeling, and devotion. A study of the *Prefaces*, of the old Greek liturgies, especially that of the Clementine, will show the difference between the two ways of using truth and history in prayer.

Fifthly, another fault, closely allied to the one just referred to, consists in using the office of prayer as a medium for imparting to Almighty God information concerning things in regard to which He may be supposed to be sufficiently well informed already. Telling God what He is, how He has created the world, what are His purposes in creation and providence, or giving Him information as to matters of science and history—this is not prayer, it is presumption. Of course, as said



before, truth in regard to God, the world and man may enter into prayer; it is the *manner* in which this is done that makes it offensive or otherwise. And while on this point no formal rule can be given, the sincere worshipper will at once feel whether the introduction of such truth is presumptuous and foolish, or whether it is devotional. When a prayer at a Fourth of July celebration rehearses the greater part of our national history, as though the Lord did not know it—really to show how much one knows, and what an eloquent speech one could have made if only he had been put in the place of the orator—this is a perversion of the office of prayer, of which no Christian minister should ever be guilty. On public occasions the temptation is often very great to “show off” in this way; but for a true and conscientious man of God such temptation should have no power. And how much less, then, ought one ever be tempted thus to sin in the house of God!

Finally, every thing like sickly or offensive sentimentalism should be avoided in prayer. Under this head comes the use of *diminutives* and of adjectives implying too much *familiarity* in addressing God: for example, “*Goddie*” for God, “dearly beloved Jesus,” “Sweet Jesus,” and similar expressions of endearment. Such expressions lack reverence. It is merely natural sentimentalism that they convey. Some of our young peoples’ associations have fallen into this bad habit. And posture and manner are usually in keeping with the irreverence of the language. The leader of the meeting says: “Will brother N. give us a word of prayer?” And, then, in a tone and style that would be appropriate in talking to a little girl, brother N. proceeds to address the meeting, though ostensibly his words are directed to God. In fact, brother N. *gives the meeting* a word of prayer—or, may be, two or three. And similar irreverence is sometimes manifested by ministers. Suppose a minister nonchalantly shuffles into his pulpit on a Sunday morning, and with his hands in his pockets, and carelessly leaning upon the sides of the pulpit, begins to pray, somewhat as follows: “O, precious God, we are assembled in



this beautiful morning hour, to tell you how glad we are that we are alive. O, sweet Jesus, we are glad for the beautiful sunshine, and for the flowers, and for all the other nice things," etc. Let it not be supposed that this is a wild exaggeration. We have ourselves witnessed exhibitions coming very near to the above representation. Nor let it be supposed that we are here making fun of sacred things. These things are not sacred. They are merely earthly and carnal.

In conclusion we remark once more that the most effective means of avoiding these and other faults, provided the true spirit of devotion is present, consists in the careful study of the forms of prayer contained in the best books of worship of ancient and modern times. If this condition be complied with, then an extemporaneous service may be a true and edifying service. But let no one suppose that a service, or an exercise, is a true and genuine act of worship just because it is extemporaneous. If a liturgical form of worship may be in danger of falling into mere outward and heartless formalism, so also may an extemporaneous form; and then the extemporaneous form will be much the worse of the two, for it will have neither the *spirit* nor the *beauty* of holiness. What saves us from formalism is not the absence of form, but the presence of the true spirit of devotion in the heart; and that is a matter that needs to be continually watched, no matter what may be our order of worship, whether liturgical or free. And we are quite sure that the devil of formalism lurks in as many non-liturgical as in liturgical churches; and where the true spirit of prayer is present, we are convinced that the liturgy is a far more appropriate form of expression than is the extemporaneous form—for that, too, is a *form*, only perhaps not as reverent, as beautiful, and as conducive to devotion as a genuine liturgy. But where a genuine liturgy can not now be used with the full approbation and participation of the people, it is the duty of the minister to make the extemporaneous service as truly liturgical, that is, *people's worship*, as possible.

## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[Any books noticed in this REVIEW can be obtained at the lowest prices, of the *Reformed Church Publication Board*, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.]

**THE EVOLUTION OF IMMORTALITY.** By S. D. McConnell, D.D., D.C.L. Pages 204. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1901. Price \$1.25.

This volume is devoted to the discussion of the most important question with which the mind of man can ever be concerned. It is the question, What after death? "If a man die shall he live again?" It is a question, moreover, which men can never abandon, and which all who have reached a certain degree of culture, at least, are bound to answer in one way or another. Among civilized men the answer has usually been that the human soul is essentially immortal, and that death does not in any case end its existence. According to Plato, the soul is a divine idea, bound up with the very being of God, and therefore not dependent for its existence upon any passing association with matter. This Platonic conception of immortality, however, Dr. McConnell contends, is no longer tenable in the light of modern knowledge. In the first place the advancement of physical science has demonstrated the intimate connection of the soul with the body. Any injury to the brain or nervous system will at once exercise an influence upon the action of the mind, and may speedily suspend it altogether. How, then, can we conceive of the continued existence and conscious activity of the soul in entire separation from the body? Moreover the evolutionary philosophy has demonstrated the essential identity, physically and mentally, of man and the animal. If, then, we would not admit the immortality of animals, how can we continue to hold the essential immortality of men? And, finally, it is now known, says Dr. McConnell, not to be true that all men are endowed with an instinct of immortality; and one of the strongest arguments in favor of this doctrine has, therefore, lost its force. "To the contention that belief in eternal life has been held always and everywhere, and by all men, the only reply is that the facts are not so. It is as far as possible from being true to-day. The overwhelming majority of men are now, as has always been the case, at too low a stage of intellectual development to comprehend the thought" (p. 40).

In view of these and other facts Dr. McConnell, therefore, rejects the commonly received doctrine of essential or natural im-

mortality, and puts in its place what he calls the doctrine of the *immortality* of man. Man is not born with a soul that is naturally and necessarily immortal, but with the capacity of becoming immortal through a process of moral and religious development. Immortality, accordingly, is not a gift, but an achievement, and it is a biological as well as a moral and religious achievement. A man must achieve his immortality, or his eternal life, just as he must achieve his physical development, his intellectual attainments, and his moral character. This view, Dr. McConnell contends, is something different from the somewhat widely received theory of *conditional immortality*. According to this latter theory immortality is a gift bestowed upon a man from without on conditions which are more or less arbitrary, mechanical and artificial. For instance, it may be supposed to be a gift imparted by the Holy Spirit in Baptism. Man by nature possesses only carnal and psychical life. But when he is "born again" in Baptism he has imparted to him spiritual life, and that is his resurrection life, or eternal life. Or the eternal life may be supposed to be imparted in the sacrament of the Eucharist. This is the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. But the body and blood of Christ are the food of immortality. By the eating and drinking thereof there is formed within the natural body, before its dissolution takes place, a spiritual body as the condition of the continued existence and consciousness of the soul in another world. Or, again, the gift of immortality may be supposed to be conditioned upon the more inward volitional acceptance of Christ, and upon the new spiritual birth which may be supposed to be instantaneously connected with such acceptance of Christ.

In all these views immortality is something impressed upon the soul from without, while all souls naturally possess the same intrinsic qualities. Dr. McConnell claims that his view is something essentially different from this. "No doubt," he says, "each and all of the conditions above named will be found to be concerned, but the distinction is far deeper, more natural and reasonable, even though it be far more difficult to state. Speaking plainly, it is a biological process we are seeking to trace, and a biological classification we attempt to discover. It may be that the biological classification we are in search of may turn out to be also a religious one. We believe it will. But it will be religious because it corresponds to an actual reality already existing, and not because of an arbitrary divine arrangement. What we maintain is that, if any human life becomes capable of passing on into another life, with personality intact, it will be because such a life has already reached to a stage of spiritual fixedness and stability which will make survival 'natural' and destruction 'unnatural' to it, and that such an achievement, if reached at all, must be by an extension of the long path by which the soul has

climbed up from the primordial slime." The capacity for eternal existence and life, then, is strictly the product of evolution. When may it be supposed to be reached? When the soul has reached the condition of an ethical personality, or when the conscience has been developed. "The place of escape from out of the closed ring of what we call nature is not the body, nor the mind, but the conscience" (p. 100). When the conscience, the faculty for the knowledge of good and evil, has been evolved, then a path has been opened for the soul out of the finite world of matter into the realm of infinite spiritual existence. The "Adam" of the Bible was a man in whom this faculty to know good and evil arose, and who could therefore conceive the thought of living forever, if he were obedient, or of dying, perishing, if he were disobedient. "For it is not the mere possession of a potential faculty for goodness, or the actual manifestation of a rudimentary ethical sense that will suffice" (p. 99). What is required is a distinct ethical life and character. It may not be possible to define the precise moment when a soul becomes actually immortal; "but facts do not cease to be because classification is impracticable" (p. 102).

In confirmation of this view Dr. McConnell appeals to the teaching of the Bible. And there can be no doubt that the words of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, literally understood, lend an air of plausibility to the conception of biological and ethical immortality. We are here confronted continually by the antitheses of "life" and "death," "salvation," and "destruction." "But," says Dr. McConnell, "we have been so long accustomed to think of eternal *life* as being equivalent to eternal *happiness*, and the converse, that it will require a strenuous and steadfast effort to see in Christ's words what they meant, and what alone they could have meant, to those who heard them" (p. 107). But how have Christ's words come to be so long misunderstood, especially if it be true, as Dr. McConnell maintains, that the idea of immortality is not a native idea in the human soul? Dr. McConnell raises this question himself, and the only reply that he has to make is "that, at any rate, He was not misunderstood by His Apostles and first interpreters"; and then he goes on to show that the same phraseology is used by the Apostles as that which had been used by Christ, and that it must be interpreted in the same sense—the sense which is alone consistent with the evolutionary and ethical conception of human existence universally considered. Everywhere in this world it is a law that goodness alone survives. This law holds true now of men and nations; and it must always hold true. They only will live forever who have made themselves worthy of eternal life.

But there are some obvious difficulties connected with this theory, and Dr. McConnell does not shrink from a consideration

of them. There is first the fact that, according to the universal teaching of the New Testament, eternal life, whether as a gift or as an achievement, is possible for men only through Christ, and secondly the fact that so few only of mankind have heard of Christ, or hear of Him now, and that these accordingly must all sometime cease to live. Dr. McConnell's solution of this difficulty would be, first, that not all are really *men*, who approach the human form. The quality of manhood begins only with the emergence of conscience; and there have been immensely long stretches of life in the past, and there are great sections of life now, that have evidently been without it. But in the second place, Dr. McConnell holds that Christ's relation to mankind is not limited to the historical conditions of space and time which belong to His earthly appearance, but is eternal. Hence men could become immortal through Christ before the time of His earthly appearance, and some may now become immortal through Him who never hear of Him in this world. "If eternal life be in any actual way organically correlated with the Divine Man whom we adore, it must be in some way which is superior to times and dates and missionaries.\* \* \* If Christ be the Son of Man to any available purpose it can only be because He is some force which is available to all men at all times" (p. 134). Besides, it can not be required that the moral development of men should be *perfect* before death, in order that they may live afterwards. The process of moral evolution will doubtless continue after death; and souls which are not perfect here may be perfected there. Dr. McConnell, however, has no favor for the doctrine of universal restoration through aionian discipline, which, he says, is "a belief that can only be held at the expense of a confusion of thought." But there is, secondly, the fact that a very large proportion of the human race dies in infancy, and that according to the theory adopted all dying infants would seem to fail of immortality, and would become extinct at death. This is a fact which our author seems to feel keenly, but the force of which he seeks to break by saying "that the marvellous possibilities which are seen to lie in the law of heredity may well contain all that is needed here. \* \* \* That ethical qualities, when they exist, are transmissible is a common experience. It would at least be no violation of the analogies of Scripture and nature if the child of one who has achieved life eternal should also be immortal" (p. 186).

Now, that may be so; but we ask, does not the theory at this point break down? We have read this book with great interest, and we cordially commend it to our readers who are interested in the subject. It contains much that is worthy of all consideration, and that is well calculated to make one think. And yet as to the main contention we are bound to say that, in our opinion at least, it has not been proven. We still believe that all souls are made

to live forever. We believe in evolution; but we also believe in an eternal Father behind evolution, whose child is every human soul. And if the eternal Father is ever compelled to "unmake a soul, it is only to remake it." To suppose that He ever made a "soul in vain"—is a thing that "must not be." At last, somewhere, somehow, He will realize His purpose in every soul. And of this eternal destiny, we believe, there is a vague consciousness in all men. It is true, of course, that, as Dr. McConnell says, vast numbers of men are too low in the scale of intelligence to conceive the thought of immortality. But that does not prove that the elements of it are not in their souls. If they were not there, they could never come out. But the fact that they do come out upon occasion of moral and spiritual development proves that they are there. And the fact of their being present constitutionally in all souls, is to our mind a striking proof of their essential immortality. But while at this point we cannot agree with our author, we nevertheless thank him for his book, and recommend it to all earnest seekers after truth on the important and interesting subject with which it is concerned.

**THE EARLY HISTORY OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE.** By Lewis Bayles Paton, Ph.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism in Hartford Theological Seminary. Pages xxxvi + 302. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1901. Price \$1.25, net.

This volume belongs to the *Series of Hand-Books in Semitics*, now in course of publication by the Scribners, under the general editorship of Professor James Alexander Craig, of the University of Michigan. The whole series is intended to consist of thirteen volumes, of which three are now ready, the present volume forming the seventh in the series. The object of this series, as stated in the general prospectus, is to present the results of recent Semitic study and research in popular scientific form. "Each work is complete in itself, and the series, taken as a whole, neglects no phase of the general subject. Each contributor is a specialist in the subject assigned him, and has been chosen from the body of eminent Semitic scholars both in Europe and in this country." The reader may be sure, therefore, of getting the latest and best results on each of the subjects treated in this series. And in order to understand the immense progress made in Semitic studies during the last half century, one need only to compare one of the volumes of this series with, say, the writings of Kurtz, or even of Ewald. Kurtz's *Sacred History*, which was studied in our Theological Seminaries forty years ago, is as much behind time now as would be a work on electricity written at the beginning of the nineteenth century.



The work now before us treats of the general history of the Semitic nations in Syria and Palestine. Its purpose is not to go into the details of the history, political, social, and religious, but rather to trace the general movements of history in these lands from the time of the first arrival of the Semites about 3500 B. C., down to the fall of Babylon in 539 B. C., and the cessation of Semitic supremacy in western Asia. The more particular features of the history of the different Semitic nations is to be treated in other volumes of the series. The history of Israel, accordingly, is treated in this volume only in its general outlines, and in its points of contact with the history of other nations, especially that of the Assyrians and Babylonians on the one hand, and of the Egyptians on the other. And, in fact, it is only in this way that the history of Israel can ever be thoroughly understood.

The lands occupied by the Syrian and Palestinian nations in later times were in prehistoric times occupied by Aryans. Even the Sumerians in Babylonia were not Semites. But the Semites made their appearance in these lands as early at least as 3500 B. C. Their original abode was in Arabia, from whence they swarmed forth at different times, into the Euphrates and Tigris valleys, into Mesopotamia and the regions west of it, and into the coast lands of the Mediterranean. The nations best known to us from the Old Testament are the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Aramaeans, and the Israelites, who were a branch of the Aramaeans. The Hittites and Philistines were not Semites, although the latter adopted a Semitic language. The Amoritic migration, according to Professor Paton, occurred about 2500 to 2230 B. C. And during this period must be placed the Babylonian supremacy in Palestine, and the rebellion referred to in Gen. 14. But if this view be correct, then Abram, if he was an historical person at all, could not have been the ancestor of the Israelites. He was much too early for that. A great deal of stress has in recent times been laid by apologists upon the occurrence of the name of *Abram*—*Abiram*, *Aburam*—on Babylonian tablets, from which the historicity of the 14th chapter of Genesis was inferred. But there seems after all not to be much gained by this; for the historicity of *Abram* proves nothing as to *Abraham*, the latter name being entirely different from the former, and being combined with a root, *raham*, which exists in Arabic, but is not known in Hebrew. Professor Paton thinks there is no reason for rejecting the historicity of the main facts recorded in Gen. 14, provided Abram be regarded as an Amorite chief of much dignity and power. But whence got the editor of Genesis this story? Professor Paton rejects the view that it was copied from some Babylonian tablet in the time of the Exile, and supposes that it was obtained from original Amoritic or Canaanitic sources. In this way also Professor Paton accounts for the presence in the Old Testament of



traditions and legends which are substantially identical with similar traditions in Babylonian. Here belong traditions concerning the origin of the world and of civilization, concerning the origin of the Sabbath, which was connected with the worship of the Babylonian moon-god, and with the phases of the moon, and traditions concerning the flood, the tower of Babel and the dispersion of mankind. These stories all have their counterpart in Babylonian literature; and it used to be supposed by many that the Old Testament accounts were borrowed from Babylonian tablets. But the better view doubtless is that they were brought along by the primitive Amorite, Canaanite, and Aramaean immigrants, and afterwards purified and spiritualized by the advancing Hebrew mind in Palestine.

Abraham, says Professor Paton, was the collective name of a group of Aramaean peoples, including not only the Hebraic clans, but also the Ishmaelites and a number of other desert tribes. These Aramaean peoples migrated into Palestine, about 1500 B. C., from Mesopotamia, whence some centuries earlier the Canaanites had come, under the pressure presumably of advancing hordes of Kassites and Mittani. Abraham was not known as the personal ancestor of the Israelites until near the time of the exile. The Hyksos who at one time conquered Egypt and reigned there for several centuries were Canaanites. After their expulsion Egypt exercised supremacy in Palestine from about 1500 to 1393 B. C. During the latter part of this period took place the Aramaean migration which put an end to the Egyptian supremacy. To this period also belong the famous Tell-el-Amarna letters, which have enabled scholars to reconstruct the history of Palestine. The Khabiri of these letters, who had so much to do with the destruction of the Egyptian power in Palestine, and who at one time were supposed to have been identical with the Hebrews, were not Hebrews in the strict sense, but Aramaeans who had migrated from the same regions from which the Hebrews came. The Israelites were a collection of Aramaean tribes who had grown up in the region about Kadesh-Bannea. They were not lineal descendants of one ancestor; although after having been consolidated in one nation they claimed Israel, whom they identified with Jacob, as their common father, in like manner as the Greeks claimed Hellen as the ancestor of the Greek people. The exodus, or rather the entrance of Israel into Canaan, took place about 1200 B. C. Only the Rachel tribes, Ephraim and Manasseh, ever dwelt in Egypt, and they were the subjects of the history of the exodus. Gad and Asher were Canaanite aborigenes, who were incorporated with Israel in Palestine. The consolidation of the loose Aramaean tribes into the nation of Israel was the work of Moses, who brought out the tribes that were in Egypt and united them with the clans of the

desert. The basis of the union was the religious idea. Yahweh, the ancestral god of Midian, whose dwelling place was at Sinai, in the neighborhood of Kadesh-Bannea, not at the extreme southern end of the peninsula, became the God of Israel by covenant. This covenant relation was the foundation of the ethical character of the religion of Israel. "The peculiar relation of Israel to the religion of Israel. "The peculiar relation of Israel to Yahweh," says Paton, "was the appropriate historical situation for the imparting of a new conception of the holiness of God; the origin of that conception, however, cannot be found in any natural antecedents, but only in the mystery of divine self-revelation. Through this revelation the religion of Israel was placed from the first upon an ethical basis. This was the fundamental difference between it and the religions of other Semitic peoples, and it was the secret of its unique later development" (p. 142).

But we have given enough of the contents of this book to enable the intelligent reader to form an idea of its character and of its value. It is not the purpose of the author in this volume to write the religious or ethical history of Israel. It is the ethnological and national development of the Aramaean peoples, including the Israelites, that is to be portrayed. In order to this these peoples must necessarily be considered in their relations to each other and to the great world powers lying to the east and south of them. Such a history as this could not have been written even a few decades ago, because the materials for it did not exist. It is only since the archeological discoveries in the valleys of the Nile and of the Euphrates, that we can reconstruct the ethnological movements in the ages to which the Bible refers in its beginnings. It has frequently been said that the pick and the spade are bringing to light the arguments by which the historical truthfulness of the Old Testament is to be maintained. Now, that is true, though probably not in the sense in which it has been intended. How different is the history when construed under the teaching of the pick and the spade, from what it was when construed under the teaching of the dogmatic theory of inspiration, is sufficiently evident from the volume before us. From the few instances given in this notice it may seem to some as if Professor Paton had reduced to confusion all our knowledge of ancient, and especially of sacred history. If Professor Paton is right, we shall have to reconstruct all our knowledge of those past ages, and of the Bible too. Will that do us any harm? Not, if we may judge from its effects upon such men as Professor Paton. He is a conscientious Christian scholar, and professor in a Christian school of theology that ranks among the first in the land. The great mass of Old Testament scholars are in substantial agreement with him. The works of such scholars can only be read and studied with much profit; and we cordially commend this volume to our readers.

MORAL EVOLUTION. By George Harris, D.D., Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Pages ix + 446. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. Boston and New York. 1899. Price, \$2.00.

This work is the product of a thorough scholar and a profound thinker, who is alive to the intellectual and moral conditions of the present age. His object in writing it is to present the leading doctrines of moral science in harmony with the now almost universally accepted theory of evolution. Without professing to be an original investigator of the facts on which this theory is based, he heartily accepts it "on the agreeing authority of its acknowledged interpreters." It would be presumptuous in a theologian and moralist, who has had neither time nor opportunity to master all the details of fact upon which the theory of evolution rests, either to set himself against it, or to go on working in his own chosen line as if it did not exist. The more modest course is to accept the theory on the authority of all scientists and philosophers who have a right to speak on the subject, and, if possible, to adjust one's views in other departments of thought to its requirements. This is what Professor Harris does in the work before us; and he ventures to think that the result is no slight gain to the science of ethics; and the present reviewer ventures to agree with him.

"There are," says Professor Harris, "four possible relations between evolution and ethics. They may be regarded as antagonistic, as independent, as identical, and as harmonious. Every one of these four relations has in fact been supposed to exist, and has had its advocates." Professor Harris advocates the last view, namely, the view that *morality is in harmony with evolution*. Some have maintained that morality is antagonistic to evolution, because its fundamental law is the law of love and sympathy, while the law of evolution is the law of selfishness, of conflict, of destruction, and waste, and also because morality rests upon freedom, while in evolution there reigns only necessity. From this view it would follow that either the doctrine of evolution must be false or morality must be an illusion. According to others the two interests have no relation to each other. Mr. Alfred R. Wallace and Mr. Huxley were of this opinion. According to this view the law of evolution reigns in the physical world beneath man, and in man, too, in so far as he is a natural being; but a new law, of an entirely different character, comes in somehow where the moral order begins. These views Professor Harris rejects, along also with the theory that evolution and morality are identical; which would virtually imply that there is no difference between nature and mind. The view adopted by Dr. Harris is that evolution and morality are not identical, but harmonious. The rejected views, he believes, rest upon false conceptions both of the nature of evolution and of the essence of morality. It is

not true, he says, that in the process of evolution there is nothing but selfishness, struggle for existence, and survival of the strongest. There is there also sympathy, altruism, self-sacrifice. And, on the other hand, there is in morality not merely altruism, and sacrifice, but also self-assertion, self-preservation, self-realization; and so, while the two interests are not identical, they are nevertheless throughout harmonious.

This consideration of the relation of evolution and morality leads the author, in the second chapter, to the consideration of *personality in society*, and, in the third, to the consideration of the *moral ideal*. Man is not man except in society. Morality, indeed, may be defined as *self-realization, the perfection of personality*; and this is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution. But personality is perfectible only in society; and, accordingly, the moral ideal must be defined as personal perfection and well-being in society. This is something different from the theories of *hedonism*, and of *utilitarianism*, but different also from the Kantian theory of *rigorism* which admits of no connection between morality and happiness. The good to be accomplished through the moral process of humanity, the *summum bonum*, is the perfection and happiness of the individual person as a member of a perfect organic community of persons. This view is not merely in harmony with the theory of evolution, which lays stress upon the conditioning environment as well as upon the evolving subject; but it is in harmony also with the teaching of Christianity, which makes the *Kingdom of God* to be the supreme good promised in the gospel. And the nature of the good determines the nature of the *moral law*, or the *right*.

Chapter six of the volume before us is devoted to the formal discussion of *self-realization* and *altruism*; and this is followed, in the next chapter, by an extended treatment of the subject of *ethics and evolution*. In the opening of this chapter the author gives a résumé of the points established in the preceding chapters. From this we quote a few sentences: "It has been found that an ideal of the worth or perfection of persons in society constitutes morality; that this ideal is obligatory in law or right; that it is realized in love, which is self-love and love of others; that it is rooted therefore in the self-regarding and the sympathetic feelings, which issue in self realization and altruism." And these are, according to our author, the two points around which, like two foci of an ellipse, the moral universe revolves. The chief difficulty in recognizing the harmony between evolution and ethics arises from the struggle which accompanies the development of all life, animal and human. "This difficulty," our author remarks, "may not be entirely overcome. But if it is seen to be the incident rather than the law of progress, and the incident of an essential element of morality, the difficulty will be greatly reduced.

\* \* \* And if self-preservation becoming self-realization tends to eliminate strife and suffering, and thus to correct its own defects, the problem will have a sufficiently satisfactory solution." Evolution and morality agree in this, that both look to the realization of one and the same ideal. And if there be conflict in the realization of it, this, so far as man in relation to man is concerned, is in the main a *perversion*. "The sympathetic and humane sentiments rebel against it, at least within the limits of a social group. \* \* \* Man's conflict with his fellow-man is moral perversion, dimly or clearly recognized as such, but which nevertheless has been attended with some advantage in developed power, and in the mingling of races to form the most vigorous nations."

Chapter eight of the volume under review is devoted to a discussion of *morality and religion* in their mutual relation. The process of cosmic evolution, culminating in rational, moral, social man, must be an intelligent and purposive process. The process is intelligible, and must therefore have intelligence in it. But this is equivalent to saying that there is in it a self-conscious, personal God. In all evolution which, on earth, issues in humanity and morality there is, accordingly, a divine element; and consequently morality must have a relation to religion. The immanence of a righteous God in the world-process is the supreme sanction of morality, and also the guarantee of its ultimate perfect realization. One person, indeed, may be temporarily and exceptionally moral without being religious, but morality can not exist without religion. The realization of the ideal of man's relation to man is possible only on condition of the realization of his right relation to God. And this implies immortality, too. "The moral ideal, which is God's thought perceived by man, means the eternal life in which alone the ideal can be realized. Immortality is as closely related to morality as to religion." But the highest development of morality implies the highest development of religion, that is, Christianity. To the question, Can there be such a thing as *Christian ethics*, the author of this volume gives a decidedly affirmative answer. Some have denied it. They have said that the principles and sanctions of morality are always and everywhere the same; and hence no distinction can be accepted between philosophical and Christian ethics. But the theory of evolution teaches us to recognize historical stages in morality as well as in religion; and Christianity is the highest, the most perfect evolution of both. The chief characteristic which distinguishes Christian from pagan as well as Jewish ethics is "the displacement of rules by principles." The Christian ideal, like every other ideal, is personal and social, and the fundamental law determining it is the law of love—love of self and love of one's neighbor. Such recognition of Christianity must serve to differentiate any work on ethical science essentially from any mere

philosophical treatise. And we have, accordingly, in the work before us discussions of the idea of the *Kingdom of God*, and kindred ideas, which we would be glad to notice more fully, if our space permitted.

There are, however, several peculiar ideas which we can not pass over. First among these is the idea of *degeneration*, forming the subject of chapter eleven of this book. "Theoretical systems," says Professor Harris, "are occupied with the nature of the chief good, the grounds of obligation, the motives and desires which determine virtue, and with criticisms of alternative theories. About the only wrongness recognized is the wrongness of systems which are regarded as erroneous, and that is an intellectual rather than a moral perversion." But in Christian ethics it is necessary to recognize moral perversion, sin, *degeneration*. What is the cause of moral degeneration? "Some of our most advanced theologians trace sin to the vestiges of the animal remaining in the human descendants." But this theory, though it contains elements of truth, is yet not satisfactory as a theory. In fact, all sin has its origin in *selfishness*, which is the perversion of *self-love*. Why the perversion? No satisfactory answer has yet been given, and perhaps never can be given. "The fact is that a philosophy of sin is extremely difficult and well-nigh impossible because sin is irrational. It is against reason because it is against nature. It is contrary to the truth. That which is unreason cannot be reasoned about, can not give a reason for itself. I am not sure but that this is the final and comprehensive *rationale* of moral degeneration, that it has no *rationale*, that it must simply be regarded as the false, absurd, irrational, as man's contradiction of himself" (pp. 282-3).

But if *degeneration* be man's self-contradiction, the falling away from the idea of his kind, or *genus*, then *regeneration* must mean "restoration of the *genus*." "As physical birth is the human species reproducing itself after its kind, so moral and spiritual birth is character reproduced according to the human type." Regeneration presupposes an abnormal, sinful type which is to be done away, and a normal, holy type which is to be realized. These two sides, the one negative, the other positive, must be recognized in the Christian idea of redemption. Redemption, accordingly, is not merely forgiveness of sin and restoration of the original character of righteousness, but realization, through the mediation of Christ, of the ultimate moral ideal of the individual in society. "Theology has obscured the simplicity of the gospel, when it has put imputation and satisfaction in the place of renewal of character." The author treats successively of *personal*, *economic*, and *social regeneration*. The successive chapters devoted to these subjects are most interesting and timely, in view of the moral condition of our age, but we have not room



here to reproduce their contents even in the merest outline. We refer only to one point, namely the question of religious teaching in the public schools. The author recognizes the impossibility, in the present circumstances of this country, of the public schools attending to the religious training of the young. "Their function is secular education. On certain days a number of hours is devoted to reading, writing, numbers, natural science, and other studies more or less useful. There is no more reason in the nature of the case, why such schools should be opened with religious exercises than there is for opening a singing school or a riding school with prayer."

The chapter next to the last is entitled *ethics and theology*, and the last, *Christianity and evolution*. The author notices the disparagement of theology on ethical grounds, which is now so common, and remarks that the disparagement comes from a "comparison of values. It is a fact that a metaphysical should not be made more important than an ethical value. It is held that correct beliefs are of infinitely less consequence than correct conduct. Derogation of theology as proceeding from the ethical point of view is a very interesting illustration of moral evolution. It exhibits a phase of moral progress; one of the latest and best phases. \* \* \* I think that nearly all the improvements of theology are ethical interpretations" (p. 392). In this connection the author notices some of the ethical modifications of theology that have been made in recent times. These we can only name. The doctrine of God has been moralized. "The change has been from the conception of sovereignty to the conception of fatherhood." The Latin theology has given way to a more humane and more Christian theology. The opinion has been abandoned that "there is a kind of opposition among the attributes of God, as if one attribute had claims against another"—an opinion which is at the root of the vicarious punishment doctrine of the atonement. Another immoral conception of God, which has been abandoned "is that which represents Him as leaving vast multitudes of His children to perish without giving them the truth which can save them." "The doctrine of redemption through sacrifice remains, but it is no longer made to rest on an unethical philosophy." Under the title *Christianity and evolution* are discussed the following topics: Revelation, the idea of God, sin, the character of Jesus, immanence of the spirit, immortality, the evolution of religion, the person of Christ, miracles and resurrection. The discussion of these topics is intensely interesting, but we have no room to give particulars. We can only say of this volume as a whole that it is most valuable to the Christian minister and preacher, who above all things needs sound ethical knowledge in order to meet the intellectual and moral demands of this age.



**A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF ST. PETER AND ST. JUDE.** By the Rev. Charles Bigg, D.D., Rector of Fenny Compton, Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford. Pages 352. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1901. Price, \$2.25, net.

This volume belongs to the *International Critical Commentary Series*, now in course of publication by the Scribners. The general editors of this series are Drs. Charles A. Briggs, Samuel R. Driver, and Alfred Plummer, who are assisted by a large corps of English and American divines of eminence in Biblical scholarship. The series is intended to cover the whole Bible, and ten volumes have thus far been published. These are on *Deuteronomy*, by Dr. Driver, of Oxford; *Judges*, by Dr. Moore, of Andover; *Samuel*, by Dr. Smith, of Amherst; *Proverbs*, by Dr. Toy, of Harvard; *St. Mark*, by Dr. Gould, of Philadelphia; *St. Luke*, by Dr. Plummer, of Durham; *Romans*, by Dr. Sanday, of Oxford; *Ephesians* and *Colossians*, by Dr. Abbott, of Dublin; *Philippians* and *Philemon*, by Dr. Vincent, of New York, and the volume here under notice.

A good commentary on the Bible is an indispensable help to the theological student and the Christian minister; and one of the most frequent questions asked by them is, which of the many commentaries now claiming the favor of the theological public would be best adapted to their interests and wants. To this question we always reply that the best commentary, and the one most useful to the Biblical student now extant, is the *International Critical*. There are a number of qualities which combine to give this distinction to this series of works. In the first place, it is not the work of one man, but of many; and therefore gives the Biblical student the benefit of the best exegetical views of many independent scholars of international reputation, who are free from polemical and ecclesiastical bias. Secondly, it is not a translation, but an original work. Now there are translations of some excellent German commentaries, like those of Meyer, and Lange's *Biblework*. But the fact that they are translations is always a serious drawback to their usefulness. Of course, there are translations and translations; but in many cases it is only a man's knowledge of the original that enables him to understand the translation at all; and this seems to be especially true of commentaries. Any one who has ever tried to read, for instance, the translation of the commentary on the Epistles of Peter in Lange's *Biblework*, will turn with pleasure to a volume like this of Dr. Bigg on the same Epistles. In the third place, these commentaries are valuable because of their thorough critical study of the original texts of the Bible according to the most approved modern methods. There is nothing omitted that is valuable for the complete understanding of the text of the Bible, but there is no useless display of learning in the regions of philology and of the history of in-

terpretation. One who has been accustomed to pages after pages of useless trash in some other commentaries, will turn with great pleasure to the volumes of this series, in which he finds, stated in the clearest English, all in the way of criticism, philology, history, and archeology that could be of any use in the understanding of the sense of the sacred writers. And, finally, another consideration that commends these commentaries to the Biblical student is the fact that they exclude all directly practical and homiletical material. What the earnest student and conscientious preacher wants is not a commentary that will "make the work of sermonizing easy," but one that will help him to understand the meaning of the sacred text. "Practical commentaries" almost invariably make dull and uninteresting preachers, because no commentator can furnish material that will be easily applicable to any other time and place than that in which he himself lives.

Of course in a work produced by so many different writers, as are engaged on this commentary, all parts will not exhibit the same qualities. Some will be more critical, others more conservative; some more liberal and free, others more traditionally orthodox; some may emphasize one phase of the teaching of Sacred Scripture, and others another phase; though all may be equally worthy of consideration and study. Coming now to the particular volume at present under notice, we should say that, while it is able, critical, pains-taking, and generally judicious in its comments, it is nevertheless strongly conservative and cautious, so far as general results are concerned. Indeed, in this respect, many of the more advanced critical students of the Bible will probably not be entirely satisfied with it. Dr. Bigg seems to have made it a rule never to depart from any traditional view unless the evidence against it is absolutely overwhelming. He is constitutionally conservative; and sometimes when his exegetical study leads only to *probable* conclusions, he will afterwards, when he has occasion to refer to them, treat them as if they were absolute and undoubted. This conservative tendency, however, can be no ground of objection to a volume forming part of a series on which such scholars as Driver, Cheyne, Toy, and George A. Smith are employed. These will more than hold up the critical and liberal side of the enterprise; and the student will thus have the benefit of varying views, which he may compare and adjust according to his own satisfaction. Indeed, there is a positive benefit in such divergency of views as may appear in these commentaries, as it will compel the student to do some thinking on his own account and come to his own conclusions. A commentary is not intended to settle all questions for the student, but rather to help him to settle them for himself.

Like others of the series, the several commentaries contained in this volume are prefaced by full critical and historical intro-

ductions, discussing the authorship, occasion, time and place of composition, and original readers of the books to be interpreted. And in the case of the Epistles of Peter and Jude this involves no slight or easy task. In a case in which opinions are so widely divergent, it requires a good deal of courage on the part of the commentator to form or maintain any conclusions of his own. This may account, in part at least, for the fact that the author of this volume is generally content to abide by the traditional conclusions of the older commentators. In the introduction to the first Epistle of Peter, after a discussion of its vocabulary and doctrinal characteristics, we have an interesting comparison between the apostles Peter and Paul as bearing upon the question of authorship. Professor Bigg controverts the view of Harnack that the Epistle was written by a disciple of Paul somewhere between 83 and 93 A. D., and holds that it was written by none other than the Apostle Peter, though through an amanuensis, between 58 and 63 A. D.; and the place of composition was Rome, not Babylon. In like manner the authenticity of second Peter and of Jude is defended. It is admitted, of course, that there is a close relation, probably a relation of dependence, between these two Epistles; and the author of this commentary does not hesitate to assign the priority to Second Peter. As to the place and time of composition of this Epistle the commentator adopts the opinion of Zahn that it was written at Antioch between 60 and 63 A. D. Dr. Chase and many others assign to it a date between 150 and 175. As to the date of the Epistle of Jude our author seems to have no definite opinion, except that he decidedly rejects the opinion of Harnack, who places it between 150 and 180 A. D. To take such a position, in view of the present state of knowledge on the subject, requires a good deal of courage, and many careful students will, on this point, refuse to go with the commentator. The man who wrote "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," 1 Pet. 1: 3, could hardly have written about the righteousness of "our God and Saviour Jesus Christ," 2 Pet. 1: 1. In regard to this last passage the commentator holds, and we think correctly, that the "combination of the two substantives under one article is a very strong reason for regarding the two substantives as names of the same person"; and that the meaning of 2 Peter is to be determined by the language used in 2 Peter, and not by the language used in other parts of Scripture. That is doubtless good exegesis; but whether it is possible to hold the authenticity of 2 Peter in view of such a principle is another question. And so when in the Epistle of Jude we read of "the faith which was once for all delivered to the saints" (v. 3), which, the commentator says, means "a body of doctrine, dogmatic and practical, which is given to them by authority, and is fixed and unalterable," it is

difficult for us to believe that the writer, whose "tone is that of a bishop of the fourth century," actually lived and wrote not long after the middle of the first. We would be inclined, with Harnack and others, to bring him down at least to the middle of the second.

But while there are positions and statements in this commentary which, for the present at least, we cannot accept, we do not hesitate to say that it is after all, in our judgment, the most useful commentary on the difficult portions of Scripture with which it deals, of which we have any knowledge. There are plenty of hard passages in these Epistles; and these are generally handled with ability, discretion, and candor. The method is distinctly grammatical, historical, and psychological; and it is only in a few cases that the dogmatic interest is allowed to have a determinative influence in the exposition. In general, the observance of the right measure, and the presentation of the right material, in a direct and intelligible form, make this a model commentary for the student, who wants to get the true and original sense of this portion of Holy Scripture.

**THE ASCENT THROUGH CHRIST.** *A Study of the Doctrine of Redemption in the Light of the Theory of Evolution.* By E. Griffith-Jones, B.A. Pages xxxvi + 469. Edwin S. Gorham, Fourth Avenue and Twenty-Second Street, New York. 1901.

"This work," as we are told in the preface, "is not a treatise in Systematic Theology, nor yet an attempt to reconstruct the whole contents of the Christian Faith on an Evolutionary basis. It is as the subtitle suggests, a study of certain spiritual facts, which cluster around the mystery of Divine Redemption, viewed in the light of that great principle of Development which has taken possession of the mind of to-day, and which seems destined, in its broader aspects, permanently to affect human thought in all its departments." These facts are the *fall of man*, the *incarnation*, and the *resurrection*; and to the discussion of these subjects the bulk of this volume is devoted. Before the discussion of these subjects, however, is properly approached, there is an introductory book bearing the general title of *Man's Place in Evolution*. This is divided into three chapters, the first of which, under the title of *Some Modern Expansions*, treats of some of the causes which have led to the present wide adoption of evolutionary methods of thought. The second chapter discusses the nature of evolution. On this subject the author adopts Le Conte's definition: "Evolution is a continuous progressive change, according to certain laws, by means of resident forces." These resident forces, according to the author, include not only the vital energies of an evolving organism, but also the cherishing energies of the environment without it. Such a conception is by no means in-

consistent with theism. The point to which some would raise objection here is the assertion of continuity in the process of development. They are willing to accept evolution, if they may be allowed to accept "breaks" at certain points of the process. For instance, it is said that life cannot be derived from lifeless matter; to which our author would reply that the fact that a thing is impossible now, is no proof that it was always impossible. He acknowledges, however, that the origin of life can not be explained by any energies now known to be resident in matter, but says that the kingdom of life, like the kingdom of heaven, "comes not with observation." The process of evolution points to the idea of the constant immanence of divine energy in nature. The third chapter of the introductory book treats more particularly of the evolution of man; in which it is shown that, after the essential completion of the physical organism by natural selection, the operation of another law came into play in order to the continuation of the process of development along the mental and moral line, namely, the law of *rational selection*.

The general subject of the *first book* of the work before us is, "Evolution and the Fall." This is divided into seven chapters, the first two of which treat respectively of the Elohist and the Jehovist accounts of the creation in Genesis. The author, as will be seen, accepts the documentary theory of the composition of the Pentateuch, and admits that the literal interpretation of Genesis 1 is finally discredited, but claims that its inner spiritual message is more impressive than ever. The relation between the Bible and science, then, is, neither one of identity, nor of contradiction, nor a mixture, but of total independence. "We are convinced," he says, "that the true method of reading the first chapters of Genesis is to look to them for neither science nor history in the usual acceptance of these terms. These pages were surely written from an entirely different standpoint \* \* \* the writer, whoever he may be, is dealing in no sense with the scientific, but with the religious aspects of things"; to which we would add, however, that that writer knows no difference between religion and science, because he knows no science at all. The subjects of the remaining chapters of this book are, respectively, *the Biblical doctrine of sin; Anthropology and the fall; the relation between death and sin; the natural history of sin; and how a fallen race may be redeemed*. On these subjects we can only make a few random quotations. Adopting Leconte's statement that virtue is the goal of humanity, and that virtue can not be given, but must be self-acquired, the author adds, "Now if, with innocence as a possession, and virtue as a possibility, evil is voluntarily chosen, then instead of a moral evolution into virtue, there is a *fall* into guilt. From the standpoint of evolutionary ethics there is nothing irrational or even improbable in the notion of

a fall. The improbability would be that, considering the tremendous drag of the lower nature and the initial weakness of a new instinct, a creature just starting on a moral evolution should not fall into wrongdoing." The fall accordingly is only something analogous to what is known as *degeneration* in the lower orders of animated nature. On the relation between sin and death the author says (p. 171), "Biology has discovered what seem to be the place and function of physical death in the world, and these appear to be beneficent rather than otherwise, and to have been essential to the progressive pathway which life has followed from the beginning." Referring to the older explanation of the remains of animal life in the rocks, the author says, "It is no longer possible to hoodwink our intelligence by such subterfuges as theologians of a generation ago were obliged to invent in order to dovetail the new science to the old beliefs." Their explanation was that God *created* the fossiliferous rocks as they now exist. Physical pain and death, the author holds, are not the penalty of sin. Sin can be *hereditary* only in the sense that there is a hereditary tendency in human nature which solicits the will to sin. "Total depravity" does not mean that "human nature is entirely and without qualification evil, but that there is in it a taint, a bias towards evil, that lowers the tone of man's whole being, just as a vapor pervading the atmosphere contaminates the sunlight" (p. 196); and *depravity* is not *guilt* (p. 197).

The subject of the *second book* is "Evolution and the Incarnation." The first chapter discusses some modern difficulties in the way of accepting the doctrine of the incarnation. Among these we refer only to one, namely, the difficulty of accepting the miracle of the Virgin birth. "This belief, which has prevailed unbrokenly among Christian thinkers through the generations, constitutes so serious a break in the sequence of history, and in the vital series, that it is an insurmountable barrier in the path of many religious evolutionists to the acceptance of the fact" (p. 255). The author admits that this miracle is not necessary to the acceptance of the fact of the incarnation; and he admits also that there are inconsistencies in the records of the miracle in Matthew and Luke; still he holds to the historicity of the text and the reality of the miracle, explaining the physiological difficulty, which is the chief difficulty in the way of accepting the miracle, on the principle of what is known as *parthenogenesis* in the lower orders of nature. This will probably be considered a weak point in the armor of our author's reasoning. In the second chapter we have a treatment of the *purpose of the incarnation*. On this subject two views are possible, namely the *evolutionary* and the *soteriological*. The first assumes that the incarnation was necessary in order to bring the human race to its predetermined perfection, independently of the occurrence of sin; the



second, that it became necessary in order to remedy the defect of sin. Where an evolutionist must stand on this question, goes without saying. The *Mystery of the cross* forms the subject of the third chapter. Here we are told that the old juridical theories of the atonement no longer satisfy the thinking of the modern Christian mind; and then, while the subject is acknowledged to be a difficult one, some thoughts are offered towards a solution of the problem. It is acknowledged now that suffering is not an evil, but a benevolent arrangement in the economy of life. The weak suffer for the benefit of the strong, the strong for the weak, and the good for the bad. These are facts which, if they do not solve all difficulties, show at least that there is no contradiction between the idea of atonement by vicarious sacrifice and the laws of progress in the development of life universally. The subject of the fourth chapter is *The Ideal Man*. Christ is the ideal man, who serves both as the *type* and the *power* whereby the spiritual evolution of mankind may be carried to perfection. A discussion of the question, why the realization of the spiritual ideal could not come at the beginning, nor at the close, of history, but in the middle of its course closes this chapter.

The subject of the third book is, "Evolution and the Resurrection." This contains five chapters, with the following headings, respectively: *The risen Christ; the resurrection a new evolutionary departure; the man that is to be; behind the veil; and some final problems.* The resurrection of Christ is an *objective fact*; it gives the world a living, present Christ, capable of infusing into His followers His own grace, and beauty, and holiness by direct contact and the breath of spirit on spirit. The resurrection of Christ served as a release of spiritual forces which were until then bound up with the person of Christ, but are now free to exert their power for the extension of the incarnation—the indwelling of God in man universally. In this sense it was a new departure in the process of evolution. And this process is continued on earth through means of the church. In the chapter on *the man that is to be* we have a forecast of man's future as it will be in this world, when the Christian principle shall have triumphed, and the Christian idea shall have been introduced into the universal life of men; and in the chapter on *Behind the Veil* we have a glimpse of man's condition and destiny after death. And the first problem discussed here is: Does death end probation? The old answer of that question is well known. But it is accepted no longer by many thinkers. "They feel the problem with a new emphasis, and the old solution weighs with the gloom of a nightmare on their hearts." Our author claims that neither the Bible nor reason is responsible for the old conclusion, and that without any doubt a great part of mankind will have their real probation only after this life. The question of the final salvation of all



men, however, is not so easy of solution. Undoubtedly punishment will last as long as sin lasts; and character *seems* to have a tendency to become fixed. But on the other hand freedom must forever continue to be an attribute of the human soul. And as long as freedom lasts, so long must last the possibility of repentance. It seems, then, that nothing positive can be said on the subject. And besides this, there are still some other residual difficulties; for instance, why has the line of revealed truth been so narrow, and what is the relation between Christianity and ethnic faith? These are discussed in the last chapter of this book.

The above is but a very brief and a very imperfect outline of the contents of this book. The reader must peruse the book for himself in order to be able to judge of its merits; and no intelligent reader having once taken it up, will be willing to lay it down until he has finished it. It is not hard reading; for the style is always perspicuous, and the thought interesting. The author is one who has done much thinking on the vital problems which confront the thought of the present age. Extremists on either side will not accept it. Theological obscurantists and scientific dogmatists will reject it. The former will regard it as being too liberal, the latter as too conservative. But many earnest thinkers, who can not give up the Christian faith, and yet no longer accept its traditional dogmas, will hail it as a valuable help in their difficulties.

CHRISTIAN BAPTISM. By James Boorman Davenport, Hartford, Conn. Pages 127. David Hobbs and Company. Candleriggs, Glasgow. 1901.

Those who believe in Christianity as a formal mechanical system to be operated by outward mechanical means, will hardly be able to find anything better in English literature to support their faith than this little volume. The following table of contents will show its scope: *Baptism of John; Our Lord's Baptism; Water in Baptism; Immersion; Baptism for Remission of Sins and Eternal Life; Baptism and the Incarnation; Requirements for Baptism; Can an Infant Have Faith; Baptism the Door of the Church.*

The author's theory, briefly, is as follows: The incarnation of the second person of the Trinity in the person of Jesus is the union of divinity and humanity, whereby the latter is freed from sin, guilt and corruption, and advanced to the glorious perfection of God, in consequence of the historical life of Christ on earth; and the new condition of human nature thus realized in the person of Christ is communicated to men in baptism, though it needs development and direction after it has been thus communicated. That we do not misrepresent the author will appear from the following quotation from p. 80: "In baptism not only does a man obtain remission of sins through the blood of Christ, but

he also obtains promotion and *ability* to know and to do; for baptism is based upon the Incarnation of the Son of God. Manhood united to Divinity in one Person, is the new condition of human nature in the Second Adam, and we want a part or share in that new condition. When this thought breaks in upon the mind, it almost staggers at the conception of that into which baptism introduces a man." In order to the attainment of this tremendous gift of divine life, and immortality, and glory, through baptism, however, there are certain requirements to be fulfilled. First among these is *faith*, not the faith of parents or sponsors, but the faith of the subject to be baptized. In order that this requirement may be met by *infants*, infants must be capable of faith; and that infants are capable of faith is easily shown from such passages of Scripture as Ps. 22: 9, "Thou didst make me hope when I was upon my mother's breast," and Luke 1: 44, "As soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded in my ears the babe leaped in my womb for joy." But another requirement in order to being deified through baptism is that it be performed by the Church. Sects can not perform such great service to sinners. That is something that will, of course, cause the hearts of sectarians to sink within them. The Church, not sects, is the body of Christ. She is related to Christ as woman is to man. On p. 112 our author says: "We may believe that the present subordinate position of woman was Divinely arranged in the creation for this very purpose—to make men understand the relationship of the Church to Christ. This is the great work in God's plan which woman is now doing." There is not in that much gallantry to woman. But then, this is not a book of sentiment or poetry. It deals only with the hardest dogmas in the hardest and coolest way.

What the author's church relations are can easily be guessed from the contents of his book. He is not a Baptist, for he holds to infant baptism, and rejects the necessity of immersion. Neither could he be a Methodist, Congregationalist, or Presbyterian, for these are *Protestant*. We would *guess* that he is an *Anglo-Catholic*, and believe that, if he were consistent, he would be a *Roman Catholic*. The theory of baptism which he maintains is consonant with the theory of a "divine fluid being communicated in the Church through episcopal hands"; but this theory, and those who hold it, are properly at home only in Roman Catholicism. To all who hold this theory and desire to know more about it, and to all who do not hold it but would like to know what it is, we commend this little book.

THE LIFE EVERLASTING. By John Fiske. Pages 87. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. Boston and New York. 1901.

This little volume consists of an address delivered by its distinguished author on the evening of Dec. 19, 1900, at Cambridge,

Mass., at the request of Harvard University, in accordance with the terms of the Ingersoll lectureship. It is published now as it was first delivered, without any changes or additions; and it is one of the last productions of the author of the *Cosmic Philosophy*, in line with his later works, like the *Destiny of Man viewed in the light of his Origin*, *The Idea of God as Affected by Modern Knowledge*, and *Through Nature to God*. Those who have read these later works of Mr. Fiske will require no words of commendation of this volume on the *Life Everlasting*, which so fitly closes the list of his publications. And all will be anxious to know what so great a thinker may have to say on so difficult and yet ever interesting a subject.

Without any signs of division in the printed volume, the address may naturally be divided into two parts, the first treating of the origin of the idea of immortality, and the second of the validity of this idea. Mr. Fiske accepts the account of the origin of the idea of immortality generally given by evolutionists like Mr. Spencer. This idea was not first communicated to men by a miraculous revelation. It was evolved spontaneously by the human mind; and dreams and similar phenomena may have had much to do with its evolution. But this fact does not weaken but rather strengthen the validity of this idea. The author here recurs to a thought brought out in his earlier publications, to the effect that, as psychical evolution can take place only under the influence of an external environment, the very presence of an idea in the mind, like that of light or sound, is a proof of an objective reality corresponding to it. This is true also of the ideas of God, of morality, and of immortality. It is admitted, of course, that the idea of immortality can not be mathematically demonstrated to be a valid idea; but neither can the opposite be demonstrated. The usual argument derived from the present connection between the soul and the body, and from the fact that at present consciousness is conditioned by this connection, is thus disposed of by Mr. Fiske: "To prove the transformation of motion into feeling or of feeling into motion is in the very nature of things impossible. \* \* \* The natural history of the mass of activities that are perpetually being concentrated within our bodies, to be presently once more disintegrated and diffused, shows us a closed circle which is entirely physical, and in which one segment belongs to the nervous system. As for our conscious life, that forms no part of the closed circle but stands entirely outside of it, concentric with the segment which belongs to the nervous system." Hence the dissolution of the nervous system by no means necessarily implies the dissolution of consciousness, which is the function of a subject by no means identical with the brain. But there remain some questions. Supposing that animals are not immortal, how then, on the theory of evolution, could "im-

mortal man have been produced through heredity from an ephemeral brute"? "The most proper answer," the author says, "is a frank confession of ignorance." He goes on nevertheless to illustrate by several analogies how immortality may be supposed to burst out of mortality by an apparent leap after the process of evolution has led up to a certain stage of perfection. We can only add, in conclusion, that the value of this book is out of all proportion to its size. In these days of much book-making it is a real pleasure to come across a volume occasionally in which there is nothing superfluous, and in which every line counts for something.

**THE CHORAL SERVICE BOOK, Containing the Authentic Plain Song Intonations and Responses for the Order of Morning Service, the Orders of Matins and Vespers, the Litany and the Suffrages of the Common Service, for the use of Evangelical Lutheran Congregations, with Accompanying Harmonies for Organ. Edited by Harry G. Archer, and the Rev. Luther D. Reed. General Council Publication Board, Philadelphia, Pa. 1901.**

As stated on the title page, the book of worship here noticed is intended for the use of the Lutheran Church. It may, however, be studied with profit by ministers and members of other churches also. It provides a choral service for all occasions of public worship. In a preface of fifty pages the principles of the work are explained and defended. The position is taken that song is the only proper form of rendering any act of public worship. This applies to the prayers and reading of scriptures as well as to hymns and responses. Prayers and Scriptures should be intoned by the minister, and the responses should be sung by the congregation or choir. For this purpose the Gregorian chant is best adapted. On this principle the editors of this book have provided for the Lutheran Church an order of worship the like of which we presume it has never had before. In fact, so far as form is concerned, it is a complete return to the practice of the pre-Reformation Church. The language is English and the doctrines are Lutheran, otherwise the book is Catholic. It is well known, of course, that Luther was conservative in his treatment of the Catholic order of worship. He accepted much more of the old order than did some of the other Reformers. But we think that this book goes a considerable distance beyond Luther. In its own order, however, the book, as far as we can judge, is most admirable. We do not believe either that the return to pre-Reformation principles, and the reintroduction of pre-Reformation elements into Protestant worship is altogether an illegitimate procedure. This applies especially to the matter of the Gregorian music. In a common service, that is, a service in which minister and people truly unite, song, musical sound, affords the most appropriate form in which the people can clothe their part. Musical

sound, moreover, is the best means for the excitement and expression of feeling; and for this reason it is appropriate that the responses of the people should be sung instead of spoken. But does this apply also to the reading of scripture and the repetition of prayers? And if so, why not also to the sermon? Here we think there may be reason for doubt. And in any case we do not believe that there are many Protestant congregations in which such a service as that contained in this book could be executed. We doubt whether even many Lutheran congregations would now heartily take such an order of service to their bosom. But that is no reflection upon its excellence in itself considered. And we cordially commend this book to all in our own church, whether ministers or laymen, who are interested in the subject of worship. The study of it could not be otherwise than beneficial. It would have been a great blessing to the church if all who have taken in hand to make either liturgies or hymn-books, had possessed the knowledge to be obtained from the study of such a work as this.

THE FIRST BOOK OF MOSES, Called GENESIS. Edited by A. H. Sayce, D.D., LL.D. Pages xxii + 170. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 1901. Price 40 cents, net.

This is the first volume of the *Temple Bible*, which the J. B. Lippincott Company proposes to publish in conjunction with Messrs. J. M. Dent & Co., London. Those who are acquainted with the *Temple Shakespeare* and the *Temple Classics* will have some idea of the *form* which the publication will take. The whole Bible will be published in twenty-four volumes, of which seventeen will be devoted to the Old Testament and seven to the New. The price per volume will be 40 cents for limp cloth binding, and 60 cents for paste grain roan. Each volume will be under the care of a separate editor, who will be a scholar who has made special study of the book or books assigned him. All the editors in the Old Testament are from England, and among them are such men as Professors Sayce, Kennedy, Robertson, and the veteran Davidson. Two of those in the New Testament are from the United States, Professor Vincent, of New York, and Professor Warfield, of Princeton. Each volume will contain an introduction dealing with the authorship, history, characteristics, scope and style of the books, and notes elucidating geographical, ethnological, and textual difficulties. The text adopted will be that of the Authorized Version, but serious mistranslations will be corrected in the Notes. But nothing will appear approximating to dogmatic teaching, or to the expression of sectarian or controversial opinions. The publishers say, in their prospectus, that "their desire has been to present the greatest monument of our literature—the English Bible—to the public, free from doctrinal

bias or denominational bent; in other words, as literature pure and simple."

The editor of the volume now before us is Dr. A. H. Sayce, Professor of Assyriology in the University of Oxford. The introduction, which is from his pen, fills twenty-two pages, and furnishes, in compact and yet intelligible form, such information as the intelligent Bible reader needs in order to understand the Book of Genesis. Thirteen pages of Notes, tables of Hebrew weights and measures used in Genesis, several pages of synchronism of ancient history, maps of the world as known in the time of Genesis, and a list of Biblical references in English literature, complete the volume. Professor Sayce is known as an archeologist and writer on higher criticism. Though himself a higher critic, he is known as a decided opponent to such critics as Wellhausen, Driver, Cheyne, Smith, etc. In reference to Genesis he differs from other critics especially in regard to the authorship and date of composition. As indicated on the title page, he holds that Genesis was written by Moses, as also the other books of the Pentateuch, in the age of the exodus. His main proofs are that the books of the Pentateuch present a definite plan, which has been worked out consistently from beginning to end, and which implies unity of authorship; secondly, that the art of writing was well known in the time of Moses, and that Moses was a learned man, who undoubtedly could write; and thirdly, that the geography of the exodus is that of the papyri of Rameses II., of the Nineteenth Egyptian Dynasty. As to the latter point, the critics would probably reply that the geographical horizon of Gen. 10 is that of Ezekiel, which would seem to imply that Genesis and Ezekiel must have been written nearly about the same time. And as for the unity of plan, that, the critics would say, is due to the redactor or redactors. And the fact that Moses could write, if it be a fact, does not prove that he *did write* so large a work as the Pentateuch. Prof. Sayce, however, is a critic, too, in his own way, and admits that older documents are used in Genesis. There are in this book both Babylonian and Egyptian sources. To the former belongs the account of creation and the story of the flood, the latter being almost identical with the Chaldean flood story as embodied in the eleventh book of the Epic of Gilgames. The story of Joseph, on the other hand, bears a strong likeness to the Egyptian "Tale of the Two Brothers," a novel written in the time of Seti II., after the exodus. As to the design of Genesis, the editor says that it "is to exemplify the fact of divine selection, first of all in the history of civilized mankind as a whole, and then in that of a particular branch of the Semitic family, and the object of the divine selection is to make known God's revelation of Himself as the one and only God, who has created the world, and beside whom no other God exists." We



commend this volume, and those which are to follow, to the attention of all earnest students of the Bible, who want to study it as literature, and can not command the larger critical works and commentaries.

**A SUPPLEMENTAL CATECHETICAL TREATISE.** For use by Pastors, Parents and Sunday-school Teachers in the Preparation of the Youth of the Reformed Church for Confirmation and the Holy Communion. And **HANDBOOK OF THE HEIDELBERG LEAGUE**, Containing its Constitution and By-Laws. By Rev. Franklin F. Bahner, A.M., D.D. Pages 42. Publication Board of the Reformed Church, 1306 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 1901.

The contents and purpose of this booklet are well defined on the title page. It is a practical work by a Reformed pastor for the use and benefit of Reformed pastors and people. And the work itself is Reformed in thought and sentiment. The following are the topics treated in the catechetical part of the work: *Infant Church Membership; The Catechumen; Confirmation; The Holy Sacrament in General; Holy Baptism in Particular; The Holy Communion in Particular; The Confirmed Members of the Church; Our Ecclesiastical Polity; Church Worship; The Sacred Days and Seasons of the Church Year.* The lessons are appropriately interspersed with hymns and prayers, the latter being Collects taken from the *Directory of Worship*. In this connection we may give the author's answer to the question: "What external order of service is calculated most fittingly to express a true spirit of devotion?" Ans. Those elevated, chaste, and ornate forms, hallowed through usage by the saints of all ages, which the Church has provided for her congregations, and by means of which her worship can be most effectually rendered to God not only 'in spirit and in truth,' but also, 'in the beauty of holiness.'" The latter part of the booklet gives the constitution and some other literature of the Heidelberg League. It is our full conviction that no pastor can do better than to put this little treatise into the hands of his catchumens to be studied along with the Heidelberg Catechism. It will tend to make earnest and intelligent church members.